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Tiivistelmä – Abstract 
 
This pro gradu thesis analyses the dimensions of historical representation in Kim Stanley Robinson’s Galileo’s Dream (2009). Its aim is to 
specify how historical content in the novel is utilized for fictional purposes, and furthermore to relate the fictional history of Galileo 
Galilei to historiographical knowledge. Galileo’s Dream depicts Galileo Galilei’s scientific work, focusing on his astronomical discoveries, 
but the novel is also overtly counterfactual and presents a Galileo that dreams of a future utopian society while being manipulated by a 
futuristic agent. The novel discusses history explicitly by exploring the possibility of changing the past, and this overt thematisation of 
history directs the reader’s attention to historical reference and understanding in general. The thesis also identifies the historical content 
of the novel, its reinterpretation of the past and its previous representations as history. 
 
The thesis first relates definitions and theory concerning the difference between past realities and their textual representations. The 
thesis describes the postmodern cultural and theoretical context of the novel and contemporary philosophies of history to the extent 
that they direct the interpretation of the representation of history in fiction in general, and in the analysis of Galileo’s Dream in particular. 
The theory clarifies ways of differentiating factual references to the past and the fictional utilization of that reference, history. Chapter 
3.2 in particular introduces the questions raised about the possibility of textual presentation to refer to any non-textual reality, as well as 
a past that is distant from the current postulated cultural situation of postmodernity. 
 
The analysis of Galileo’s Dream is divided into two parts. Chapter 4.1 discusses the implicit historical content of the novel, i.e., its 
utilization of historical reference and narrative patterns, whereas chapter 4.2 discusses history as it is explicitly discussed by the 
characters of the novel. The first part approaches the historical significance of depicting a fictional Galileo, and the narrative means of 
doing so, namely creating a narrative in a modern context and by using a modern voice. The chapter also questions the representation of 
Galileo Galilei in terms of the historical authenticity or historicity of the novel. Lastly, the first part specifies the idiosyncratic structural 
elements of Galileo’s Dream, which include a shifting narrative presence and intertextual references. The second part, chapter 4.2, 
discusses the overt historical narratives and metanarratives presented in the novel. It compares the metanarratives presented and relate 
them to the fictional history that is Galileo’s Dream itself. Whereas the metanarratives explicitly comment on the history of Galileo, the 
narrative of Galileo’s Dream comments on the historical narratives themselves and the possibility of valid narrative representation of the 
past. The analysis concludes by identifying the historical content of the novel itself, as if it were history, namely its fictional 
reinterpretation of Galileo Galilei’s significance and context. 
 
The thesis argues that Galileo’s Dream represents history as already-read, in that the figure of Galileo always evokes previous conceptions 
of his role and nature, as well as entire symbolical explanations and metanarratives of history. By doing so, the novel shows how history 
is to be approached and understood – with the awareness that preconceptions and metanarratives form large parts of the historical 
content of any given representation. The implicit historical content of Galileo’s Dream and its narrative structure moreover represent 
history as a discursive construct: it is influenced as a text by conflicting interests, yet retains a significance and relevance for a modern 
audience, and should nevertheless be approached with objectivity as a goal. History is also represented as an affective cause for action in 
the present. It is depicted as a general imperative to create a better future. The novel presents a rediscovery of the domestic context of 
Galileo and the way metanarratives simplify complex human affects. By narrating Galileo’s eventful life, the novel seeks to dramatize a 
human being, not a symbol of rational modernity or scientific martyrdom. It is not historiography, but it presents a historical lesson 
nonetheless. 
 
The conclusion comments on the themes and topics of the novel and the attempt to find representative idiosyncracies in the narrative. It 
also presents avenues for further research in the topic. 
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Tiivistelmä – Abstract 
 
Tutkielmassa analysoidaan historian representaatiota Kim Stanley Robinsonin romaanissa Galileo’s Dream (2009). Tutkielman 
tarkoituksena on eritellä kuinka historiaa käsitellään romaanissa fiktion tarkoituksiin ja kuinka fiktiivinen kertomus Galileo Galilein 
elämästä vertautuu historiantutkimuksen antamaan tietoon. Galileo’s Dream kuvaa Galileo Galilein tieteellistä työtä, etenkin tämän 
tähtitieteellisiä havaintoja, mutta teos esittää myös tieteiskirjallisuuden keinoin vaihtoehtohistorian, jossa Galileo uneksii tulevaisuuden 
utopiasta ja jossa häntä manipuloidaan historian ohjaamiseksi. Teos käsittelee historiaa eksplisiittisesti etenkin kuvaamalla menneisyyden 
muuttamiseen tähtääviä juonia. Tämä historian tematisoiminen herättää teosta tulkittaessa kysymyksiä historian referentiaalisuudesta ja 
tulkinnasta. Tutkielma osoittaa myös teoksen oman historiallisen asiasisällön, sen tarjoaman uudelleentulkinnan kuvaamastaan 
menneisyydestä ja tuon menneisyyden aiemmasta historiallisesta kuvauksesta. 
 
Teoriaosiossa määritellään aluksi tutkielmassa käytetyt avainkäsitteet ja käsitellään menneisyyden ja sen tekstimuotoisen kuvauksen, 
historian, eroa määrittävää teoriaa. Teoriaosuudessa eritellään teoksen postmodernia syntykontekstia, ajankohdan kulttuurista taustaa ja 
kulttuuriteoriaa, sekä historianfilosofiaa siinä määrin kuin nämä ohjaavat fiktion keinoin tapahtuvan historian representaation ja Galileo’s 
Dream -teoksen tulkintaa. Teoriaosio selventää fiktion ja tietokirjallisuuden viittaussuhteiden eroja suhteessa menneisyyteen ja sen 
aiempaan historialliseen kuvaukseen. Tekstin mahdollisuuksista viitata (postmodernista) nykyhetkestä irralliseen menneisyyteen tai 
kielenulkoiseen todellisuuteen ylipäänsä on esitetty epäilyjä. Myös näitä kysymyksiä käsitellään teoriaosiossa. 
 
Galileo’s Dream -teoksen analyysi on jaettu kahteen osaan: ensimmäisessä osiossa analysoidaan teoksen implisiittistä historiankuvausta, 
toisin sanoen sen viittauksia historiaan sekä sen kerronnan muotoja; toinen osio käsittelee teoksen eksplisiittistä historian käsitteen ja 
merkityksen pohdintaa. Ensimmäisessä osassa eritellään fiktiivisen Galileon historiallisia merkityssuhteita ja kerronnallisia keinoja, joilla 
fiktio luodaan, etenkin nykyaikaisessa kontekstissa. Osiossa kyseenalaistetaan myös Galileo Galilein kuvauksen historiallinen autenttisuus 
ja teoksen historiankuvauksen mahdollisuus. Osiossa eritellään ja analysoidaan lopuksi teoksen kerronnallisia ominaispiirteitä, joista 
merkittävimpiä ovat kertojan häilyvä läsnäolo omassa kertomuksessaan sekä teoksen runsaat intertekstuaaliset viittaukset. Toinen osio 
käsittelee teoksessa suoraan esitettäviä historian kertomuksia ja metakertomuksia. Hahmojen esittämiä metakertomuksia vertaillaan 
keskenään ja suhteessa Galileo’s Dreamiin historian kertomuksena itsessään. Siinä missä metakertomukset avoimesti kommentoivat 
Galileon historiaa, teos itsessään kommentoi historian kertomuksia ja ennen kaikkea mahdollisuutta representoida menneisyyttä 
kertomuksen keinoin. Analyysin lopussa määritellään lisäksi teoksen tarjoaman historiankirjoituksenomaisen sisältö, sen fiktiivinen 
uudelleentulkinta Galileo Galilein merkityksestä ja tämän kontekstista. 
 
Tutkielman keskeinen argumentti on, että Galileo’s Dream esittää historian ikään kuin aina valmiiksi luettuna, mikä tarkoittaa että Galileo 
hahmona viittaa aina tämän edellisiin representaatioihin. Tämä herättää mielikuvia Galileon roolista ja luonteesta ja tuo esille kokonaisia 
metakertomuksia ja symbolirakenteita, jotka selittävät historiaa prosessina. Näin ollen teos ikään kuin ohjeistaa lukijaa lähestymään ja 
ymmärtämään historiaa oikein – siinä tiedossa, että ennakkokäsitykset ja metakertomukset muodostavat suuren osan kunkin 
representaation historiallisesta sisällöstä ja yksilöllisestä tulkinnasta. Teoksen implisiittinen sisältö ja sen kerronnan rakenne 
representoivat historian diskursiivisena luomuksena. Historia näyttäytyy siis tekstinä, jonka viestiin vaikuttavat ristiriitaiset intressit, mutta 
joka on yhä merkityksellinen ja relevantti nykyaikaiselle yleisölle, ja jota pitäisi kaikesta huolimatta pyrkiä kuvaamaan mahdollisimman 
objektiivisesti ja luotettavasti. Historia on teoksessa affektiivinen, motivoiden toimintaan nykyhetkessä. Se toimii teoksessa yleisenä 
yllykkeenä paremman tulevaisuuden luomiselle. Galileo’s Dream myös kuvaa eräänlaisen perhepiirin merkityksen löytämisen Galileon 
elämästä ja kontekstista, mikä on teoksessa osoitus metakertomusten ihmistoimintaa yksinkertaistavasta luonteesta. Teoksen kuvaus 
Galileon vaiheikkaasta elämästä esittää ihmisyksilön, joka ei taivu liikaa pelkistämättä rationaalisen moderniteetin tai tieteen 
marttyyriroolin symboliksi. Teos ei ole historiankirjoitusta, mutta se sisältää historiallisia opetuksia. 
 
Yhteenvedossa kommentoidaan teoksen aiheita ja teemoja ja tapaa, jolla teoksen ominaispiirteitä on tulkittu. Yhteenveto esittää myös 
aiheita ja suuntia mahdollisille jatkotutkimuksille. 
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1. Introduction
1.1 Aims and Structure
The heyday of the multidisciplinary theory describing postmodernism as a (mainly western) cultural 
and  societal  phenomenon  has  long  since  passed.  For  many  critics  and  theorists  it  had  –  and 
continues to exhibit – its own, symptomatic excesses that have a left a bitter aftertaste of overly 
confident,  qualitative  philosophical  and  literary  analysis.  The  problematic  motivating  and 
underlying these analyses has not gone away, however. Textual representations of reality continue to 
conflict with each other in ways that remind of many questions evoked by postmodernists. Namely, 
on an individual level,  (specific)  texts present  mutually incommensurable truths despite sharing 
outwardly identical forms and strategies signalling objectivity.
The question of objective truth regarding the narratives of causes and effects as well as history 
are surprisingly – and regrettably – topical. The principal political crises of the day in Europe, for 
example,  are  replete  with  conflicting  explanations  of  their  own causes  and  possible  solutions. 
Political and economic theory seems to be incapable of reaching a shared truth on any practical 
level,  and  history  is  (re)interpreted  for  example  according  to  imperialist,  communitarian,  and 
separatist aspirations. This is not to say that the truth is no longer a valid goal, or that there are no 
means of reaching at the very least workable relative assessments that yield just outcomes. On the 
contrary,  it  suggests  that  a  good  understanding  of  narrative  forms  and  truths  continues  to  be 
important.
The aim of this thesis is to analyse the representation of history in Kim Stanley Robinson’s 
novel Galileo’s Dream (2009). My research problem arises from the way in which the novel depicts 
a prototypical, ‘great’ historical figure, Galileo Galileo, by way of various kinds of juxtaposition: 
firstly, the fictional narrative of Galileo is juxtaposed with (fictional) historiographical records of 
his life; secondly, the historical world is depicted in a realist fashion, yet it appears along a partly 
utopian  future  society,  which  makes  (parts  of)  the  narrative  overt  science  fiction;  and  thirdly, 
coherent narratives (concerning history in particular) are challenged and juxtaposed with alternative 
interpretations throughout the narrative. All these issues evoke discussions concerning the nature of 
history and its role in fictional narratives.
My analysis relates the narrative form of Galileo’s Dream (henceforth abbreviated GD) to the 
conventions of historiography, specifically by focusing on the formal peculiarities of GD, such as its 
subjective narrative voice and its use of intertexts. I will determine the historiographical content of 
GD,  i.e.,  the  novel’s  interpretation  or  assessment  of  the  factual  history of  Galileo Galilei,  and 
analyse the ways in which the plurality of historical narratives undermines and substantiates this 
content. I also discuss the possibilities of the historical content of  GD of representing reality, its 
anachronisms and fictional liberties, and the relation of that content to reality and historiographical 
truths.
The explicit historical themes in K.S. Robinson’s novel underline modern conceptions of the 
nature of historical  narratives and historical  knowledge, and in many ways it  exemplifies what 
Linda  Hutcheon terms in  The  Poetics  of  Postmodernism (1988)  as  historiographic  metafiction. 
However,  a  central  critique  of  the  constructivist  understanding  of  human  knowledge  and  the 
narrative turn in history, both of which were popular parts of postmodern theory in its prime and 
which  I  will  introduce  in  the  theory  sections,  is  that  their  premises  already  determine  the 
conclusions, and this critique applies also to historiographic metafiction as described by Hutcheon. I 
will therefore concentrate on relating the historical themes of GD to their functions, for example the 
content of this specific historical narrative and the ethical dimensions it evokes in the narrative of 
the  novel.  This  thesis  will  show  that  GD comments  on  history  as  an  abstract  construct  by 
juxtaposing historical narratives with conflicting metanarratives, counterfactual present moments, 
and anachronistic intertexts and paratexts,  specifically in  order to demonstrate  the relevance of 
history to a contemporary modern audience.
I will progress by presenting theoretical summaries of the relevant terms and concepts that are 
connected to history: these include the past, history, the contemporary (postmodern) context, as well 
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as  the  notion  of  counterfactuality  and  the  relation  of  fiction  to  historiography  and  historical 
knowledge or understanding. This theoretical background yields ways of approaching the text in 
question,  K.S.  Robinson’s  novel,  more  rigorously  and  systematically.  To  answer  such  general 
questions as how history is represented in the novel and to what purpose, it is valuable to inspect 
past debates on the form and basis of historical narratives as well as the relation of fiction to history 
and its object, the past.
In the following subsection I will briefly elucidate the background of the novel and its author 
Kim Stanley Robinson. I will also relate the author and the works to prior research that has been 
done on them. The following two main chapters present the theoretical background of my analysis. 
In 2.1 and 2.2 I define the central concepts of my thesis and relate the shifts that have occurred in 
the understanding of the concept of history in general. In 2.3 and 2.4 I discuss the way in which 
history exists in the context of fiction and how it relates to the external world, especially following 
the postmodern problematisation of authenticity and objectivity.  In chapter 3, I turn to fictional 
representations of history and the possibilities of attaining historical understanding through fiction, 
especially  formally  postmodern  texts.  Chapters  3.3  and  3.4  present  the  specific  cases  of 
counterfactual phenomena and the existence of historical characters in fiction, and the methodology 
of  identifying  the  historical  possibilities  of  structures  of  knowledge  and  discursive  constructs, 
respectively.
Chapter  4  presents  my  analysis  of  GD.  It  is  divided  into  two  parts,  which  discuss  the 
representation of history in the novel firstly as a part of the structure of the novel and its formal 
patterns, i.e., implicitly, and secondly as the explicit content of the novel, namely as narratives of 
history told by the characters of GD. In the first part I discuss different elements of the discourse of 
the fiction, for example its narrative forms, symbolical content and its implicitly referential content, 
and the novel’s original utilisation of intertextuality. The second part addresses the metanarratives 
depicted in the novel, specifies and separates them, and finally discusses what I argue to be its 
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historiographical content – its reinterpretation of Galileo Galilei’s history, and the ways it comments 
on the history in question.
1.2 Background Information and Context
Kim Stanley Robinson (b. 1952) is an American writer of mainly science fiction works. He has a 
background in the humanities, having completed his Ph.D. on the novels of Philip K. Dick in 1982 
after undergraduate studies in literature and English.1 His works include eighteen novels, which 
have won him several major science fiction awards. His fiction discusses such themes and topics as 
history, alternate history, utopia, science and scientists, human evolution (into society), and political 
theory. His Orange County novels (1984–1990) are a trilogy of works imagining three different 
utopian and dystopian futures for California. He is best known for his Mars trilogy, comprising Red 
Mars (1992), Green Mars (1993), and Blue Mars (1996), which depict the colonisation of Mars in 
the twenty-first century. The works speculate as much about the ecology and engineering aspects of 
human presence on Mars as the political ramifications and even utopian possibilities engendered by 
the colonisation.  His ‘Science in the Capital’ trilogy (2004–2007) focuses on the pragmatics of 
science and its  role  in  government  in  the context  of  climate change.  Although the novels  that 
directly concern history are  The Years of Rice and Salt (2002) and Galileo’s Dream (2009), it is 
present  as  a  topic  in  most  of  his  novels.  K.S.  Robinson  consistently  discusses  several  topics 
recurrent in his works in all of his novels.
Robinson is critically recognised as a skilful, literary writer. For example, in The History of  
Science Fiction (2005), Adam Roberts states that despite the difficulty (if not futility) of predicting 
future literary histories,  Robinson “not only deserves but seems assured of a  major reputation” 
(History 320).   In  2012,  the  journal  Configurations devoted  a  special  double-issue  on  K.S. 
Robinson’s work. The writers of its introduction point to the recurrent themes of his work, stating 
that Robinson “epitomizes” science fictional investigation of the workings of science, and that his 
work “is, in essence, a laboratory for political theory” (Yaszek & Davis 3, 4). Critical interest on 
1 His doctoral advisor at the University of California was Fredric Jameson.
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K.S. Robinson has focused on the three trilogies and, specifically, on the themes most evident in 
them: utopia and history, ecology and environmentalism, science, and politics. Yet Galileo’s Dream 
has not been studied in much detail; only Sherryl Vint’s article in the Configurations special issue 
focuses solely on the novel, and it explores GD as “an example of science fiction as science studies” 
(Vint 29).
Where this thesis therefore breaks new ground is in its examination of a less studied work by 
an arguably significant contemporary author. My thesis also studies a theme – history – that has not 
been investigated in the work in question, although it has been examined with reference to other 
works, especially the Orange County novels. Robinson has openly stated his interest in the concept 
of history and its close connection to his mode of writing, namely science fiction, in interviews. For 
example, in 2012 he stated that “it is always historical work to understand the present, and any 
thinking about the future is always a kind of science fiction” (Davis & Yazsek 189). Already in 
1984, in the introduction to his revised thesis, The Novels of Philip K. Dick, he establishes what is to 
become an ever-present theme in his own fiction, arguing that
we are in need of a literature able to mediate on the historical process, so that we can, in 
these thought experiments, contemplate where our history might lead us. Science fiction is 
this literature of historical meditation, and as such it can be a powerful and important tool 
of human thought. (Robinson, The Novels xii)
It is evident in these quotations that Robinson considers his work to be highly relevant for the 
present, ruling out the possibility of disregarding his intentions as fantastic escapism.
Furthermore, the merits of Robinson’s treatment of historical nuances in his works have been 
critically praised. For example, in his analysis of the historical dimensions of K.S. Robinson’s Mars 
books, Kenneth Knoespel notes the formal aspects of Robinson’s treatment of history: He states that 
“Robinson does not simply repeat the [facile] modes of representation used by […] earlier authors” 
of similarly resonant, large-scale epic/utopias, who 
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relied on a teleological notion of history to structure their epics and celebrated individual 
heroes  as  enabling  the  foundation  of  civilizations justified  by  certain  moral  and often 
eschatological ends. Instead, he challenges readers to ask important questions about the 
strategies used by literary authors to interrogate history and myth. In particular, Robinson’s 
use of multiple narratives shapes a critique of the teleological assumptions of epic that 
engage historiography itself. (Knoespel 111)
The evident and sufficient formal complexity of the representation of history in Robinson’s work 
makes  it  a  relevant  object  of  study.  This  thesis  will  continue  the  research  on  Robinson’s 
preoccupation with history, and it will focus on the relevance of history in general, not on literary 
historical or specifically science fictional genre theory. Moreover, it will apply theoretical notions 
related to the study of historiography, narratives, and discourse, which differs from several previous 
studies that often approach the subject from the perspective of utopian studies.
Robinson’s academic background is also visible in his fiction. He is open about the use of 
‘theory’ in his novels and his familiarity with “Raymond Williams, Bahktin [sic], […] Latour,” for 
instance  (Davis  &  Yazsek  190).  Concepts  that  he  has  found  valuable  “as  a  writer”  include 
“Jameson’s cognitive mapping, and his political unconscious”; “Williams’s ideas about the residual 
and emergent, and about structures of feeling”; as well as “Bahktin’s [sic] vision of the novel as 
dialogic, as a heteroglossia” (Davis & Yazsek 191–92). However, the fiction itself is not concept-
heavy,  reducible  to  a  roman  à  clef of  literary  theory.  Studies  preceding  this  thesis  have  also 
managed to find more than enough material to analyse in his works, despite the correspondence of 
some topics and these theoretical themes (cf. Vint’s use of Latour).
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2. History and the Past
History is distinct from the past in several ways. In the first subsection, 2.1, I aim to define ‘history,’ 
and clarify the concepts that are used to refer to the past and the bodies of knowledge about it. The 
multiple denotations and connotations of the concept of history already point towards the way it is 
discussed and represented in fiction. The next chapters approach more generally the questions to do 
with signification and references to the past, first in historical discourse and then concentrating 
more on the role of history in fiction.
A discussion on the philosophy of history is necessary for an accurate analysis of the role of 
history in fiction. I discuss and explore mainly such epistemological views and theories of history 
that are valuable in the critical analysis of fiction both as an aesthetic as well as a socially purposive 
activity. My interest is not, therefore, to determine the referential relation of K.S. Robinson’s novel 
to the actual past or its historical record. Theories of history are relevant to the extent that they 
complement the understanding of the separate functions of fiction, especially historical fiction.
2.1 History as Discourse – Definitions
The  fundamental  issue  in  defining  ‘history’ is  that,  speaking  strictly  from  the  perspective  of 
historiography, it,  history, is distinct from the past. To state that history is (a discourse), while the 
past is not, seems to reveal a further essential difference (Jenkins 5). The past is similar to the 
extratextual ‘reality’ we sense and (try to) represent through language, in that our textual relation to 
both  is  limited  by  various  inevitable  factors.  This  relation  is  the  question  that  epistemology 
approaches.  Similarly  Paul  A.  Roth  argues  that  although the  epistemological  and metaphysical 
problems of historical reference and knowledge are noteworthy, “the ‘reality of the past’ […] proves 
to be no more problematic than our account of any other aspect of reality, and so historical claims 
ought  to  be treated  as  subject  to  the  same conditions and caveats  that  apply to  any theory of 
empirical knowledge” (315). Mark Day has described the nature of the existence, the ontological 
caveat, of this empirical knowledge by stating how “that what there is to talk about is  dependent 
upon our thinking or language. Without us, the reality in question would not exist” (191; emphasis 
original).  This  ‘anti-realism’ draws  on  a  dichotomy  with  a  basis  (for  example)  in  Kantian 
metaphysics on the one hand and modern constructivism on the other, and it is an important factor 
specifically  in  the discussion on the past  and on history,  as it  suggests  that  the past  reality  (if 
nothing else) is for human cognitive purposes existent or present only in our perceptions of it (Day 
191–92).
In  order  to  define  history  and  indicate  the  nature  of  the  problems inherent  with  it  as  a 
discourse,  it  is  perhaps  sufficient  to  refer  to  the  way  in  which  the  creation  and  shaping  of 
information or knowledge about the past (or reality) always unavoidably falls short of the ‘totality’ 
of existence (Jenkins 10). Furthermore, what history as a discourse concerns is the past, that is to 
say, phenomena that are for the most part non-existent in the present and cannot be sensed at the 
moment, apart from their effects on other lasting phenomena. History is thus doubly distinct from 
the past: firstly by being a discourse, a ‘text’, and secondly by being a present discourse on the past. 
Questions of history are very much textual by nature. First of all, the traces of the past that are 
used  to  construct  historical  truths  are  often  textual  media.  As  Keith  Jenkins  states,  “[h]istory 
(historiography) is an inter-textual, linguistic construct” (7). I would argue that because both the 
material of history and the end product itself are predominantly textual, contemporary fiction with 
its postmodernist technical undertones is aptly equipped to discuss them and the meaning of the past 
and history.  To read history is  to interpret  that  discourse,  and although the literary perspective 
adopted in this thesis does not claim to be equivalent to a specifically historical study, literary 
imaginations of  historical  events  and their  meaning do partake  in  the  interpretation  of  history, 
especially by presenting history as a specific kind of discourse.  As Alun Munslow polemically 
states, “there are no original centres of meaning to be found outside the narrative-linguistic universe 
we call History. History is, in and of itself, a representation of something” (Munslow 7; emphasis 
original). From this point of view, fiction joins in the discussion about those centres of meaning. In 
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relation to this line of thought, my thesis seeks to determine precisely what the epistemological 
purport of GD is, i.e., how it comments on historiography, if only as fiction?
As to the nature of history as a specific discourse, there are various ways in which history is 
distinct from other knowledges, and the aspects that are relevant to my thesis concern specifically 
its pragmatic and aesthetic characteristics. Jenkins’s discussion in Re-thinking History (1991) relies 
on  theories  of  history  as  a  narrativised  discourse,  which  follow the  linguistic  turn  in  modern 
philosophy  and  sciences.  It  is  from  this  perspective  that  he  argues  that  whereas  the  past  is 
comprised  of  events and situations,  history  in  its  entire  form,  in  the  (meaningful)  connections 
between events and so on, is a construct created by the historian (11–13). Moreover, the “meanings 
given to histories” are “not meanings intrinsic in the past [...] but meanings given from outside(rs)” 
(17). This view is not without problems and will be discussed in the following section, along with 
the representation of history and the object of history’s representation. However, as history concerns 
also narratives and impressions outside historiography, there are questions regarding definitions and 
related to Jenkins’s position that need to be discussed.
Specifically, as Jenkins’s and Munslow’s polemical claims above suggest, historical meaning 
and the meaning of  history are not  inherent  qualities of the past.  Rather,  they are assigned by 
individual people, but also produced in discourses and ideologies. History ‘has meaning’ outside 
historiography  and  philosophy  as  well,  specifically  as  very  general  ideas,  both  mundane  and 
philosophical. On the one hand the past is often equated with history. This leads to a conception of 
the world that is defined most clearly in matters that ‘traditional’ history writing has covered, in a 
manner that history writing has dictated.  Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth notes a “commonsense idea of 
history,” which is that ”history is a condition, a medium, something almost indistinguishable from 
time itself”  (Ermarth 54).  History  is the past,  but  it  is  also the things that  will  be history – a 
‘historical moment’ does not necessarily have anything to do with the past, but with events and their 
importance, both in the present and in the future. In addition, the conception of a (historical) world 
revolves around the subjects of chronicles, for instance, where there are no other memorable facts 
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or narratives to present or remember.  The point is  not  so much that  the kings,  rulers,  bishops, 
inventors,  scientists,  and  artists,  as  well  as  events  and  groups  that  are  mentioned  in  various 
chronicles, are not the ‘true’ subject of history, but that history is often equated with whatever has 
concerned the most unified and consensual of historical treatises.
The  dictionary  entries  in  the  Oxford  English  Dictionary (OED)  cover  these  two  basic 
denotations: “[s]enses relating to the narration, representation, or study of events or phenomena,” 
namely history as narrative/knowledge, and “[p]ast events and related senses,” namely history as 
‘the past’ (“history”). The definitions that most visibly differ from the theoretically precise use 
correspond to a general idea of history as a near-elemental force, as a ‘thing’. History is thus “[t]he 
aggregate of past events; the course of human affairs” (“history” [Def. 7a.]). Furthermore, OED also 
notes  the  use  of  the  word  ‘history’ as  an  actant,  referring  to  history  as  “this  branch of  study 
[historiography] personified” (“history” [Def. 2b.]; emphasis added).
History is thus also ‘invested’ with agency, of a sort. History either teaches human beings 
something, often without scepticism for the accuracy of the report, or it has an effect on the present, 
as  though  it  were  a  material  or  spiritual  (Hegelian)  ‘thing’ with  some  way  of  manipulating 
circumstances. In this way history can be equated with its constituents: events and continua as well 
as the works of the historians that make up ‘history’ as if it were a single ‘thing.’ In historiography, 
‘history’ is made explicit in its entirety, by direct reference to sources and to the reasons of its given 
formulation. On the other hand, in unproblematized use it is opaque in the sense that it fails to 
reveal  what  it  consists  of.  In  the  latter  case,  ‘history’ is  an actor  in  the  sense  that  ‘ideology,’ 
‘religion,’ and ‘science’ can also be seen as coherent, somehow self-directing forces.
The two latter uses of the word, history as personified or as the course of human affairs, are 
often seen and used as parts of narratives of history, specifically  metanarratives. As Day states, a 
“metanarrative provides a teleology” that  defines and explains historical  change and places the 
individual into an explanatory context (183). In addition to specific philosophies of history that are 
considered metanarratives, such as the Hegelian idea of dialectical progress or the Marxist history 
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of the means of production and the dialectics of freedom and necessity, metanarratives can be more 
general ideas or understandings of history as a process of a certain kind (Day 183). History can in 
this latter sense even be understood (offhandedly, if nothing else) as the cause or reason behind 
events, whether in religious or non-religious beliefs. Furthermore, metanarratives are “narratives 
that are ostensibly about the past, but that shape our future as well,” which points to the way they 
are also ethical and political constructions (Day 228).
Ermarth  argues  polemically  that  there  are  ways  in  which  history  has  been  the  single 
perspective that objectifies and universalises time and society, and furthermore “[t]hat time, neutral  
time, is the most important effect or product of historical explanations” (55; emphasis original). In 
connotative terms, history is a metanarrative by itself. The way “conventional” history, history as a 
‘medium,’ legitimises the importance of some things over others (for instance, certain events over 
mundane  and  repetitive  action)  underlines  Ermarth’s  point  when  she  argues  that  “[h]istorical 
explanation thus creates and maintains this ultimate and still largely unacknowledged fiction: that 
time is a neutral, unproblematic universal medium ‘in’ which everything happens” (54–55). This is 
directly related to the more direct (authorial/narratorial) structuring of lived events and experiences 
in fiction, where history also appears as a structuring pattern. My thesis applies this to my research 
problem and to the analysis of the narrative structure of GD and the way it shapes historical content.
In terms of this thesis, the analysis of the ‘representation of history’ includes both the sense of 
history as the past in general, and history as an aggregate of large parts and processes of the past, as 
well as history personified as a seeming actant. The representation of history in novels thus involves 
signifiers that represent the past, such as historical figures and events, but also metanarratives of 
history,  i.e.,  explicit  and  implicit  representations  of  history  as  a  mostly  chronological  process 
whereby events are bound together following a certain logic and possibly affecting the way present 
moments turn into ‘present pasts.’ Before discussing primarily fictional narratives of history, I will 
examine the relation of historiographical texts to their object, their referent. I will also discuss the 
form of history, and the arguments that have been made about it in modern theoretical discussions.
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2.2 Reference, Narrative History, and the Linguistic Turn
The topicality  of  the peculiarities  and problems inherent  in  the  representation  of  history are  a 
consequence  of  structuralist  and  post-structuralist  thought.  The  postmodern  idea  of  reality  as 
textualised (in  an extreme formulation)  is  manifested in  historiography most  importantly as  an 
epistemological dilemma. In Narrating the Past: Historiography, Memory and the Contemporary  
Novel (2011) Alan A. Robinson discusses historical narratives and historical representation in a 
contemporary,  postmodern context.  He approaches the linguistic  turn in  historiography and the 
referential  dilemmas it  involves in  semiotic terms,  which aptly illuminates the problem and its 
origin in structuralist thought: the past, “non-linguistic reality,” as it has irrevocably occurred in its 
“original  actuality,”  is  the  referent, for  which  the  textual  and  extratextual  historical  traces  as 
signifiers construct a corresponding “mental representation” – ‘the past’ as signified (A. Robinson 
4).  Consequently,  “anti-foundationalist  historiography,”  namely  the  work  of  such  historians  as 
Hayden White and Keith Jenkins (A. Robinson 8), invokes this semiotic problematic by underlining 
epistemological  issues  as  inescapable:  the  historical  ‘truth’ is  only  an  aesthetic,  a  “Barthesian 
‘reality  effect’”,  and the signified past  remains  distinct  from the  referent  –  the actual  past  (A. 
Robinson xiii, 9; de Groot 111).
The epistemological assumption behind such arguments is that “as an object of knowledge 
and as  a  source  of  meaning,”  the  world,  reality,  comes into being only through representation 
(Rigney, 415).  Following Lubomír Dolezel,  the concept of representation,  denoting the way all 
images are always interpretative constructions (Rigney 415), points to the way that “knowledge 
acquisition and representation” can become a pretext of a literary imperialism (Dolezel 785). The 
focus  on  the  formal  aspects  of  the  structuration  of  that  knowledge  overrides  the  referential 
functions,  contributing  to  an  “epistemological  relativism,”  which  blurs  the  distinction  between 
factual representations and fiction, and gives precedence to literary strategies of judgement (Dolezel 
785, 790).
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This  highlights the  question of  the ‘authenticity’ of  history as  a  narrative  of  past  events, 
especially when used as a term for a single, legitimate or authentic (re)presentation of the past or 
events  in  the  past.  The  post-structuralist  interpretation  and  the  inescapable  (inter)textuality 
concomitant with it is not the only philosophy of history available to a postmodern reader, however, 
as A. Robinson argues. As A. Robinson suggests, “the ineluctable absence of the past” is first of all 
“belied by ordinary experience,” as in the persistence even in critical discourses of terms such as 
“trauma” and “cultural  memory” (A.  Robinson xiii).  Furthermore,  the actualities of  conceptual 
understanding and  organisation  of  phenomena  are  not  (only)  “retrospective  impositions  on  the 
chaotic  past”,  but  part  of  contemporary  cognition  in  the  present,  which  is  related  to  and 
substantiated by the identification of schemata and scripts as typical aspects of human cognitive 
activities (A. Robinson 13). To argue that concepts such as the Cold War, global warming, and 
globalisation are for instance inherently meaningless would be a simplification (A. Robinson 13). 
Although true as a part of a semiotic argument about the arbitrariness of linguistic signification or a 
Foucauldian argument concerning truth and (discursive) power, the use of conceptual generalisation 
does not invalidate the existence and value of trends and connections in practice for (non-objective) 
knowledge of any kind. As problems of referentiality do not remove the actuality of real world 
events and their progression,  they do not erase the existence of a past either. Consequently, it is 
important to keep this criticism of representational anti-foundationalism in mind throughout the 
following discussion of the representation of history, in both historiography and fiction.
This argument is connected to A. Robinson’s critique of Hayden White and his narrativist or 
aesthetic historiography. Following the logic of the linguistic turn,  White argued that  history is 
constructed into a narrative by using quintessential linguistic tropes such as “metaphor, metonymy, 
synecdoche, and irony” which prefigure the structure of the historical narrative (116). The narrative 
into which historical interpretation is shaped is an analogous structure, but in terms of the plot and 
its conventions, such as “Romance, Comedy, Tragedy, Epic, or what have you” (White 106). The 
counterargument is, however, that veracity and truth-valuation are removed as factors “[o]nly if we 
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posit  that  […]  all  language  is  poetic,  non-referential  (Dolezel  792).  While  A.  Robinson 
acknowledges that the narrativist critique enables a demystifying outlook on the unconscious and 
the generic formulations inherent in (historical) interpretation, he disagrees with White’s insistence 
on the essential ambiguity of the historical event and especially the consequences of this assertion: 
if  historical  notions  can  be  structured  even  in  contradictory  ways,  then  the  epistemological 
reliability on historical traces is secondary to aesthetic and moral arguments. As a result,  in A. 
Robinson’s view “White’s relativism leaves history unable to justify any stand against dangerous 
myths  and  ideologies”  (11–12).  Dolezel  also  writes  of  the  “logical,  ethical,  and  existential 
consequences” and the ensuing dystopia, where distinctions between truth and falsity,  guilt  and 
innocence, and authenticity and forgery are impossible (792). While this critique is very important, 
I would nonetheless argue that there are many areas in contemporary social reality, where such 
questions  are  never  simply  answered  by  meticulous  evaluation  of  history  and  veracity:  the 
interpretation of information from conflicting sources is manifest on all levels of social life.
On the other hand, while I appreciate White’s criticism of the narrativist philosophy of history 
(although it is to some extent directed at straw men [A. Robinson 12]), A. Robinson’s defence of the 
epistemological self-awareness of historiography is convincing, because of, among other things, the 
intuitive distinction of the function and role of the study and writing of history, if not its infallibility. 
This view can be further specified with Dorrit Cohn’s theory presented in The Distinction of Fiction 
(1999), where she argues that in comparison to fiction, the works of history aim to argue overtly, 
showing the reader the basis of the arguments presented (114). Cohn’s definitions will be discussed 
further in the following section. Although historical knowledge is in all probability always partial, 
enough impetus and interest would seem to (and hopefully can) increase reliable information, at 
least  in  an  environment  open  to  competitive  discourse.  However,  if  one  follows  for  example 
Foucault’s notions on power and knowledge, one is still  left  with the indeterminability of truly 
objective knowledge outside power,  not  its  disappearance  –  knowledge and truth are  always a 
(positive) function of power (Foucault 1980, 118–19). This is more evident in Day’s terminology, 
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where ‘anti-foundationalism’ is substituted with “coherentism” (194). A. Robinson’s corresponding 
wording  of  this  discursive  determination  of  truth  relies  on  consensus:  “the  assumption  that 
consensual views bear some plausible relation to truth is a strategy which works” (27).  
Furthermore, A. Robinson refines White’s criticism to some extent: he argues that to insist on 
the inherent meaninglessness of history approaches Lyotard’s claims about metanarratives and is 
“persuasive if restricted to the macro level – to speculative philosophy of history with a capital H” 
(A.  Robinson  12).  On  a  more  limited  ‘micro’ scale,  historians’ interpretations  can  be  seen  as 
attempts to re-present conceptual understanding and knowledge of ongoing processes that “were 
current at the time and both reflected and shaped how contemporaries perceived, experienced and 
acted in their society” (A. Robinson 13). Consequently, reliance on “inference,” “probabilities and 
uncertainties”  has  not  diminished  the  explanatory  power  of  historiography,  as  the  theoretical 
awareness  of  such  challenges  runs  parallel  with  the  interest  in  the  influence  on  events  of 
“contingency,  miscalculation  and  unintended  consequences”  (A.  Robinson  14).  A.  Robinson 
furthermore argues that narrative history (White’s area of interest) becomes viable particularly well 
due to this interest in contingencies, along with the contemporary focus on “the causative influence 
of historical agents,” their experiences, and their relation to social and institutional structures (A. 
Robinson 14–5). In essence, in addition to historical interpretation (reading and writing history) 
being formed in a certain way, following linguistic and narrative tropes (White’s view), it can also 
be  seen  the  other  way  around.  In  contrast  to  White’s  theory,  A.  Robinson  suggests  that 
contemporary  historical  issues  comprise   of  interests  that  conveniently  lend  themselves  to  a 
narrative structure, namely the focus on individuals with limited, conceptual understanding, plotting 
personal action, and personal futures that are distinct from the larger historical direction of society 
yet contingent on it.
Jonathan  Gil  Harris  similarly  argues  that  “elements  of  the  past  are  always  part  of  the 
polychronic assemblage that  is the present,  operating at  rhythms and speeds that  we might  not 
always recognize”, which opens a view of “the duration of the past into the present” (618). Harris 
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discusses  the different  manifestations of  this  persistence and the way it  breaks the  linearity  of 
history (especially any Hegelian connotations of a Eurocentrism of a specific kind) in various ways, 
ranging from the deconstruction of classical myths into their deeper history in different cultures, to 
historical  monuments  and buildings,  and their  heterogeneous origins.  Consequently,  it  becomes 
obvious  that  in  specifically  historical interpretation,  the  historicism  of  events  and  contexts 
necessarily surpasses the identification of periods and their implications. The present is permeated 
by the past in ways that overcome mere superficiality or linear and causal relations.
An example of fiction where this kind of heterogeneous view of the past as persisting in the 
present is seen, is Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children (1980). In the novel, the history of India is 
an amalgamation of twentieth-century politics, religious and geographical disputes and discussions, 
as well as old and new myths and stories, meaning among other things that the history of a nation is 
never  satisfactorily  identifiable  with  the  trappings  and  a  neatly  coherent,  single  national  story 
(Merivirta 27). The narrator Saleem weaves cyclical repetition, myth, and politics into his personal 
history,  which he proposes to  be analogical  to  the history of  India  as  a  nation (Merivirta  27): 
notwithstanding the radical break of independence(s), the present moment is thus never removed 
from history (34–5).
A. Robinson stresses the actuality of the past and a chain of reference to it in textual traces 
that  manage  to  assimilate  in  their  ‘images’  the  past  as  it  has  been  conceptualised  by  the 
contemporaries of that past present. This  defence of the capacity of historiography to overcome 
epistemological obstacles, namely the attacks of (post-)structuralist theories of representation and 
signification, has its merits. As mentioned, on the other side of the argument is Keith Jenkins, who 
argues that “[e]pistemology shows we can never really know the past; that the gap between the past 
and history (historiography) is an ontological one, that is, is in the very nature of things such that no 
amount of epistemological effort can bridge it” (19). History is marked by the form it gives to the 
past, whether strictly narrative or otherwise, but also by the ‘materiality’ of past histories. They 
have to be historicised and read in context, further distancing their actual referentiality. If there is a 
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true history, it is only by virtue of it having been produced by a dominant discourse (Jenkins 57), 
and  its  “internalisation”  as  accurate  and  true  (Jenkins  53).  In  Jenkins’s  view,  truth  is  thus 
“dependent on somebody having the power to make it true” (Jenkins 31). While A. Robinson does 
not ignore the ‘linguistic’ and sociological grounds of these assertions, the divisive issue seems to 
be the significance  of  the assertion of  the persistence of  power in  Foucault’s  theory.  Jenkins’s 
critical view certainly underlines the importance of methodological awareness on the part of the 
historian  (or  novelist),  but  if  that  importance  is  acknowledged,  what  remains  is  an  almost 
compulsory focus on the positive aspect of power that Foucault explores – its capacity to determine 
truths as opposed to its tendency to deny others. A. Robinson solves the same issue by focusing on 
consensus and the material existence of the actual sources.
The  difference  between  the  two  poles  of  the  discussion  can  also  be  linked  with  their 
analogous phenomenological assumptions. As Dolezel notes, comparing fiction and history, where 
the “world-constructing power of the fictional text implies that the text is prior to the world, that it 
calls the world into existence and determines its structure […], cognitive texts represent (image) a 
world that exists prior to, and independently of, textual activity” (789). The crucial question is, 
perhaps,  to what  extent do the historical  representations construct  the phenomenological  world, 
instead of a historical world (as available to our understanding) being prior to them. The distinction 
between  fiction  and  history  points  toward  this  question  and  the  way  in  which  fictional 
representations comment of historical knowledge. Moreover, it is this tentative, above all literary, 
question that  interests me. The literary lack of constraint  from strictly referential  utterances,  as 
evidenced by Cohn’s description of it,  for example, enables fiction’s diverse questioning of the 
construction of the discursive reality. In my analysis, I will use this theoretical debate to identify 
how narrative form constructs history or our preconceptions of historical content in GD.
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2.3 Fictional Representation and History
Turning towards a  literary approach to  literary representations,  I  will  in  the  following sections 
discuss the foundations of the literary possibilities of historical reference and interpretation. Starting 
with a discussion on the nature of representational acts, I will return to the question of referentiality 
in fiction. The insistent problems of historical representation become apparent in Fredric Jameson’s 
metacommentary,  his  theory  on  interpretation  and  the  nature  of  texts  as  “symbolic  acts”  (The 
Political Unconscious [PU] 81). Jameson’s theory brings fiction into the discussion, as his focus on 
interpretation and representation underlines the contextuality of all texts. The text is furthermore 
interpreted as  an ‘act,’ as  the  value  of  historical  representation  and narrative  is  in  his  Marxist 
outlook always more than mere antiquarian interest (Jameson, PU 175). Dominick LaCapra asserts 
similarly that art and fiction are in fact historical and social acts, and that a “reductive contextualism 
does not sufficiently account for the work and play of the text or of art in general, including its 
formal devices and the variably divided ways it may have a critical and possibly transformative 
relation to contexts and not simply be symptomatic of them” (17).
In Jameson’s Marxist hermeneutics, in an extensive, semiotic sense of ‘text’, each cultural 
object or text projects in itself its own subtext, the circumstances that created it: “The symbolic act 
[…] begins by generating and producing its own context in the same moment of emergence in 
which it steps back from it” (PU 81). “The whole paradox” of representing history or external 
reality,  visible  in  the  interpretation  of  that  representation,  is  seen  in  “that  the  literary  work  or 
cultural object, as though for the first time, brings into being that very situation to which it is also, 
at the one and the same time, a reaction” (Jameson 82): the sign (the text) creates its own referent 
(Vainikkala  270).  As  Erkki  Vainikkala  adds,  the  referent  is  therefore  self-contradictorily 
“immanent” in the text but also its “condition” (270). In this way, the referent is actually doubled in 
the paradoxical subtext: (on the one hand) the text is an image of its context, a representation whose 
referent  is  “in  an  imaginary  relation”  (Vainikkala  270)  to  the  (on  the  other  hand)  non-textual 
referent – reality – that is “fundamentally non-narrative and nonrepresentational” (Jameson, PU 82). 
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Consequently,  Jameson  sees  that  it  is  crucial  that  interpretation  acknowledges  both  of  these 
“inseparable  yet  incommensurable  dimensions  of  the  symbolic  act”  (PU 82):  an  unbalanced, 
unilateral theory results, on the one hand, in structuralist ideology, by effacing the actual referent 
altogether,  or  “vulgar  materialism”  on  the  other,  by  effacing  the  discursive  power  of  the  act, 
specifically by prescribing the text merely as a projection or reflection of its context (Jameson, PU 
82). LaCapra’s argument follows the same logic, as he notes how “[f]ormal considerations help to 
prevent a simple reduction of [art] to symptomatic expressions of either transhistorical forces or 
historical contexts, while still raising the problem of the mediated, problematic relation of novels or 
other works of art to both transhistorical and historical considerations” (27). LaCapra’s example is 
Flaubert’s  Sentimental Education,  in which he sees the process of modernisation present in the 
autonomisation  of  public  and  private  spheres  of  life,  both  of  which  are  illustrated  as  well  as 
criticised and questioned by the novel (LaCapra 17).
This is relevant in that it underlines the problems in discussing history and the past, especially 
if we subscribe to theories of ideology and power, such as those presented by Foucault. What is 
apparent in Jameson is the fact that the past has relevance in the present, but that cultural objects 
evoke the past, refer to it, in peculiar ways. For Jameson, History is an absent cause, manifested 
through its  effects,  and it  is  distinct  yet  inseparable  from the uniquely created subtext of  each 
textual utterance. In one sense, this is the history that fiction is: all texts (including fiction) that 
point  to  history  are  articulations  in  a  discussion  of  the  politics  of  (historical)  truth.  Texts  as 
historical and fictional narratives are unique acts in that they create the history they make, although 
Jameson strives  to  find  a  referential  relation  in  place,  somewhere  in  the  subtext.  Thus,  as  his 
assertions  about  ideology  and  social  interpretation  show,  Jameson  tries  to  keep  both  post-
structuralist  anti-foundationalism and a socially interpretative referentiality in focus at  the same 
time  (Vainikkala  270).  History  is  and  persists  in  the  present,  but  it  is  indistinct  from  its 
representations.
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Dorrit Cohn takes an altogether different stance in The Distinction of Fiction (1999), where 
she argues that there is in fact a clear difference between fiction and history.  Her definition of 
fiction  is  that  it  is  a  “literary  nonreferential  narrative”  (12).  With  the  term  ‘narrative’  she 
differentiates fiction from other discourses that deal with abstraction, such as logic, philosophy and 
other not necessarily sequential statements (12). Whereas this use of narrativity as a defining aspect 
of fiction largely follows theoretical consensus, her focus on the nonreferential nature of fiction 
diverges  very  much  from  contemporary  theory,  especially  with  its  postmodern  focus  on  a 
permeating (inter)textuality without material referent. Cohn affirms the idea, which is also part of 
Jameson’s theory of representation, that in referring to any world, a particular fiction creates that 
world in the act of reference itself (13).
Cohn qualifies this concept of reference by stating, first of all, that the nonreferentiality only 
means  that  although  it  can  refer  to  a  real  world,  the  reference  itself  never  excludes  its  other 
functions: “it does not refer exclusively to the real world outside the text” (15; emphasis original). 
Indeed, for the most part the fictional text does not refer to historical traces. Secondly, what follows 
from the  first  point  is  that  the  references  of  fiction  to  extratextual  reality  “are  not  bound  to 
accuracy”  (Cohn  15).  Following  Cohn’s  definition,  describing  fiction  as  nonreferential  thus 
discriminates it from such narratives that are judged on the basis of veracity, meaning also that 
whereas fiction is complete, works on history are required to be verifiable (by reality as well as 
other texts) (15–6).
Furthermore, Cohn notes that although the similarities of history writing and fiction are, as 
White argued, evident  in the narrativity of both forms, in her discussion of the story/discourse 
dichotomy she shows that there are differences in the formal features that act as the “signposts of 
fictionality,”  referenced  in  the  title  of  her  corresponding  section  (113–14):  “the  synchronic” 
metastructure  leaves  out  a  compulsory  reference  to  the  diachronic  source,  fictional  modes  of 
narration  (such  as  omniscient  or  conjecturing  narrators)  appear  without  justification,  and  the 
“doubling of the narrative instance into author and narrator” inserts unwarranted ambiguity in and 
20
defers  the  judgement  of  the  narration  (Cohn  130).  Fiction  remains  distinctly  fictional,  as  its 
narrators and authorial  ‘voice’ underline its  autonomy of the real  world events (Cohn 130–31). 
Moreover, the events represented in fiction become devoid of “historical reality” (Cohn 157) by 
being, as Paul Ricoeur argued, on the one hand an undivided extension of the fictional narrators and 
characters (1988, 129; quoted in Cohn 157–58), and on the other hand by being placed thus in a 
fictional context without the interest of pursuing historical truth (1985, 3; quoted in Dolezel 791).
The conclusions that  can be drawn from Cohn’s theory have not so much to do with the 
referentiality of fiction and characters, but the explication of the fact that interpreting fiction and 
history are different operations, regardless of the referentiality to reality. Cohn’s definition has been 
evoked here to indicate that fiction and history are still challenged not only as similarly referential 
or  nonreferential,  but  also  as  (arguably)  distinct  registers  or  modes  of  writing.  However,  I  do 
incline towards Linda Hutcheon’s discursive history as well as certain propositions from Jameson. 
For although Cohn shows how the two registers are distinct, she does not consider the referentiality 
of non-fiction in the same way that postmodern historiographers such as White and Jenkins, as well 
as postmodern theorists such as Hutcheon and Baker do: the question that remains undiscussed is 
what are the ways in which the veracity and value of the writing of history is in the final analysis 
defined. The significance of Cohn’s arguments for my purposes is its qualification of the registers, 
which reveals that their differences can be argued quite coherently, although the referentiality of 
historiography remains in Cohn’s text as a given. What Jameson’s point about representation adds 
to this is the notion that the subtext arising from a representation of reality (which includes fiction’s 
contextual facets) is in the specific form of the representation actually created by it. In a less anti-
realist sense, the subtext that stands in for reality is merely qualified by the representation. My 
analysis applies this debate to determine how GD substantiates or undermines the historical content 
within it, i.e., its fictional histories.
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2.4 The Postmodern Challenge 
This section maps out the context of postmodern cultural activity. I introduce postmodern theorists’ 
views on cultural production and later present a discussion on the communicability of experience. 
My intention  is  to  make  evident  the  hypothesised  difficulties  of  communicating  truthfully  and 
ethically in the present context. In my analysis, this is the critical background against which any 
narrative attempt to convey ideas, historical or otherwise, must be weighed.
Postmodernism challenged the understanding of culture and human knowledge. It is linked 
with the (post-)structuralist semiotic and philosophic turns discussed earlier, and as such qualifies 
the possibilities of fictional representations of reality, as well as its formal and ethical nature. All 
descriptions and all the various forms of the adjective ‘postmodern’ are somehow related to the 
‘modern’. As the modern/postmodern division is relevant to my thesis as a theoretical framework of 
cultural expression, I will briefly discuss the issue in order to define postmodernism.
The ideas and discourses  that  frame contemporary theory and are  reflected in  fiction are 
presented  in  many texts  of  the  postmodernity  debate.  In  terms of  contemporary  culture,  Jean-
François Lyotard argued in the latter part of the twentieth century that there is “a sort of decay in the 
confidence placed by the two last centuries in the idea of progress” (“Defining the Postmodern” 
1613). This loss of confidence signals the expiration of reliable grand narratives, especially the 
“liberal grand narrative of progress, civilisation and consensus”, resulting partly from the persistent 
heterogeneity  of  ideology as  well  as  the  postcolonial  challenges  to  these  typically  Eurocentric 
narratives  (Morrison  22).  For  Lyotard,  these  grand  narratives  are  “markers  of  modernity”, 
modernity itself being the desire or will to construct these various narratives – a totality-aspiring 
project (Baker 65).
For Lyotard, ‘the postmodern’ is a “mode of representation” (Baker 67), which is relevant to 
my discussion in several ways. Firstly, on account of the fallacious nature of the grand narratives, 
critical  thinking  is  only  possible  in  postmodernity  “through  the  acceptance  of  heterogeneity,” 
especially as opposed to the self-legitimising “a priori concepts” of modernity (Baker 66; emphasis 
22
original). Reality does not limit  to the categories of such concepts as Marxist  class conflict  or 
governing myths about human nature or civilisation. Secondly, Lyotard argues that the postmodern 
aesthetic revolves around a postmodern sublime (a term deriving from Kant):
Here then lies the difference: modern aesthetics is an aesthetic of the sublime, though a 
nostalgic one. It allows the unpresentable to be put forward only as the missing contents; 
but the form, because of its recognisable consistency, continues to offer to the reader or 
viewer matter for solace and pleasure. […]
The postmodern would be that which, in the modern, puts forward the unpresentable 
in presentation itself; that which denies itself the solace of good forms […]; that which 
searches for new presentations, not in order to enjoy them but in order to impart a stronger 
sense of the unpresentable. (The Postmodern 81)
Accordingly,  Lyotard’s own examples specify Proust as modern and Joyce as postmodern (The 
Postmodern  80–81). In Proust, the narrative is still  intact  in its syntax, the signifiers remaining 
superficially referential, although the unrepresentable (“identity of consciousness”) is deferred; in 
Joyce, however, the text as signifier is revealed in all its instability (The Postmodern  80–81). In 
postmodernity,  totality  is  thus  only  present  in  its  impossibility,  it  is  deconstructed  in  the 
postmodernist fiction. Moreover, Jameson’s interpretation of E.L. Doctorow’s  Ragtime, which is 
discussed more comprehensively in a following chapter, follows a similar representational logic. In 
short,  Doctorow’s novel exhibits an instability and incoherence of its signifying function that is 
analogical to Joyce’s. This is seen for example in the way its characters can be thought to originate 
from or refer to differing levels of ‘fictional ontology’ (see Jameson, Postmodernism 23–5).
The link between society and aesthetic production or art in postmodernity is connected with 
this issue of (meta)narrative(s) and representation. The situation and question of the autonomy of art 
and culture in society, particularly their material existence and creation and the relationship with the 
economic base, is also a part of the discussion on postmodernity and postmodernism, as in Fredric 
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Jameson’s theory, for example. Jameson’s argument, as the subtitle of his work on postmodernism 
(The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism) indicates, is visible in his statement how in postmodernism:
the cultural and the economic […] collapse back into one another and say the same thing, 
in an eclipse of the distinction between base and superstructure that has itself often struck 
people as significantly characteristic of postmodernism in the first place, [which] is also to 
suggest that the base, in the third stage of capitalism, generates its superstructures with a 
new kind of dynamic. (Postmodernism xxi; emphasis original)
This argument derives from Theodor Adorno’s critique of the culture industry and the much debated 
idea of the reification of art  under its  industrial  production – an issue Marxist  that  critics find 
problematic particularly due to the loss of the critical distance between art and the social sphere it 
indicates (Baker 34–5). In Baker’s words, “[t]he truly utopian yearning of relatively autonomous art 
is discarded by the culture industry in its fusion of the aesthetic and the socio-economic. In its 
disavowal of autonomy, the culture industry indicates its refusal to posit the image or semblance of 
any alternative to actuality” (35).
The importance of this idea for Jameson’s view of postmodernism arises from Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s concerns for the effects of such a process on the “qualitative shift in the means by 
which we, as individual cognitive subjects, perceive and reflect on our social relations” (Baker 34) 
Furthermore, “[t]he vision which this model suggests of the reconciled worlds of aesthetic images 
and social praxis is one of barbaric harmony” (Baker 34). An elucidation of this is provided in 
Lyotard’s argument that the mass media products of the image, pervasive in contemporary culture, 
are superior in generating “effects of reality, or if one prefers, the fantasies of realism” (Lyotard, 
The Postmodern 74). As Adorno and Horkheimer’s ideas indicate, the problem for critical theorists 
is not primarily aesthetic: these fantasies of ‘stabilised referents’ (Lyotard, The Postmodern 74) are 
counterproductive  in  that  they  reinforce  the  images of  “totality,  objectivity  and strict  temporal 
chronology” of realism (Baker 24). As opposed to realism, which “in its representation of social 
totality, implies an external reality, which is objective, knowable and representable” (Baker 23), the 
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dialectic  of  modernist  fiction  “confronts  us  with  the  need  to  construct some  form  of  order, 
indicating  the  constructedness  […]  of  all  ordering  systems”  (Baker  26;  emphasis  original), 
including Lyotard’s images of ‘fantasies of realism’. In our attempts to understand history and the 
social reality, discourse comes to the fore, which will be evident in my analysis of GD as well.
The cultural shift that makes this question of the relation between the culture industry and 
transformative or transgressive art (such as avant-garde) into markedly postmodernist is visible in 
Brooker’s view:
Whereas under modernism [...] a retreat, at its extremes, into the sublime indifference of art 
coexisted  with  a  contrasting  avant-garde  defiance  of  the  present  in  the  interests  of  a 
transformed future, a Baudrillardian postmodernism knows no such contrast. In a world 
where Surrealist techniques sell cigarettes and consumer durables, where art is fashion, the 
original project of the historical avant-garde appears to have lost all credibility. (19–20)
In other words, the distancing artistic stances and techniques that aim to criticise society or its 
cultural industry are subsumed under the mass media, and the critical distance disappears.
In his main work on postmodernism, Jameson follows this Baudrillardian formulation, but 
Baker remarks that his pessimistic stance depends too much on his theoretical framework, which he 
fails  to  reconcile  with  the  possibilities  of  individual  texts  (Baker  198).  The  critical  aesthetic 
distance, which a differentiated cultural sphere of art needs for some of its functions, is instead 
found “between the individual postmodern text and the cultural condition of postmodernity” (Baker 
205). For instance, Paul Cantor sees in Don DeLillo’s work the implications of a postmodernist 
saturation of media and mass cultural identity politics, but he also underlines the importance of his 
willingness  to  criticise  it  (58).  Cantor’s  (typically  postmodernist)  analysis  is  that  DeLillo’s 
trivialising of Nazism in White Noise (1985), for example, is in its uncomfortable association with 
popular culture an effective reminder of the ethical pitfalls of a culture that is primarily form and no 
content, even though Delillo’s work overall fails to escape the same cultural logic (58–61). The 
relevance of this loss of distance between image and object for my thesis is that it points to the 
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problem of historical imagination as well. I will therefore seek to account for this by analysing the 
distances depicted in  GD  as well  as its representation of historical possibilities and differences, 
especially in chapter 4.1.2.
There  are  also  other  ethical  and  political  operations  of  a  similar  nature  present  in 
contemporary postmodern culture. For one, the textual strategies prevalent in postmodernism have 
an effect similar to that of the lost critical distance. This is seen for example in the way ubiquitous 
‘postmodern irony’ (although there is nothing particularly postmodern about it, except for its scope) 
has short-circuited all critique into a repetition of the same, of a postmodernity of surfaces. The 
dominance of this ironical mode has sought to affirm the present cultural mode by its reduction of 
all ‘authentic’ affects and alternatives to a false, groundless belief in some lost reality or totality 
against which their value is measured. This is exemplified by David Foster Wallace’s reflection in 
his  essay  “E  Unibus  Pluram”  (1993).  He argues  that  the  way  in  which  commercial  television 
adopted postmodern textual playfulness (including irony) as its central technique (and taught its use 
to the reader/viewer) is illustrative of an entire modern culture turning to a self-referential cynicism 
(177–79). This fundamental “irreverence” is troubling in that “irony, entertaining as it is, serves an 
exclusively negative function” and is “singularly” unconstructive (Wallace 183):
irony tyrannizes us. […] All irony is a variation on a sort of existential poker-face. All U.S. 
Irony is based on an implicit “I don’t really mean what I say.” So what  does irony as a 
cultural norm mean to say? That it’s impossible to mean what you say? […] Anyone with 
the  heretical  gall  to  ask an ironist  what  he actually  stands for  ends up looking like a 
hysteric or a prig. And herein lies the oppressiveness of institutionalized irony […]: the 
ability to interdict the  question without attending to its  content is tyranny. (Wallace 184; 
emphasis original)
As Brooker’s reference to surrealism as a marketing technique shows, the critical and the rebellious 
are  domesticated,  and  the  authenticity  or  earnestness  of  any  comment  is  deferred.  Robert  L. 
McLaughlin identifies this explicit wariness of irony in Wallace’s fiction, in Brief Interviews with 
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Hideous Men (1999) and Infinite Jest (1996), suggesting that it is shown in the way his narrators are 
aware of the complicity of their language with a loss of sincere sentiment, yet crave for a more 
naïve or personal (as opposed to always pre-imagined) language (“After the Revolution“ 288). The 
problem of earnest language and expression is also seen in such works as Michael Chabon’s The 
Yiddish Policemen’s Union (2007), a stylistically well-developed pastiche of a ‘hardboiled’ detective 
story. The narration is full of utterances where the characters are at a loss with sincerity, as when 
“Landsman’s  [the  protagonist]  congratulations  [‘Mazel  tov,  Berko’]  are  so  ironic  that  they  are 
heartfelt, and they are so heartfelt that they can only come off as insincere” (Chabon 57).
Wallace’s reference to the ways of “our postmodern fathers” furthermore suggests that if this 
is an aspect of a persevering postmodernism, the mode itself is mutable in its cultural production 
(183).  McLaughlin  writes  of  this  shift  from a  postmodernism that  seemingly  only  plays  self-
referential textual games with the “indeterminate reality”, to a so-called “post-postmodernism” that 
also  utilises  conventions  of  realism  without  subscribing  to  its  (nineteenth-century)  mimetical 
assumptions (“After the Revolution“ 289). In an earlier discussion on the poetics of Wallace and 
Jonathan Franzen, McLaughlin summarises the reasons for this new emphasis:
Self-referentiality by itself collaborates with the culture of consumer technology to create a 
society  of  style  without  substance,  of  language  without  meaning,  of  cynicism without 
belief  [...].  However,  [...]  postmodernism was  never  about  self-referentiality  by  itself: 
postmodernism made the process of representation problematic, it foregrounded literature 
pointing to itself trying to point to the world, but it did not give up the attempt to point to 
the world. (“Post-Postmodern” 66)
In this way he argues that the “post-postmodernists” learned to see even the textualised, “unstable 
reality  suspiciously”  (McLaughlin,  “After  the  Revolution“  289).  Yet  its  subversive  potential 
remains important, as his example of “our,” i.e., US novels’, “national response to 9/11” shows 
(“After the Revolution“ 292). All the dichotomies of the global war on terror can be seen as features 
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of a new hegemonic narrative that calls for a critical representation, which McLaughlin finds in 
Pynchon’s Against the Day (2006), for example (“After the Revolution“ 292).
Wallace’s explicit  worries concerning a cultural  mode that  struggles with authenticity and 
content  in  the  midst  of  images  and  surfaces  runs  parallel  to  those  of  postmodern  theory,  as 
exemplified by Jameson. Both Baker’s reading of Jameson as well as Wallace’s hopes for narrative 
alternatives underline a reappraisal of postmodern textual strategies: with Baker these concern the 
possibilities of reformative imagination in the fiction of postmodernity (which Jameson struggles 
with),  whereas Wallace hopes in  1993 for  ‘rebellious’ fiction that  is  “willing to  risk” seeming 
“[b]ackward,  quaint,  naïve,  anachronistic”  and  being  accused  of  “sentimentality,  melodrama. 
Credulity” (193). While Hutcheon described the poetics of (an already established) postmodernism 
as positive in 1988, specifically as it is “fundamentally contradictory, offering only questions, never 
final answers” (42), shortly afterwards this obliqueness came to be seen as problematic.
As Theo D’Haen argues, however, the postmodern stagnation into irony has largely been a 
Western rephrasing of the tensions of reference, whereas “postcolonial and multicultural counter-
forms of postmodernism instead aimed to be ‘re-constructive’ in that they not only critiqued but 
also  proposed  alternative  histories,  societies,  worldviews”  (274).  Similarly  Ramón  Saldívar 
discusses “speculative realism” which “posits the speculative possibility that we may be able to 
imagine the conditions under which the thing in itself and its phenomenal form might coincide” 
(14). Saldívar argues the existence of the possibility to reappraise the development of narrative 
form,  in  that  “Realism” now becomes a  persistent  “substratum of  narrative”  – “a  horizon that 
includes  naturalism  and  realism,  social  realism,  surrealism,  magical  realism,  and  perhaps 
speculative realism” (14). Magical realism for one suggests that the urban, spatial postmodernism of 
Jameson’s theory does in fact leave out more fluid narrative forms that have been utilised outside 
North American and Western European societies for a ‘reconstructive’ ethical and political writing. 
Again, Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children seems a fitting example, as is Gabriel García Márquez’s 
One Hundred  Years  of  Solitude (1967),  both  of  which  display  the  fantastical  aspects  of  their 
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narratives explicitly, yet do not break into mere textual and self-referential play. The novels deal 
with history thematically, yet they do not merely parrot the linear, western narratives of rule and 
leadership. Beliefs and their imprint, whether material or immaterial, on the cognition of the people 
presented  are  underlined  along  with  material  circumstances  as  well  as  ordinary  and  familial 
relationships. Furthermore, the histories represented in, or those that can be interpreted on the basis 
of, these works are not organised in terms of the grand narratives of myth or rational progression, as 
Merivirta  argued  with  reference  to  Rushdie  (27).  In  my  analysis,  this  awareness  of  the 
problematisation of ironic subversion and criticism is applied to the depiction of historical rewriting 
and ameliorative historical (meta)narratives within the fiction. The problem of genuine assertions 
and affirmation of value, as opposed to mere ironic criticism, is discussed particularly in reference 
to the novel’s narrative form, which utilises postmodern aesthetic techniques, and its conflict with 
the narrator’s assertions about the exemplary nature of the history of Galileo.
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3. The Functions and Aesthetics of Novels Representing History
This chapter will approach the contemporary novel by inspecting the effects and ethics of various 
discussions about historical narratives, specifically by examining some aspects of the postmodern 
problematic of representation and textual aspects that make history explicit in fiction.  I will first 
introduce ways in which historical novels promote historicist understanding and how this comes to 
be problematized.  The chapter  proceeds to  a  discussion on the  implications of  the postmodern 
theoretical novelties to the specific case dealing with the sense of the loss of authentic history, dealt 
with in 3.2. In 3.3, I will discuss the types of reference and critique that counterfactual narratives 
present along with the case of historical figures in fiction. Together these make overt the historical 
reference of novels, be they explicitly historical or counterfactual or not. This section concludes 
with  an  introduction  of  genealogy  –  a  means  of  describing  the  formation  of  knowledges  and 
historical truths.
3.1 Fictional Interpretations of History
In the preface to A Poetics of Postmodernism (1988), Linda Hutcheon evokes the referentiality of 
contemporary fiction as a question of “the paradoxes set up when modernist aesthetic autonomy and 
self-reflexivity come up against a counterforce in the form of a grounding in the historical, social, 
and political world” (ix). Obviously, contextual and subtextual interpretation is integral to historical 
fiction  in  general.  For  Hutcheon,  the  postmodern  historical  fiction  that  she  terms  as 
historiographical  metafiction along  with  postmodernism  in  fiction  as  a  whole  challenge 
assumptions about historical meaning and reference. Yet they retain a meaningful, if not referential, 
relation  (denied  or  questioned  by  other  theorists)  to  the  past  and  the  present,  and  to  history: 
historiographic metafiction thus “subverts, but only through irony, not through rejection” (Hutcheon 
xii). Hutcheon argues that postmodernist art does not avoid or remove  its context and its bygone 
referential source, but that it altogether denies a “genuine historicity” or “ultimate objects” of the 
past,  preferring  a  discursive  ‘metaphysics’ of  history  to  the  ‘real’ concerns  of  the  concepts  of 
Jameson, for example (Hutcheon 24–5). 
The differences between historical fiction and historiography have been discussed in various 
terms. Possible-worlds literary theories approach factual and fictional propositions on the basis of 
the ontological status of a represented situation or world: (possible) worlds created in fiction are 
seen to be more or less autonomous, disconnected from the actual world and its past, and therefore 
the analysis of their relation to reality in terms of veracity and “correspondence to known historical 
facts” is irrelevant (A. Robinson 28–29). However, the complete separation of fictional worlds from 
the ones they model is dubious. As A. Robinson argues:
historical fiction resembles historiography in that its interpretive emplotment constructs a 
subjective present past; this differs from a wholly invented spatiotemporal world, as it is 
modelled on and anchored on a former actuality. What is disorienting for readers is that 
historical fiction blurs indistinguishably what is imported from known historical data and 
what is invented. (29; emphasis original)
Although some material  and its  ontological  origin might  be underlined,  such as in the case of 
known  historical  characters  or  actual  historical  sources,  this  lack  of  distinction  between  the 
‘sources’ of most text in fiction is as an essential formal characteristic of historical fiction, utilised 
for various effects. For example, alternate histories might be created from divergent personal or 
social reactions to actual past events, or as in Don DeLillo’s Libra (1988), where the fictionality of 
Lee Harvey Oswald’s path, leading him to become an infamous assassin, is shadowed by the actual 
progression of the events on a broader level. Furthermore, as the idea of the disorienting effect (in 
the quotation from A. Robinson above) hints at, historical fiction is very much aware of its artificial 
and  fictional  constitution.  While  mentioning  that  this  is  for  Hutcheon  a  central  aspect  of 
historiographical metafiction, de Groot also claims that this self-awareness has always been a part 
of historical fiction – at least as a possibility (de Groot 2010, 120–21; Hutcheon 120).
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A. Robinson’s description follows the same logic: “[a]s a hybrid genre, historical fiction is 
partially counterfactual” not only in some instances but to a certain extent in general (30). This is 
evident in that whereas historiographical discourse seeks to “conjecture” on the basis of historical 
traces and thus represent its object coherently and consistently, in “the narrative discourse (sju!et) 
of historical fiction” the narrator may disregard coherence by leaving out information about the 
fictional world: fictions are therefore more explicitly subjective “interpretive model[s] of reality” 
(A. Robinson 33). Although the objectivity of the factually oriented approach can be questioned, for 
instance in terms of the limitations of our present understanding and its structural characteristics, as 
is visible in Foucault’s ‘epistemes’, the nucleus of the argument is that fiction is generally judged 
more on the basis of the portrayed world, whereas the historian’s work is appraised by its utilisation 
of historical traces. As Hanna Meretoja states, the truth/cognitive value of fiction is of a different 
nature  in  comparison  to  historiography,  for  example  (77).  Nonetheless,  fiction  does  promote 
historical understanding in a different way, for instance, as Meretoja suggests, “integral to the way 
in which we assess the ‘truth’ dimension of historiographical novels is precisely their ability to 
make intelligible the experience of those living in a particular historical world” (77). This view 
follows the humanistic notion of the general capacity or function of art, as well as the Lukácsian 
function of historical fiction as pedagogical, as it instructs the reader of the specificity of historical 
identity and consciousness (de Groot 29). Clearly the function of narrative histories is separate from 
a  contextual  description,  in  that  it  uses  the  historical  reference  to  either  deepen  the  historical 
interpretation in some way or make overt the need to understand  better the act of interpretation 
itself.
Both fiction and historiography (as well as the theory concerning both, I would add) can on 
the one hand be criticised for their possible anachronism, while on the other hand the capability of 
historical narratives to historicise historical experience or interpretation itself becomes an interest 
for historical imagination: As both modes concern the past, creating teleology and tradition on the 
basis  of  the  present  is  a  crucial  question,  which  the  diachronic  perspective,  for  example,  can 
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nonetheless undermine (Robinson 32). Meretoja raises this issue as well, writing of the expectations 
of  a  credibly  and ethically  “sustainable”  representation  of  the past  and its  importance  even in 
novelistic  “invention” (78).  Meretoja  discusses  the experience of  history particularly in  Günter 
Grass’s novel Dog Years (1963) and his autobiography Peeling the Onion (2006). Her analysis of 
the works evokes particularly the question of anachronistic representation of historical continuity. 
Meretoja argues that Grass’s narration shows that in a historically overdetermined or over-explained 
moment  such  as  the  rise  of  National  Socialism  in  Germany,  the  lived  experience  suggests  an 
inevitability in the developments at the time, whereas  in retrospect “the narrator can show that 
history consists of concrete choices” (85). It is the “idealist history” of the Nazis that forces the 
impression of history as an inevitable mythic process (of progress) that continues to the (ideal) 
future, but in which the individual and the particular do not feel or seem to possess influence (83). 
Therefore, as Meretoja argues:
Grass’s novels display the historically mediated character of experience, that of both the 
present and the past, by providing us with different narrative accounts of the past, which – 
instead of pretending to give us access to immediate reality or experience – are shown to 
be  subjective  interpretations  and  narrativizations  arising  from  a  certain  cultural  and 
historical tradition. (92)
The  importance  of  this  is  that  all  experiences  and  interpretations  of  history  are  contextually 
determined.  Furthermore,  both  the  experience  and  the  representation  of  particular  social 
constructions and historical moments as explanatory and meaningful in themselves are also to be 
contextualised. In other words, their representation in terms of tradition and teleological process is 
also historically determined, as is suggested in Meretoja’s analysis of Grass’s narrators.
The relation of the past with the present, which the notions of tradition and teleology bring 
forth,  is an important question not only for historians but also for literary critics.  Any form of 
representational art implicitly summons interpretations of the represented world, which indicates the 
socialising or cognitive function of art (in addition to any other principal functions it has in a given 
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theory of art). In addition to Meretoja’s examples, A. Robinson presents other approaches to history 
in  contemporary  fiction,  ranging  from  works  concerning  personal  identity,  such  as  Margaret 
Atwood’s The Blind Assassin (2000), to the national stories in Salman Rushdie’s fiction. Memories 
and traces of the past are turned into representations of history that concern very directly the models 
of reality that they as fictional wholes present, whether or not they discuss the nature of history 
thematically. Thus Meretoja’s essay reveals that the experience of a historical moment in a given 
ideological and social context is historical.
An example of a postmodern fiction that deals with history and the  present construction of 
historical narratives explicitly is Martin Amis’s novel  Time’s Arrow (1991). The novel narrates in 
reverse the crucial western human catastrophe, the Holocaust, which has also quite obviously been 
an important subject in historiography as well as in other forms of historical interpretation. Both 
through its backwards-proceeding historical narrative, and, as Baker argues, by juxtaposing Nazi 
ideas with post-war mass media melodrama, the novel deconstructs and disarms the excuses and 
psychological  distortions  of  the  protagonist  death  camp  doctor  (Baker  139–142).  The  sheer 
grotesqueness of the way the narrator turns the acts of Nazi doctors, their work in birthing healthy 
human beings out of the gas chambers and treatment rooms, into a salvational narrative, underlines 
the distortion of the actual euphemisms of the entire operation, of which the terms ‘solution’ to ‘a 
problem’ stand as an indicator.
Importantly, Baker also notes that  Time’s Arrow exemplifies the notion “that the means by 
which we interpret or attempt to represent a historical situation are themselves open to moral and 
ideological  critique” (145).  As a concrete example,  in his essay on our commemoration of the 
Holocaust, Timothy Snyder writes of the shortcomings that persevere even in its historiographical 
study. The historical narrative often centres on Germany, and to his disappointment often relies on 
German material, despite the fact that Eastern Europe was the area where most of the victims lived, 
and that the history of the event is larger in scope than that of (Nazi) Germany or (simply) anti-
Semitism (Snyder 80–82). Snyder argues that the conventional narrative is misleading in that “[t]he 
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history of a modern catastrophe takes on the form of a classical tragedy: decline and fall, with anti-
Semitism as the tragic flaw” (81). In other words, it seems as if this narrative is too effective, as the 
tension of anti-Semitism “[i]n literary terms” awaits its historical unravelling in catastrophe (Snyder 
81–2), in exactly the same way that the entire phenomenon awaits narration in tragic form. The 
problem of this narrative presentation is that its form begins to define its content, in that whereas 
with Germans, “anti-Semitism is presented as worthy of study as a problem within a civilization,” 
the “anti-Semitism in the lands where the Holocaust in fact took place appears […] as an ahistorical 
force” (Snyder 82; emphasis added). It thus becomes clear that narrative structure itself must be 
analysed in terms of its  ramifications on the content,  as well  as being subjected to “moral and 
ideological critique” (Baker 145).
Consequently,  Baker  notes how the  postmodern aspects  of  Amis’s  novel  self-referentially 
point to their own limitations and concomitantly critique the cultural logic governing all historical 
representation in postmodernity (146). This is seen in the way that the perspective is at the same 
time that of a Nazi criminal and through the textualisation of the world, “the cultural dominant of 
postmodernism”, as “Time’s Arrow may be read as a specifically postmodern attempt to rewrite the 
history of the Holocaust which simultaneously foregrounds the ways in which that rewriting reflects 
the Nazi justification of the act in the first place” (Baker 146).
The ramifications of this comparison align with Jameson’s theory of postmodernism. For even 
as the textualised history in Amis’s novel reveals the horrible psychological aversion of reality by 
the perpetrators of the genocide, in the very act of doing so the strategies enabling this revelation 
are implicated in the same ideology, indicating the “inadequacy of the postmodern reimagining of 
history”  (Baker  148).  Furthermore,  according  to  Jameson,  they  might  be  the  only  strategies 
available  in  a  narrativised,  anti-realist  postmodernity.  As  Baker  states,  at  its  seemingly  most 
utopian, the narration reveals itself as ideological (148). At the same time, the “utopian aspect” of 
the novel is found in this very moment, in that while it does not equate the two, the narration shows 
the persistence of the monstrous rhetoric in “the cultural forms of the contemporary”:
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the  utopian  aspect  of  Amis’s  novel  can  be  situated  in  the  continuously  (and  guiltily) 
implied expression of what it can never quite acknowledge: namely the horror of its own 
aesthetic mutilation of a narrative of others’ suffering. Time’s Arrow relies for its power on 
the reader’s appreciation of how its narrative has distorted the history of the  Endlosung. 
(Baker 148)
Again, the implication is that the utopian possibility of such a (historical) novel lies in its enactment 
of the insufficient standards by which any textual representation is bound to portray its referent: the 
representation of the unrepresentable (in this case, trauma), as in Lyotard’s sublime.
In my analysis of the historical narrative of Galileo in GD, I will apply these questions of the 
possibilities of narrative modes of representation – and the inevitability of their use. I will especially 
consider the (in)sufficiency of a single essentialised metanarrative to represent a historical world. 
This question itself is, I argue, part of the historiographical content of GD.
3.2 A Loss of History
Fredric  Jameson’s  well-known discussion on postmodernism approaches its  subject  matter  as  a 
periodizing endeavour: as the title of his work suggests, in Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic  
of Late Capitalism (1991) Jameson defines the postmodern as a cultural dominant of contemporary 
society (Postmodernism 5–6). By this approach he seeks to underline the pervasive influence of the 
reigning  mode  of  production  –  the  shift  in  the  organising  logic  of  society  that  differentiates 
modernism from postmodernism – while refraining from prescribing the postmodern as a single 
style that excludes the existence of difference and variety (Postmodernism 4–5). Consequently, he 
argues that the preponderance of exchange value “to the point at which the very memory of use 
value is effaced” is related to an addiction of a sort to pastiche images, an “appetite for a world 
transformed  into  sheer  images  of  itself”  (Postmodernism 18).  This  Baudrillardian  world  of 
simulacra “can now be expected to have a momentous effect on what used to be historical time”, as 
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the former in imitation of reality (or even preceding it) qualifies its experience and representation 
(Jameson, Postmodernism 18). The function and value of images has shifted:
The past is thereby modified: what was once, in the historical novel as Lukács defines it, 
the organic genealogy of the bourgeois collective project […] has meanwhile itself become 
a  vast  collection  of  images,  a  multitudinous  photographic  simulacrum.  In  faithful 
conformity to poststructuralist linguistic theory, the past as “referent” finds itself gradually 
bracketed, and then effaced altogether, leaving us nothing but texts.
Yet it should not be thought that this process is accompanied by indifference: on the 
contrary, the remarkable current intensification of an addiction to the photographic image 
is  itself  a  tangible  symptom  of  an  omnipresent,  omnivorous,  and  well-nigh  libidinal 
historicism. […] Nostalgia does not strike one as an altogether satisfactory word for such 
fascination (particularly when one thinks of the pain of a properly modernist nostalgia with 
a past beyond all but aesthetic retrieval) […]. (Jameson, Postmodernism 18–9)
The epistemological suggestion is that of the postmodern, anti-foundationalist historiography Alan 
A.  Robinson criticises,  but  Jameson’s  description is  not  quite  as  radical  as  that  of  Baudrillard 
himself.  The  change  in  historical  time  is  concomitant  with  an  addiction  or  appetite  for  its 
representation, which rather than effacing the referent altogether, complicates the division between 
true representations (that work to indicate a sense of historical necessities – an ultimately Marxist 
definition) and depthless images. Although Jameson’s tone is here very pessimistic, his persistent 
attempt to define or predict a more positive and critical way of engaging with the past (Baker 204–
5) suggests that his theory of the postmodern need not be used in its strictest Baudrillardian sense.
Hutcheon’s approach stresses that as the referent of art, the past is discursive, which means 
that  she promotes the possibility of fruitful  references to the past,  but  only in the sense that  a 
heterogeneous history (which Lyotard calls for) is more true and valuable than a (single) history that 
defines truthfulness on the basis of an impossible correspondence to the past that existed (but no 
longer does) (Hutcheon 24). Consequently, both arguments follow a logic similar to the aesthetic 
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historicism of Hayden White, for example, in that history is not a structure of knowledge that is 
legitimised  strictly  by  correspondence  to  past  events.  Furthermore,  as  the  evocation  of 
Baudrillardian simulacra suggests, Jameson sees that, in postmodernity, the historical content may 
be indistinguishable from other images, such as the pastiche creations of the present.
Jameson elaborates on this in his discussion on E.L. Doctorow’s Ragtime (1975), arguing that 
it exemplifies the postmodernist difficulty, if not impossibility, of representing the past. What he 
suggests is that  Ragtime acts out in its form what it is unable to do in its content, thematically 
(Postmodernism 25): “the way in which the kind of reading this novel imposes makes it virtually 
impossible for us to reach and thematise those official ‘subjects’ which float above the text but 
cannot  be  integrated  into  our  reading  of  the  sentences”  (Postmodernism 23).  Jameson’s 
interpretation of Doctorow’s oeuvre is that he “is the epic poet of the disappearance of the American 
radical past, of the suppression of older traditions and moments of the American radical tradition” 
(Postmodernism 24). As “the waning of the content” is, according to Jameson, the subject of the 
novel,  it  necessitates  the  fact  that  it  is  precisely  the  form  of  the  novel  that  represents  the 
disappearance  of  a  past,  a  referent  (Postmodernism  25).  The  logic  is  thus  similar  to  Lyotard’s 
postmodern  sublime,  in  that  the  novel  represents  in  its  form something  unrepresentable  –  the 
disappearance of history.
Both Jameson and Hutcheon underline the political message of Ragtime. For Hutcheon, it is 
crucial that it is the dispossessed in the novel who invent the “new aesthetic forms” – ragtime, for 
instance (Hutcheon 61–62). Jameson, however, focuses on the fact that these consequently suppress 
the transformative potential of the class struggle depicted (Postmodernism  23), as they turn the 
platforms and “those historical parameters in which [it] is situated” into a stage of simulacra (Baker 
55). The crucial difference is that Hutcheon sees this peculiar historical narrative with its cavalcade 
of elements of  varying ‘fictional  ontological’ backgrounds as an emancipatory challenge to  the 
historical  (meta)narratives  that  neglect  or  disempower  the  people  on  the  margins  of  the  grand 
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narratives,  whereas  Jameson  writes  from  a  slightly  different  perspective,  underlining  the 
nonrepresentational nature of this kind of narrative. 
As Baker notes, Jameson sees postmodernism, the entire cultural  logic, as an inescapable 
horizon  (55).  Jameson’s  analysis  of  Doctorow  is  incisive,  for  if  the  figures  of  Ragtime are 
representational,  they  are  so  in  a  very  peculiar  way.  They  are  certainly  in  some  sense 
“incommensurable” to a levelling onto similar historically referential roles, being a collection of 
fictional, intertextual and historical characters, and as such very much incompatible, “like oil and 
water” (Postmodernism 22). Jameson’s point is that it  is remarkable that a “seemingly realistic” 
historical  novel  about  the  ‘waning’  of  a  collective  enterprise  utilises,  necessarily,  such 
“nonrepresentational”  figures  (Postmodernism  23).  He  suggests  that  the  historical  moment  or 
“synchronic totality” portrayed is no longer representable by some other narrative such as realism – 
that the only way to represent the theme is by way of these images from the present, always already 
interpreted prior to the moment of reading (Postmodernism 24). It is very much as if the characters 
in Ragtime have like simulacra superseded their historical referents:
If there is any realism left  [in cultural production], it  is a “realism” that is [...]  slowly 
becoming aware of a new and original historical situation in which we are condemned to 
seek History by way of our own pop images and simulacra of that history, which itself 
remains forever out of reach. (Jameson, Postmodernism 25)
This postmodern ahistoricity is for Jameson partly due to the mode in which these representations 
are  constructed.  For  Jameson,  the  collective  presence  of  the  characters  of  Ragtime has  the 
metafictional effect of revealing the inadequacy of their historical reference. Similarly to the case of 
Amis’s Time’s Arrow, the representation of the history is unavoidably structured in the object of its 
criticism:  where  Amis was  forced to  use  the  anti-realist  expression  to  show the  horror  of  the 
pervasively  reified  language,  Doctorow  has  used  the  non-representational  form  to  work  the 
representational dilemma. Therefore, as de Groot describes this theoretical outlook, “[d]ue to the 
breakdown in signification and representation […], contemporary society finds itself in the position 
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of  the  schizophrenic,  unable  to  appreciate  the  passing  of  time  because  of  the  corruption  of 
language”  (114).  The  postmodern  consciousness,  afflicting  the  reader  and  the  writer,  is 
schizophrenic  in  that  the  signifiers  that  ground  meaning  and  reference  are  now incoherent  in 
relation  to  other  each  other,  the  coherence  of  the  individual  experience  being  simultaneously 
fragmented (de Groot,  114).  Historical  experience loses integrity in the moment  it  is placed in 
context with other signifiers.
On  the  other  hand,  as  mentioned,  as  Jameson’s  theory  of  postmodernism  encompasses 
postmodern culture as a whole,  he is  also continually seeking ways in which cultural  products 
represent  and  seek  to  criticise  the  contemporary  mode.  There  are  thus  explicit  problems  for 
Jameson’s emphasis on an all-pervasive cultural industry (of a sort) that precludes critical voices to 
exist,  which  nonetheless  coexists  with  his  accepting  outlook  on  postmodernism,  arguing  for  a 
(temporarily)  incommensurable  utopian  possibility  (Baker  202–203).  Consequently,  such  more 
readily optimistic  views of specifically  historical representation as Hutcheon’s historiographical 
metafiction seem to share with Jameson some aspects of the postmodern.
The differences are  located in  their  belief  in  the critical  possibility  of  fiction despite  the 
perpetuation of strategies of the image and modes of nostalgia. For Hutcheon, the critical possibility 
lies in the use of parody, which she defines in the postmodernist context as a textual strategy that 
not only ridicules in its imitation, but can also utilise sincerely or revere the imitated, despite being 
implicated in and critical of its reapplication (34). Parody evokes the past in the present and “allows 
an  artist  to  speak  to a  discourse  from  within it,  but  without  being  totally  recuperated  by  it” 
(Hutcheon 35; emphasis original). In Hutcheon’s theory, parody is precisely the “mode” that allows 
the  “ex-centric”  to  criticise  the  dominant  ideology,  on  the  periphery  of  which  they  lie  (35). 
Although  Hutcheon  and  Jameson  see  ‘the  postmodern’ very  differently,  I  would  argue  that 
Hutcheon’s formulation of parody is parallel to notion of the possibilities of the individual work of 
art, which Baker found to be a point missed by Jameson. If, following Baker, the inconsistencies of 
Jameson’s lament and utopian expectations are to be seen as unnecessary, the fissure of critical 
40
distance, which lies between the critical potential of individual artistic works and the cultural mode 
that absorbs it (Baker 204), can be conceptualised as Hutcheon’s parody.
Following Paul Cantor, Baker  acknowledges in Don DeLillo’s work an instance of cultural 
ahistoricism. Cantor notes the way DeLillo portrays Hitler doing a Chaplin impersonation on a lost 
film reel in his novel Running Dog (1978), which, along with passages laden with postmodern irony 
in  White  Noise  (Baker  110–111),  exemplifies  DeLillo’s  boundless  ‘postmodernising’,  which 
“repudiates the very concept of history and historical specificity itself” (Cantor 60): representing all 
events  as  postmodern  simulacra  and  including  narrators  and  characters  in  the  same  logic,  all 
historical difference or rather, difference of the past, is swept under a uniform postmodern pastiche.
Baker notes how this ahistoricism of the postmodern is a peculiarly Marxist interpretation of 
the  loss  of  individual  and  collective  stability  in  modernity,  their  reification  as  it  were,  which 
prompts the assessment of a lost history (124). Baker states that “[t]he postmodern historical novel, 
to the  postmarxists, is not principally the reproduction of a historical narrative […] but is more 
concerned with the  creation of history, the rediscovery of a historical  dimension in the reading 
process  itself”  (126;  emphasis  added).  Thus,  postmodern  fiction  can  be  seen  firstly  as 
heterogeneous dissidence in terms of subject positions, and secondly as a reappraising criticism in 
terms of  all “authorative” historical, totalising narratives, as opposed to the Marxist position of 
ruing a lost perspective that came with certain communal positions (Baker 126–127).
This section has introduced the fears for a lost authentic history in postmodern representation, 
which  is  found  particularly  in  Jameson’s  analysis  of  postmodernism.  This  loss  of  history,  or 
historicity, derives from an immersion in the present culture, in its strategies of pastiche, parody, 
and irony. In my analysis, this framework is valuable in questioning the possibility of authentic or 
truly  worthwhile  historical  representation  according  to  the  specific  style  and  form  of  K.S. 
Robinson’s novel. In other words, the reservations articulated by Jameson and alleviated somewhat 
by Baker form the critical backdrop of an analysis of a science fictional, counterfactual  narrative 
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that features anachronistic juxtaposition. The question these reservations posit is whether intended 
postmodern anachronism occludes the history in the historical fiction of GD.
3.3 Historical Reference and Construction: Counterfactuality and Historical 
Figures
Intertextuality, historical figures, and counterfactuals in fiction are points in the text that make the 
use of history explicit. They open the text and discursive strategies for inspection and analysis in a 
way that is analogical to the ‘presence of history’ in a work in general. In the same way that history 
is most often identified with agents and events, their analysis in fiction points to the problems and 
possibilities inherent with their representation. This chapter discusses these notions, counterfactuals 
and signification, which are explicit elements and themes in GD as well.
The way Amis’s Time’s Arrow breaks the conventional historical narrative, as discussed in the 
previous section,  points us towards counterfactual  historical  fiction.  At  its  most unproblematic, 
alternative or counterfactual history portrays events and continua that run contrary to what is known 
to  have  happened  differently  or  to  be  impossible.  Alternate  histories  can  be  used  even  in 
historiography  to  demonstrate  that  the  historical  causalities  we  now see  are  considerately  less 
determinate when the events are considered from the point of view of individuals living through the 
past events in question (de Groot 171). A. Robinson sees this as a shift in perspective from the 
present past to that of the past present and, crucially, the past futures imagined and conjectured in 
that past moment (35). Consequently, whether or not a narrative portrays alternative history, the 
counterfactual  assumptions and desires of characters also give rise  to “poignancy and dramatic 
irony”, as the reader knows the destinies of the characters and the true results of historical events, of 
which the characters can have no foreknowledge (A. Robinson 35).
Dolezel makes a similar point in a short discussion on possible-worlds theory, stating that “[i]f 
there is a lesson to be learned from historicism, it is this: that the past was what the present is – an 
actual space in which living people pursue intentional acting” (800). By showing the changed world 
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arising from specific counterfactual events or circumstances, the counterfactual history superficially 
follows the same logic  as a conventional history that  supports a view of history and historical 
causality as an inevitable prelude to the present. What Dolezel’s and A. Robinson’s descriptions 
underline, however, is the fact that the possibility of positing an alternative to the factual narrative 
itself suggests a picture of past moments as open to their contemporaries. The alternatives question 
the force of historical  causalities by juxtaposing them with other factors that  were existent and 
effective at the time.
As Karen Hellekson describes, alternate histories (and counterfactuals in general, I might add)
question the nature of history and of causality; they question accepted notions of time and 
space; they rupture linear movement; and they make readers rethink their world and how it 
has become what it is. They are a critique of the metaphors we use to discuss history. And 
they  foreground  the  ‘constructedness’ of  history  and  the  role  narrative  plays  in  this 
construction. (The Alternate History 4–5)
As Hellekson shows, alternate histories in novels can for instance question the cause or birth of a 
historical  narrative/world,  argue for or against  “a teleological  model of history” that  affirms an 
inevitability in human history, discuss randomness and chaos and the lack of definable causalities, 
and query the role of individuals and their impact on history or the future (The Alternate History 
10).  Counterfactuals  thus  inevitably  discuss  and  portray  “model[s]  for  organizing  history” 
(Hellekson, The Alternate History 10). The evocation of a counterfactual detail or element suggests 
something about the way in which society and history are constructed, about the power or weakness 
of ideas,  ideologies,  individuals,  and structures of feeling,  in  that  they are  juxtaposed with the 
knowledge of the reader.
For example, Philip Roth’s The Plot Against America (2005) presents an alternative history of 
the United States where anti-Semitism has become a part of the nation’s official policies. The story 
thus takes an aspect of the actual society and via its alternative history shows how these actually 
existent anti-Semitic sympathies become a defining aspect of the ‘history’ of this society, in this 
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different  turn  of  events.  History  is  here  organised  in  terms  of  historical  individuals  (Charles 
Lindbergh winning the presidency) but also in terms of ideas and ideologies (the relevance of anti-
Semitism and its popularity).  As de Groot writes, the effect of the novel is partly a questioning of 
“the teleology of united nationhood” (179) that is associated with many western societies during the 
Second World War. In addition to being subject to comparison by the existence of a real alternative, 
counterfactuals can thus also be used as a self-aware criticism of that history or the way it is written. 
Furthermore, it could be argued that this is something that counterfactuals always implicitly do, as 
this reading is always enabled by the reader’s final act of interpretation.
Hellekson furthermore  argues  that  alternative  history  in  fiction  has important  ethical  and 
psychological  functions,  namely  the  opening  of  the  present  to  possibilities  and  options  (The 
Alternate History 110–111). Past moments are shown to be composed not only of the causalities and 
the plotting that are inscribed into history (as a metanarrative). Instead, the way in which fictional 
alternative  histories  (as  well  as  historical  fiction  in  general)  introduce  non-canonical  or  non-
historical choices and aspirations, and the plotting that is based on them, suggests that the present 
with its indeterminate consequences is also part of the processes of ‘making history.’ According to 
Hellekson, “[t]he personal thus becomes the universal, and individuals find themselves making a 
difference in the context of historical movement” (The Alternate History 111). The ‘past futures’ of 
the characters evoke the present cognition of the reader. I would argue that this is the sense in which 
alternate  history  acts  as  a  concentrate  of  the  imperatives  of  historical  fiction,  or  the  historical 
elements in fiction: it brings the concept of history to the fore with all the persevering questions and 
problems it involves. However, I would argue that the opposite of Hellekson’s argument is also true. 
The  multiple  causalities  of  historical  fiction  do  not  always  argue  that  individual  agency  is  a 
determining factor in historical causalities, for example, and the same is true for alternate history.
The way novels exhibit historical dependencies can underline the effect (or the complete lack 
of  explanatory power)  of  individual  agents  and events,  or  conversely  larger  structures  such as 
ideologies and gothic or naturalistic transhistorical stigmas. This aspect is present in Roth’s  The 
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Plot Against America as well, as de Groot notes how the unexpected becomes inevitable in history 
(178). He argues that “Roth’s ‘terror of the unforeseen’ makes history, and the writing of historical 
fiction, possibly, a way of understanding and dealing with the horrors of potentiality, of not being an 
individual with agency but someone prey to the inevitable chaos of history” (178).
Alternate histories only emphasize what is a part of all historical fiction, however, if viewed 
from the standpoint of  comparison to the actual  run of  past  events.  Although historical  fiction 
usually  adheres  to  known  historical  facts,  it  is  nonetheless  “[a]s  a  hybrid  genre”  always 
counterfactual,  specifically  in  the  way  it  narrativises  history  in  markedly  fictional  terms  (A. 
Robinson 30): counterfactual novels then “flag the liberties that the historical novel takes with the 
historical  record”  (de  Groot  173).  Contemporary  literary  conventions  and  the  ever  more 
complicated  notions  of  fiction  and  historical  facts  allow  postmodernist  fiction,  especially 
historiographic  metafiction,  to  challenge  repeatedly  this  adherence  to  known  history  and  the 
ontological logic – coherence and non-contradiction – of the real past, in addition to the already 
traditional genre of alternate fiction (A. Robinson 30).
For example, Pynchon's  Mason & Dixon (1997), being a “postmodern novel, written in an 
eighteenth-century  style  and  employing  nineteenth-century  conventions  of  characterisation,” 
foregrounds the textual media which are used and the meanings that these forms carry and are used 
to discuss (Baker 135). The novel suggests “something of how history has affected the forms that 
[the understanding of ourselves and of others] of the subject have taken” (Baker 125), in essence 
showing  the  historical  determination  of  our  knowledge.  Following  Hutcheon,  they  deny  the 
“pretense of simplistic  mimesis” and furthermore offer fiction “as another of the discourses by 
which we construct our versions of reality” (Hutcheon 40).
What is important to keep in mind, however, is that, as A. Robinson notes, the “[n]arratorial 
projection of possible futures is  […] a sleight  of hand, designed to arouse the illusion that,  as 
characters and readers are caught up in the the dynamic unfolding of the plot, the ending of the 
story is not yet determined” (39). This is even contradicted in the typical, past tense narration of 
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historical fiction. Therefore, even in the case of explicitly fictional characters, and especially with 
historical figures as characters, the outcome of the narrative is always already predetermined. The 
point here is that even though characters may project their own futures, they always adhere to the 
plans of the narrator or (implied) author.
The  presence  of  historical  figures  or  ‘actual  human  beings’ in  fiction  raises  questions 
concerning the ontological status of fiction and the referentiality of texts. Since judging the veracity 
of fiction is not entirely sensible, the more relevant question concerning literary ontology can be 
formed in terms of the aesthetic and functional effects of juxtaposing explicitly fictive and explicitly 
factual  material  in fiction.  Characters and figures are interesting objects of study in this sense, 
because they act as individual locations and signs in the text where extratextual reference come to 
the fore. As Cohn states, “[c]learly, when it comes to presenting the inner life of historical figures, 
the  historian’s  and  the  novelist’s  narrative  domains  are  most  sharply  and  most  noticeably 
contrasted” (154).
Herb Wyile notes, on the basis of Naomi Jacobs’s  The Character of Truth (1990), how the 
expectations of adherence to historical facts constrains the use of historical figures in traditional, or 
realist, historical fiction (16). Brian McHale points to the same tendency, underlining the way in 
which realist historical novels attempt to hide the artificiality of their “projected worlds” by making 
the fiction and the different types of characters, explicitly fictional ones and others with a historical 
referent,  conform  to  accepted  history  (16–7).  Thus  Scott’s  historical  novels  portray  historical 
characters as perceived from the outside, as secondary characters, in order to promote the effect of 
historical authenticity – observed from the outside they can be made to adhere to the history the 
reader  knows to have happened (Hutcheon 114). On the contrary, Doctorow’s The Book of Daniel 
(1971) and Robert Coover’s  The Public Burning (1977) make considerable changes to history in 
their portrayal of the Rosenberg trial and the people and events surrounding it. Thus in postmodern 
fiction, the representation of the historical event or the historical figure is freer to deviate from 
known facts, which openly shows the fictionality of the representation by not hiding the cracks that 
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separate the ontologically distinct entities. Yet, the novels are seen as discussing the actual past and 
not an alternate history.
If the characters of fiction are to be seen as mimetic at all, then, as Wyile argues, the “literary 
imagination” of fiction, especially historical fiction, shares with historical writing its fundamentally 
intertextual nature:  not only the manner of composition, but also some of the  material for that 
composition is shared (28). This view posits them as partaking in the same discourse, although with 
different expectations, “a different set of rhetorical strategies – in particular a less sustained gestural 
intention”  (Wyile  28).  Catherine  Gallagher  argues  that  in  encountering  historical  characters  in 
historical fiction the reader acknowledges the historical/real referent of the fiction, but does not read 
everything about that character as historical information, particularly due to the expectations of the 
fiction’s noncontradiction with history (320–321). Instead, readers distinguish between the fictional 
and historical observations as coming “in the  subjunctive voice” and as historical interpretation, 
respectively (321; emphasis original). Gallagher notes the narration of characters’ thoughts as an 
example of fictional material, which follows Dorrit Cohn’s ‘signposts of fictionality’ (discussed in 
section 2.2 above). Interestingly, Gallagher notes that the “doubleness” of alternate history fiction, 
the way historical characters in counterfactual situations make choices or end in the same situations 
as their historical referents did in reality, reinforces the sense of fictional entities as having the 
“personal  referents”  that  their  proper  names  suggest  (327–328).  For  instance,  although  in  a 
counterfactual narrative Napoleon might have held on to his rule longer than in reality, he would 
still be betrayed by Joachim Murat later on, exactly as really happened (Gallagher 327). Gallagher 
remarks that the historical characters’ “very capacity to sustain counterfactual conjectures,” the fact 
that their actions and contexts adhere to the expectations their real counterparts’ personalities give 
rise to, ascertains the sign of this referential relation instead of mitigating it (327–328).
Possible-worlds theory links together such historical references in fiction as historical figures 
and allusions as well  as counterfactuals or  alternate histories.  Furthermore,  the question of  the 
function of  these elements in  fiction is  somewhat  clearer  if  approached momentarily  from this 
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perspective. Dolezel argues that “[a]s non-actualized possibles, all fictional entities are of the same 
ontological nature. Tolstoy’s Napoleon is no less fictional than his Pierre Bezuchov, and Dickens’s 
London  no  more  actual  than  Carroll’s  Wonderland”  (788).  Nonetheless,  their  “actual-world 
background”  points  to  the  “ineradicable  relationship”  between  historical  entities  (Napoleon, 
London)  and  their  fictional  permutations  (Dolezel  788).  Although  “thin  and  theoretically 
controversial,” the connection between entities in different (possible) worlds is “the proper name as 
rigid designator” (Dolezel 789). The theme of this section is made explicit in Dolezel’s description 
of how
the macrostructural  opposition between fictional and historical  worlds comes into sight 
most clearly when one considers a literary genre where fiction and history seem to merge, 
that is, historical fiction. It is a defining feature of the genre that fictional persons coexist 
and interact  with counterparts of historical persons. Thus in E. L. Doctorow’s  Ragtime 
(1974)  Emma Goldman,  Teddy Roosevelt,  Harry  Houdini,  Sigmund Freud,  and others 
mingle with Father, the little boy, younger brother, Mameh, Tateh, the little girl, and so on. 
This feature gives Doctorow’s novel its literary effect, but invalidates it as a model of the 
American  society  at  the  beginning of  the  twentieth  century.  No possible  world  where 
counterparts of historical persons cohabit with fictional persons is an adequate model of 
the actual past. (793)
Dolezel thus argues that in terms of the possible-worlds framework, the historical importance of any 
historical  allusion that is placed into a fictional context is removed. An identical argument was 
made by Cohn (and Ricoeur) as mentioned in section 2.2 above.
While the distinction between fictional and historical worlds is identical to other theories, a 
possible-worlds approach does nonetheless hint at the way historiography’s ontological creations 
are  analogous  to  the  worlds  of  fiction,  at  least  following certain  philosophies  of  history.  It  is 
specifically the “transworld identities” (Dolezel 787) of elements that are found in several different 
types of possible worlds, as well as reality itself, which shows the connection, if only from the 
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literary point of view. For although each creation or fiction is autonomous, the linking together of 
information and figures is not only a default, neutral choice. If it were, all possible worlds of fiction 
would exist independent of all the historical (and contextual) information that is obviously utilised 
in their interpretation (and indeed their decipherment).
My aim is not to exploit the superficial features of the theory, but to show how the complete 
differentiation of a fictional world or discourse from other possible worlds or representations of 
worlds is not as straightforward as one might suppose, which seems evident precisely in the case of 
counterfactual fiction and historical characters. If we presume historical accounts and narratives to 
construct mutually distinct and somewhat incommensurable histories out of the past (by following 
constructionist  history),  then  those histories  can be  seen  as  possible  worlds  that  are  always  as 
necessarily distinct from the the past as any incomplete representation is from reality. The fictions 
that include historical, i.e., transworld figures or counterfactuals, do not construct historical worlds, 
as Dolezel states, because they do not seek to model the past, but they rather evoke the worlds that 
do model it – these possible worlds of historiographical representation.
The point here is that the possible worlds thus approached become relevant to the reader in 
ethical  and political  terms in  overlapping ways.  For  example,  a  factual  history  of  Lee  Harvey 
Oswald is necessarily commented by Don DeLillo’s Libra, and its model for organising history (to 
use Hellekson’s term). Baker notes that DeLillo’s texts are located “somewhere between the now 
that rewrites its past and the past that will become the now, while simultaneously – and critically – 
dramatising the inter-dependence of these two apparently contradictory stances” (119). Willman 
similarly argues that “Libra inscribes the ideological (and epistemological) limits to any account of 
the JFK assassination in its adoption of astrology as a formal principle, which is constrained to 
oscillate between the poles of contingency and conspiracy” (636). The oscillation of the explanatory 
logic furthermore represents the contradictions of the real world, offering some form of instructions 
for the reading of the history, even though it does explicitly refuse to be the factual or literal truth of 
the matter (Willman 637). The form of the history is made explicit, capable of being judged by the 
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novel’s  plotting,  even  if  it  was  not  so  before  the  structuration  that  the  novel  exhibits,  in 
juxtaposition to the history. On this level the possible worlds of fiction and history are therefore 
parallel: the fictional plotting first of all makes evident the structuration of history, if it was not 
evident as historiography, but they also offer comparable historical metaknowledge, meaning the 
interpretations that are to be made of the worlds as purposive representations.
What is related to this is the notion of the referentiality of more abstract and less specific 
qualities of objects and evaluations that fiction presents, and the significance of these in the various 
functions of art. Pavel notes how the question of fiction’s imitation of reality is not only a matter of 
specific  objects  represented  (historical  figures  as  proper  names,  for  example),  but  also  the 
inferences about abstract qualities and normative content of fiction (536–537). The latter is, Pavel 
argues,  often taken for granted,  in that  they imitate reality in a different way in comparison to 
characters and events: For example, “[i]n Stendhal’s The Red and the Black, properties and notions 
such as commoner,  aristocrat, ambitious, in love,  proud,  obstinate, indifferent, and the like cannot 
be said to be invented in the same way in which Julien Sorel, the main character, is” (537; emphasis 
original). Although Dolezel argues that a “view which presents fictional persons as a mixed bag of 
‘real  people’ and ‘purely fictitious characters’ leads to  serious theoretical  difficulties,  analytical 
confusions,  and  naive  critical  practice”  (788),  Pavel’s  notion  of  the  various  kinds  of  content 
designated by the proper names shows that their decipherment involves a partly actual reference.
Specifically  when  portraying  counterfactual  circumstances,  fiction  reveals  reality  from  a 
different perspective and challenges actuality (Pavel 529). Pavel notes how “the idealist novel” and 
“antirealist narrative prose” (529) in particular challenge the taken-for-granted properties and show 
their normative content. The difficulty for fictional representation is that the imitation that Pavel 
discusses is never straightforward. As he shows, the properties and characteristics making up a 
proper name are “not uniformly reducible to a set  of observable facts, [they] cannot be copied 
directly but can only be highlighted indirectly, through examples of human actions” (530), which in 
turn never “necessarily represent” the norms, values and attitudes that they are by convention (as 
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‘taken-for-granted’) perceived to embody (531). The poetic and pragmatic ambiguity of Achilles’s 
actions in the Iliad and the shifting evaluation of the behaviour and motivation of such a figure as 
Napoleon serve as Pavel’s examples of the way human action is always interpretative (531). The 
representation of actual historical figures is part of this evaluation, both of the character and action 
that are endowed with normative content, as well as that content itself.
The ‘character’ is built on the basis of their actions, as well as their cognition. Therefore, the 
fictional showing and telling of action and cognition presents a situation similar to the interpretation 
of factual (and actual) phenomena. A specific historiographical text about Thomas Cromwell, for 
example, presents facts about him and what he is known to have said and done. Hilary Mantel’s 
Wolf Hall (2009) presents him doing some of these things, which denotes his correspondence to the 
historical person, but in addition to this the novel has leeway to present fictional facets of the person 
(cognition,  most  clearly)  which  depart  from  the  facts  (and  signals  the  fictionality  of  the 
representation).
I would argue that  counterfactual  fiction is an interesting example of this process,  as the 
notion of doubleness that Gallagher identified shows. Dolezel’s possible-worlds theory would place 
the fictional Cromwell in a fictional world, but conjecturing the doubleness of a historical character 
in a novel hints that deviating actions can be accounted to be performed by the historical character, 
in the specific fictional world of the novel. This is due to the idea that the actions that initially make 
up the person or character ‘permit’ the recognition of a fictional character’s counterfactual actions 
to comply with the historical character. Again, the point is not to distort the factual reconstruction of 
known past events, but to indicate the ways fiction discusses the construction, interpretation and 
ethical evaluation of the past events.
By distancing themselves  from the  actual  world,  the  possible  worlds  and counterfactuals 
(may) explicitly call into question the automatic endowment of certain values and causalities with 
the actual, social world. A clear facet of this is the attention paid to world-construction, which is 
very apparent in alternate histories (Gallagher 333), as well as science fiction, where interest in 
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questions  of  space  surpass  those  of  time  (Jameson,  Archaeologies  313).  Discussing  alternate 
histories,  Phillip E. Wegner in fact  notes that  “[t]he fundamental  challenge to our sense of the 
necessity and naturalness of our present reality” is a “supreme […] operation” of science fiction 
(38). As Pavel argues, antirealist forms challenge specifically the automatic endowment of abstract 
qualities with actions and words. The poetics of Kurt Vonnegut, for example, often expresses this 
objective, as do magical realism and aspects of post-colonial literature. Vonnegut’s subversion of 
nationalist  impulses  and deconstruction  of  symbols  by  positing  quite  naïve  pictures  of  objects 
(flags, etc.) next to descriptions of the importance of these as symbols and as the referents of these 
symbols in  Breakfast of the Champions (1973), or his use of the ubiquitous phrase ‘so it goes,’ 
would seem to point to and raise questions about the taken-for-granted normative content of objects 
and attitudes, precisely in the way Pavel visions literature to do.
I would argue that it is self-evident that historical interpretation is sought because of its ethical 
and pragmatic value. The role of fiction is that it addresses the historical material, the content of the 
historical world. Moreover, it exposes and exhibits the epistemological act of using that knowledge 
to  construct  historical  models that  are always ‘real’ in  that  they structure reality  into historical 
scripts  and  schemata.  The  clearest  example  of  this  is  the  simplification  or  misconception  that 
history itself  is a factor or force in the actual  world.  Thomas Pavel’s description of the ethical 
processes of fiction as imitation is thus applicable when he states that
The normative inferences triggered by a work of fiction can lead to substantial hypotheses 
concerning the foundations of the moral and political world, to more circumscribed ‘if, 
then’ statements,  to considerations regarding the process of interpretation itself,  and to 
critical  speculations concerning the relations between the  normative  perspective of  the 
literary work and the artistic procedures it displays (537–38)
Pavel notes the possibility of making a (crude) division between the unreal facts regarding fictional 
beings and the serious, normative, and in some sense more universal facts or judgements to be 
inferred from the fictional entities (537). Thus on the one hand purely fictional characters such as 
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Anna Karenina, Leopold Bloom and Saleem Sinai may not imitate anything specific in reality, but 
their particularity and presentation nevertheless creates an interpretive framework on the basis of 
which the reader makes inferences regarding the moral and political world (as well as its artificial 
existence  and  its  peculiarities).  Moreover,  the  way  that  fictional  narratives  overtly  show  the 
formation of historical identity, as for example in the cases of Napoleon, Emma Goldman, or Lee 
Harvey Oswald, underlines the process of interpretation and the construction of history out of a 
conglomerate  of  actions  and  ideas.  In  other  words,  as  the  birth  of  the  normative  content  and 
connotations of a proper name is shown, debated, or altogether questioned, historical experience 
and meaning are discussed.
Furthermore,  considering  explicit  historical  figures  in  fiction,  the  imitative  or  mimetical 
aspect is different. These fictional objects have a referent or a transworld identity, and in addition to 
relating to the actual political and moral world surrounding the reader, they evoke the historical 
framework, another historical world. It is obvious that some representations of historical existence 
seem and are anachronistic, but the presence of history,  underlined by historical  characters and 
counterfactuals, gives rise to the following question: “even if you know the fate of the character, the 
historical events, and the meaning given to them, do you know (what it feels like to experience) 
them?”  Discussing  Philip  Roth’s  counterfactual  novel,  de  Groot  similarly  points  to  how 
understanding of “history as ‘what was the case’ […] is distinct from actually experiencing history,” 
and moreover how this is made possible specifically by “the counterfactual form” (179).
Counterfactuals similarly point to the history ‘we know,’ i.e., to the historiographical facts, 
but ask whether we understand the complexity of communal time and social change as well as the 
nature of the relation of the present to the past.  As Hellekson specifies,  alternate histories can 
discuss the latter question in terms of models for organising history (The Alternate History  10), 
whether  in  continuity,  teleological  progression,  chaos  and  randomness,  and  the  artificiality  as 
opposed to structural longevity and (communal) memory.
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3.4  Genealogy
Fredric Jameson’s understanding of the representation of history and reality relies on psychoanalytic 
theory, specifically on Freud’s and Lacan’s conceptions of reality, the imaginary, and the symbolic. 
Discussing the social construction of historical subtexts, Jameson opens cultural interpretation to 
involve the criticism of representation, historical and otherwise. Michel Foucault’s practice (and/or 
theory)  of  genealogy  similarly  discusses  historical  representation  and  narrative  construction  in 
critical terms. Foucault himself has noted that what he calls the genealogical approach is “a form of 
history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects etc., 
without having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field 
of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history” (Foucault 117). It is thus 
heterogeneous  as  history,  creating  difference  by  hypothesising  the  conditions  of  possibility  for 
structures of knowledge and discourses, instead of providing a single narrative leading up to the 
present, one created on the basis of current narratives and models of thought.
Charles Shepherdson has discussed Foucault’s relation to history and psychoanalytic reality 
and explains how genealogy is for Foucault a discussion of the present formulations of questions, of 
the formation of knowledge (7). He describes the historicist narratives that Foucault presents in 
such works as  History of Madness and  The Archaeology of Knowledge in terms of their peculiar 
relation to historiography, their “historical issue”:
[They operate] neither as "mere" fiction, nor simply as truth, neither as an entertaining 
disclosure of strange practices long ago forgotten, nor as a compilation of facts about the 
past, but rather by rebounding upon us, to show us who we are for the first time, as if in 
spite of everything these bizarre images were portraits of ourselves. (Shepherdson 7)
Foucault’s texts are not (primarily or solely) alternative histories, but in some sense the underside of 
homogeneous or genetic historiographical narratives: “Foucault’s work touches on something that 
does not belong to history, or even to philosophy, something we might speak of as fiction” – it is “a 
kind of action, what Foucault calls a ‘making of differences’” (Shepherdson 8). The ethical function 
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of the genealogical narrative is that it reveals heterogeneity where histories of progression creates 
homogeneity, shows the common origins of concepts standard history constructs as opposite. For 
example, in History of Madness Foucault explicates how in the grand narratives of history reason is 
separated from madness,  “concealing their  original  relation”,  their  common origin,  and by this 
historiographical  operation  forming  into  “a  construction  whose  supposedly  natural  status  is  a 
fiction” the entire structure of the separation and polarity of reason and madness (Shepherdson 15–
17).
Consequently,  although  Foucault  does  offer  alternative  narratives  of  history  in  his 
genealogical approach to knowledge and discourses, this is not his goal. On the contrary, Foucault 
does not view repressed narratives, opinions, and passions as forms of opposition or resistance to 
the reigning discourse, but as its correlate, following from and belonging “to the apparatus of power 
itself” (Shepherdson 25). Consequently, genealogy
does not aim at recovering lost voices, or restoring the rights of a marginalized discourse 
(speaking on behalf of the prisoners, or recovering the discourse of madness). Genealogy 
does not participate in this virtuous battle between good and evil, but is rather an operation 
that goes back to the origins, the first moments when an opposition between madness and 
reason [for example] took shape, and came to be ordered as a truth. (Shepherdson 26)
Foucault’s interest is not in creating a (more) heterogeneous image of historical narratives in order 
to write grand narratives that incorporate the newly visible oppositional and alternative processes in 
a single function, i.e. “the signification of discourses” and their more accurate archaeology (Pieters 
35).  On  the  contrary,  Foucault  explores  the  structures  of  knowledge  that  made  the  discourses 
possible  in  the first  place  (Pieters  35)  as  well  as the “politics of  the scientific  statement” that 
governs what can be known (as true) (Foucault 112).
This final subsection provides a methodology with which to describe the discursive constructs 
within GD, such as ‘science,’ and ‘religion,’ and their relation to each other. Specifically, it enables 
us to address questions concerning the birth of metanarratives and the foundation of representative 
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authority. This perspective will be evoked particularly in section 4.2 with respect to the explicit 
historical content of GD, and the metanarratives of history depicted in it.
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4. Analysis
Galileo’s Dream is a novel that shifts continuously between scenes indicating its nature as historical 
fiction on the one hand and science fiction on the other. The historical dimension is dominant, in 
that its protagonist is Galileo Galilei and its milieu is for the most part seventeenth-century Italy. 
The narrative revolves largely around Galileo’s astronomical discoveries and their ramifications for 
his life and career,  although significant emphasis is laid on his domestic  life  as well.  The plot 
therefore  seemingly  follows  the  effects  of  Galileo  receiving  a  telescope  from  the  character 
Ganymede, who has travelled from a semi-utopian future to Galileo to affect his past (the future and 
fate of Galileo).  Ganymede’s motive is  to  create a  martyr out  of  Galileo,  in order to  raise  the 
prestige  of  science  and create  a  potentially  brighter  history  for  his  utopian  society.  The  novel 
recurrently depicts discussions on Galileo’s role and his effect for the history that follows him, and 
in these discussions, it is the character Hera that opposes Ganymede’s presuppositions. She tries to 
provide Galileo with a modern perspective of his context and his patriarchal behaviour in particular. 
The narrator, who is gradually revealed to be a deictic character in his own narrative, presents these 
events and discussions and intermittently comments on them. Having come with Ganymede from 
the future to follow Galileo as his servant, the narrator too is aware of Galileo’s historical role and 
legacy.  Although the  science  fictional  elements  are  abundant  in  the  narrative,  while  living  his 
‘historical’ life in Italy, Galileo is ignorant of the fantastic elements of the story itself, making the 
depiction of his actions conform for the most part to the norms of historical fiction.
On the basis of the theoretical  background introduced in chapters 2 and 3,  my aim is to 
describe and analyse the representation of history in  GD. On the one hand I am interested in the 
novel’s thematisation of history. The central questions that arise from the fact that history is as a 
concept, a metanarrative in itself, explicitly discussed by the characters as well as the narrator of the 
novel include the following ones: why, that is, to what purpose is history discussed overtly?; How is 
it  depicted,  for  instance,  in  what  forms?;  What  is  the relation of  the fictional  depiction to  the 
philosophies of history, to historiography as a knowledge? My answers to these questions draw on 
the definition of history and its referential dimensions.
On  the  other  hand,  GD is  purely  fictional  and  functions  not  as  a  historiographical, 
epistemologically motivated discussion,  but with primarily aesthetic and ethical,  I would argue, 
intentions.  Therefore, I  wish to determine how its fictional,  counterfactual  history engages in a 
dialogue with historiography, specifically in terms of its composition and narrative form. Moreover, 
I aim to relate GD to its (post)modern context in terms of its narrative strategies and their function 
in relating its fictional historical world to a modern audience. Finally, I also discuss the novel’s 
depiction or representation of the past its events are set in and the function of this fictional depiction 
in general.
My analysis starts in chapter 4.1 with a discussion of the structure of the novel and its formal 
properties. I will examine the narrative of  GD in order to be able to distinguish the ways in and 
extents  to  which  history  is  evoked  and  whether  it  is  at  all  possible  to  appreciate  the  unique, 
exhausted past in a (post)modern, science fictional novel such as GD. I will specifically investigate 
how the narrative choices, such as the role of the narrator (4.1.3) and the novel’s historiographical 
intertexts (4.1.4), portray and construct history and historical narratives.
Section 4.2 discusses the ways in which GD thematises history explicitly by relating what is 
narrated – Galileo’s life – directly to historiographical interpretations within the depicted fictional 
world. Section 4.2.1 begins with an explication of the ‘future history’ narrative that motivates the 
characters and societies depicted, as well as the central plot elements of the novel: the character 
Ganymede’s  endeavour  to  change  history  by  affecting  Galileo’s  career.  In  4.2.2  I  specify  the 
historical narratives aiming to explain Galileo’s conflicts with authority: these are metanarratives 
constructed by characters, aiming also to teleologically determine the outcome of the process of 
history. Finally,  in  4.2.3  I  explicate  the  main  historiographical  content  of  GD,  namely  its 
reinterpretation  of  Galileo’s  obvious  historical  legacy.  I  will  argue  that  this  is  the  historical 
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metanarrative that  GD seemingly supports, and with which it supplements the diverse historical 
readings that are utilised in and commented on by the novel.
4.1 History as Implicit in Galileo’s Dream
The first section of my analysis will analyse the way in which history is  implicitly represented in 
GD. My aim is to show how the novel chooses certain thematic elements, specifically a historical 
narrative of the past, and re-presents them. In other words, I discuss the elements of the narrative, 
the structuration and inclusion/exclusion of events, for example, as well as the form of the narration 
– the relation and context of the narrator, and the referential background of the text the narrator 
utilises.
I will move from a general discussion on the structure of the novel and the patterns its content 
takes  (4.1.1)  to  more  specific  questions concerning the  viability  of  historical  reference  in  GD 
(4.1.2).  I  will  also  address  the  most  conspicuous  formal  techniques  the  novel  applies,  namely 
diegetically changing narration (4.1.3) and intertextuality (4.1.3).
4.1.1 The What, Why, and How of Galileo: Formal and Structural Choices
This section introduces the ways in which GD structures Galileo’s life into a narrative and shows its 
signifying function,  and by doing so explicates the construction of history from its materials – 
narrative content, context, and subtext. My aim is to show how the individuality of the narrated 
content becomes suspect in the narration and presentation of history. In order to do this I discuss the 
themes  and  narrative  choices  of  GD,  such as  martyrdom,  symbolism,  as  well  as  the  proleptic 
composition and interpretation of Galileo’s history. I argue that the narrative structure of GD and its 
signifying  parts  overtly  point  the  reader  towards  the  contemplation  of  the  reference  to  or 
representation of the past/history, and even more importantly its ethical dimensions in the present.
If  Galileo  is  not  a  symbol  for  something  as  a  distinct  historical  person  before  fictional 
dramatization,  GD constructs him into one and operates on the reader’s shared knowledge of his 
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focal role in historiography: Galileo, “the first scientist. The patron saint of scientist, you might say” 
(GD 137). The name is itself “a capsule characterization” and “jumps the gap between fiction and 
life,  writer  and reader” (Jacobs 129).  The science fictional elements in  the novel underline the 
(always implicitly present) counterfactuality of the character, but the specific actions and general 
role of the figure draw on historical assumptions and expand them into a discussion of historical 
knowledge in general.
Galileo Galilei is thus in many sense a symbol or sign for his context and the circumstances in 
which he worked, which is in postmodern historical fiction considered to be even more interesting 
than  (depicting)  the  authentic  past  (Jacobs  69).  K.S.  Robinson’s  novel  discusses  this  symbol 
specifically in terms of the possibility and necessity of its signification: the way Galileo becomes a 
symbol  which  represents  science,  opposed  by  prejudice.  More  to  the  point,  GD criticises  the 
consequences  of  this  symbolism,  i.e.,  the  necessities  that  follow  from  a  view  that  constructs 
dichotomies  and  hagiography  by  dissociating  emerging  cultural  formations  from  a  complex 
historical  reality  (Williams 117–19).  The novel  presents  Galileo as  a  subject  and re-presents  it 
through the metanarrative fashioned by the character Ganymede, which will be discussed in 4.2. 
However, the peculiarity of his novel is perhaps clearer in comparison with such contemporary 
historical novels as Hilary Mantel’s  Wolf Hall, which constructs a historical narrative out of the 
unknown personal life and psychology of Thomas Cromwell. Where the ethical premise of Mantel’s 
novel seems to spring from an assertion about historical gaps and a general awareness of historical 
bias, GD draws attention to the form and the medium of the historical narrative. It is the latter issues 
that will be discussed next.
A central question that arises in the narrative is whether or not Galileo should be a martyr, or 
whether this symbolism is not only unnecessary but also harmful. Ganymede persistently seeks to 
make sure that Galileo’s astronomical assertions martyr him, while Hera questions and opposes this 
plan. The question of martyrdom points to the way the novel discusses the importance of history: 
history and symbols are throughout the novel shown to be relevant for posterity as well as having a 
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direct effect on it (through the science fictional metaphor). Galileo’s question to Hera, “[b]ut why 
should science have to have a martyr?”, as well as her answer – that this has also been her question 
all along – both describe the general problematic highlighted by the novel (GD 144): this is, namely, 
that history is easily, if not inevitably, represented through these pre-interpreted schemata.
The choices concerning the framing and selection of the depicted events is important, as is 
customary in postmodern historical  fiction (Jacobs 42–3).   The relevant  question here,  as with 
histories  in  general,  concerns the nature and location of  historical experience and essence:  the 
historical figure is already predetermined as such, as important, by their persistent existence in the 
present, as images, among other things (Jacobs 74–5). Looking at the past, at the history already 
represented in historiography and narrative, is therefore necessarily done through prior frameworks, 
which  makes the  past  moment  difficult  to  distinguish on  its  own terms –  as  a  reality  without 
subjects and centres of perception and description comparable to that of the (abstract) historian. 
These positions of perception and the coherent social structures they identify are realised among 
other things in our structuration of the past as history, as the narrativist or constructionist view on 
history emphasises (A. Robinson 10). Again, the martyrdom of Galileo is to a great extent such a 
narrative, and it requires the general view of the historical moment in retrospection.
The focus of this particular narrative is on the symbolism by which the ‘historicalness’ of 
Galileo is usually and popularly condensed (not in any way as a summary of the historiographical 
knowledge concerning him, however – not here nor in the following discussion). Martyrdom does 
not rise from the subject, but from what is done to the subject, which is always somewhat out of the 
sovereignty of that subject (except in more derogatory or self-destructive senses). Inevitably, the 
distinguishing history of Galileo as a martyr concerns what happens to him outside his own actions, 
in the enmities of the period’s Renaissance Italy and in his condemnation by both specific powerful 
enemies and impersonal forces or circumstances.
In GD,  the standard form of the narrative of martyrdom is brought out by the actions of 
Ganymede, who explicitly draws out the martyrdom in order to have it retrospectively narrativized 
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and historicised. Hera explains to Galileo the logic behind Ganymede’s ambition: “In some people’s 
eyes, your success includes your immolation. Ganymede and his followers […] have a fixation on 
you and your work, on what it means to the rest of history. […] they think of you as the great martyr 
for science” (GD 144). Instead, the narrator’s exposition as well as the interaction between Galileo 
and his mentor Hera emphasise the importance of his scientific method(s). Secondly, and more 
importantly, they (anachronistically, for a realist representation) expound the manner in which both 
Galileo as an individual and the power structure to which Galileo is subjected to, operate in social 
situations, i.e., in this specific historical context.
The effect of juxtaposing these various prior interpretative frameworks follows Hutcheon’s 
Foucauldian description of  postmodern historicism,  where “[t]he  study of  anonymous forces of 
dissipation  replaces  that  of  individual  ‘signed’ events  and  accomplishments  made  coherent  by 
retrospective  narrative”  (97).  Instead of  presenting a  new antithesis  to  or  a  synthesis  from the 
historical narrative of martyrdom, GD seeks ways to represent the historical moment as less liable 
to  consistent,  teleological  antinomies,  at  least  to  a  degree,  as  will  be  discussed  in  4.2.2.  The 
narrative’s central way of approaching this is its counterfactuality.
The deviations from the actual as well as the actually possible history make the narrative an 
intended counterfactual history. It is this counterfactuality that challenges the expectations of the 
reader,  enabling,  theoretically,  the  investigation  of  the  past  on  its  own  terms  (Hellekson,  The 
Alternate  History 110–11);  therefore  Galileo,  for  example,  is  determined  by  his  actions  and 
temperament,  not  pre-existing narratives.  His  actions are  then overtly  related to  his  social  and 
historical context by Hera in particular, as will be discussed in 4.2.3. The counterfactuality of GD 
also enables the juxtaposition of different narratives that (indirectly, through Ganymede) materially 
affect Galileo’s life and make explicit the forms given to historical reconstructions of the past.
The  counterfactuality  starts with the telescope that he in a sense receives from Ganymede. 
Galileo’s life is thus immediately shown to be subtly but evidently different in the narrated world. 
Jacobs even calls this limitation of biography to specific, practical scenes from a historical figure’s 
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life a prevalent gambit in postmodern “fiction biography” (Jacobs 42–3). As the beginning of the 
novel already introduces a departure from actual history, the ‘past future’ of Galileo remains murky 
and unclear for much of the narrative. This openness is only an effect of the narration, however, and 
although it is always a formal precondition of narrated fiction (A. Robinson 39), its function in this 
work in particular is to intensify the relation between counterfactual and historical presuppositions 
and references. The “simultaneity” of fact and fiction in postmodern historical fiction underlines the 
“tenuousness” of its truths, which is further reinforced by metafictional means, as is evident in GD 
(Jacobs 42). The effect will be discussed in more detail in section 4.1.3 along with the analysis of 
the narrator. For the moment it suffices to mention that GD tries to utilize both the transparency and 
opacity of the narration, using both effects to allegorise the interpretation of history.
The framing is inherently tied to the creation of history, in that the narrated life of Galileo is 
framed by what the backwards-looking narrator, as well as his social context, so to speak, consider 
or  craft  as  historical:  the  astronomical  observations  that  build  up the  symbol  and the  myth of 
Galileo. This perspective necessarily connects the historical material to the formal manner in which 
it  is presented, namely the narration. By learning from Ganymede of the possibility to create a 
telescope,  Galileo’s  life  is  shown to be  taking a  new course,  and the  historical  background of 
Galileo (the astronomer) is evoked in direct connection with the counterfactual preface: “the arrival 
of  the  telescope  had  upended  his  life,”  Galileo  ultimately  realises  (GD 548).  The  historically 
significant moment thus also coincides with the narrative moment of origin: as Ganymede moves to 
influence and create history, the narrator does the same by creating and placing under observation 
the same period in time.
The historically meaningful nature of this event is explicitly artificial, as it is framed by the 
narrator.  Consequently, the entire history is shown to be dependent on its structuration and not 
necessarily inherently historical in the reality of the past moment. The selection and organisation of 
the  historical  material  operates  similarly to  the  “key narrative  models” that  structure  historical 
narratives in White’s notions, so that where for example “’rise and fall narratives’ will always lead 
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one to break the story off at its most dramatic endpoint,” the beginning of the narration purportedly 
establishes another limit to the relevance of the context of the entire narrative in question (Rublack 
76).  In the case of  GD,  the fact  that  the beginning of  the narrative is  determined as  much by 
Ganymede’s counterfactual  action as by the narrator,  underlines the fact  that  one dimension of 
history is that  it  is  created by  forming the past, constructing narrative (while effacing narrative 
presence) (Jenkins 11–3, 36, 38). The narrated content is drawn into the historical: Galileo’s life is 
in a sense truncated into a historical myth, first by the narrative structure and later by Ganymede – 
although  this  is  subsequently  refuted.  In  the  very  end,  this  refutation  collapses  the  historical 
narrative into an introspection of the now-revealed narrator himself.
In its content, the novel nonetheless proposes that the true merit of Galileo’s life’s work is the 
rigorous, empirical experimentation that prefigures the scientific method. This is argued by Hera, as 
opposed to Ganymede, whose interest and idea of the significance of Galileo’s life is, as mentioned, 
martyrdom – narrative and symbol. The telescope was “just the thing that Ganymede gave [him]” 
and his discoveries “were just what anybody would see when they look through such a glass” – 
bases for incorrect theories (GD 361). As Galileo’s Jovian mentor Hera tells him: “what you were 
martyred for and remembered for was a drama that overshadowed your real contribution, which was 
the inclined plane work” (GD 361). The structuration of the novel on the one hand and of history in 
general on the other become explicit in their entirety in light of the realisation that the material for 
his main contribution “had been in his mind, or at least in his notes, since before 1609,” and as such 
already before the beginning of the narrative (GD 548): the gift of the telescope, the moment that 
distinguishes the narrative of Galileo’s life as historical, is thus overtly reinforced as pattern-giving, 
so to speak, near the end of the novel. The import, content even, of formal choices is made explicit.
As the history is revealed and nominated as drama, the plotting and the structuration come to 
the fore. By giving Galileo the telescope, Ganymede “bent [his] whole life in a new direction” (GD 
361), which points to the parallel roles of the narrator and the would-be material history-maker 
Ganymede as narrative-shaping agents.
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The artificiality of the history depicted is strengthened to some extent by the anachronistic 
details of the narration. While the narrator eschews exact references to his diegetic existence beside 
his characters until the very end of the novel, his description of Galileo and his life occasionally 
refers to a modern context, which undermines the ostensible openness and obscurity of Galileo’s 
fate.  For  instance,  Galileo  is  claimed to  have  “lacked any  laws of  refraction”  while  trying  to 
understand lenses properly (GD 16). The narration also includes instances of prolepsis, as when the 
narrator comments (often forebodingly) on the repercussions of Galileo’s actions and feelings, and 
often when he describes the social totality, which is in itself problematic both from the narrator’s 
diegetic  position  in  the  narrative  as  well  as  the  narrative  moment.  This  suggests  “an  illusory 
inevitability in the course of events” (A. Robinson 32), which underlines the artificial structuration 
of  the  historical  narrative  and  reveals  a  connected  loss  of  the  sense  of  “provisionality  and 
disorientation” that marks an immanent present (A. Robinson 24). This is visible for example in 
passages where Galileo’s lambasting of the Jesuits for their Aristotelian orthodoxy is described as 
“treading a little close to the edge” (GD 121) – where again the chasm below that edge is omitted, 
yet clearly implied – or in the narrator’s words “[b]ut there were undercurrents and counterforces at 
work, even on that very morning” (GD 126).
More explicitly, the narration in  GD shows how Galileo, having seen and experienced and 
then made to forget his own burning at  the stake, has unspecific and unwarranted fears for the 
future: “’Something bad is going to happen,’ he kept saying, looking through his telescope at Jupiter 
like  a  soothsayer.  ‘Something  monstrous  wants  to  be  born’”  (GD 150).  It  is  our  historical 
knowledge of what threatens Galileo that is brought proleptically into the narrative by Cartophilus, 
later identified to be the novel’s heterodiegetic narrator: “The ancient one [Cartophilus] slunk away. 
He knew why Galileo was afraid better than Galileo himself. He bowed under the weight of it” (GD 
151).  A. Robinson also notes how the use of prolepsis in  heterodiegetic  narration “emphasises 
authorial control and implies that the emplotment is shaped by a deterministic and/or ironic or tragic 
worldview” (39). The anachronisms of the narration as well as the subtext of the events emphasise 
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the artificiality of the narrative of GD by making evident the existence and concomitant relation of 
possible worlds and ontological spheres of influence.
This proleptically layered structuration of history corresponds to Michael Rothberg’s analysis 
of  Grave  Paley’s  work,  where  “[t]he  successive  acts  of  pointing  that  Paley's  three  characters 
perform exploit the referential function of language, but the object indicated – the human arm – is 
revealed as already coded; it is in fact the very violent act of coding at which they point” (Rothberg 
271). The human arms are in Paley’s work coded “by” colour and the bureaucratic stigmatisation of 
the Holocaust victims, whereas the Galileo of GD is inevitably marked by a historical  symbolism 
and various narratives that determine all references to the historical Galileo.
The prior frameworks of historiography therefore seem to interfere in many ways with the 
historical content of the novel: the historical existence and experience of Galileo – its existence as 
history, more as part of the present than the past – is necessarily qualified by the knowledge of his 
already-written future. The narrator both evokes and withholds these modern perspectives on the 
past – in the specifically novelistic (or ‘realistic’) terms of narrative coherence or linearity – namely 
through an aesthetically motivated choice of firstly withholding knowledge of the already-known 
future, and secondly upholding the possibility of all kinds of counterfactual contingencies (some of 
which parallel actual historical facts). As Paul Dawson argues, “the narrator’s omniscient authority 
is  simultaneously heightened and problematized by their distance from the events of the story” 
(153).
The narrator’s conclusions about  the power structure and the social  totality thus betray a 
thematising  impulse  of  a  sort,  an  overlaid  structure  of  events  that  is  not  exclusively 
historiographical, yet which requires a finite and subjective view instead of conveying an image of 
the openness of the past. For instance, as Galileo, due to unsound judgement and an inappropriate 
approach,  aggressively  defends  his  anti-Aristotelian  science  in  fora  whose  rules  he  does  not 
understand, the narrator expounds how “[w]inning all those banquet debates had apparently caused 
Galileo to think that argument was how things were settled in the world. Unfortunately this is never 
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how it  happens”  (GD 153).  Similarly,  although  slightly  earlier  Cartophilus  argues  (seemingly) 
earnestly that he does not in fact know what happens next (GD 331), as the narrator he has an 
overall view of Galileo’s texts and their implicit suggestions. In this case, although it does not occur 
to Galileo or his associates that his philosophy could be used against him, namely by having his 
notions  ostensibly  supporting  dangerously  heretical  statements  regarding  transubstantiation,  the 
narrator is able to point out (vaguely) that “it did to some of his enemies” (GD 334).
This foreboding notion comes up several times in reference to Galileo’s trial. Narration is by 
definition  removed  from  the  moment  and  concomitantly  allows  a  contextual  perspective,  but 
knowledge of the fact  of Galileo’s existence in  a  ‘possible world of history’ creates a  specific 
intertextual relation, one of historical inference. The historical inferences are overtly referenced in 
the places where the narrator makes contextual deviations from the deictic present of the narrated 
moment, where the prolepsis underlines the “narrating instance” (Dawson 153), which makes his 
context analogous to the reader’s historical awareness.
Also revealing are the instances where Galileo’s life is described in seemingly neutral and 
conventionally  psychological  ways  which  nonetheless  reveal  the  narrator’s  knowledge  of  the 
particular situation of the Galileo of GD. The opening lines of the novel already present the theme 
of repetition and memory that run through the rest  of the work, and that  work similarly to the 
prolepsis of the narrator by intensifying the feeling of Galileo as a doubled or layered being:
All of a sudden Galileo felt that this moment had happened before – that he had been 
standing in the artisans’ Friday market outside Venice’s Arsenale and felt someone’s gaze 
on him […]. The sense of repetition was strong enough to make Galileo a little dizzy, 
although a part of his mind was also detached enough to wonder how it might be that you 
could sense someone’s gaze resting on you. (GD 1)
As the opening scene of a work which unfolds at first as a relatively conventional (historical) novel, 
the feeling of repetition seems to be merely a déjà vu, but in light of the entire work and specifically 
its two main formal frameworks the scene receives further expressiveness. The déjà vu is thus on 
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the one hand explained as a real memory, a result of the actions of Ganymede, who seeks in the 
novel to change the past entirely by interfering in the life of the Galileos of alternative pasts.
On  the  other  hand  the  feeling  of  déjà  vu  in  the  opening  lines  is  related  to  the  act  of 
encountering representations of reality, which in this case is a representation of (a) history. In this 
sense, Galileo acts as and stands for, indeed represents, the reading subject of history, in that the 
representation is,  in  terms of  Jameson’s theory,  always already read and interpreted before the 
individual text is fully assimilated (Postmodernism 24). This is, I would argue, an allegory of the 
interpretation of history. The signs through which the history is encountered are predetermined, and 
the sense of déjà vu is the unfolding of the narrative against the backdrop of historical knowledge. 
Similarly in terms of alternate history, the counterfactual inevitably evokes the factual and is judged 
by it (Hellekson, “Alternate History” 454; Singles 55, 72, 130).
It is in many ways impossible to tell the (hi)story of Galileo as if for the first time, even in 
counterfactual narratives: the narrative is overshadowed by tropes pertaining to it as well as the 
specific narratives of and other references to it in our minds; I would not argue that this has created 
a displacing simulacrum of Galileo Galilei, to use Baudrillard’s terms (Brooker 19–20), but that an 
inadequately  complete  representation  of  him  is  surely  encroached  by  connotations  and  other 
extraneous traces of his other representations. In any case, it is not the interest of this novel, nor that 
of stereotypically postmodern fiction, to aspire to complete representations (Baker 126–27). Indeed, 
GD incorporates several implicit versions as well as understandings of Galileo’s history; some, at 
least one of them our own, whereas others are fictional ones where Galileo is burned, for example. 
The structuration of the novel itself, as was introduced above, points to the understanding of the 
novel’s historical function that this familiarity and multiplicity offers – that the past is framed and 
determined in multiple ways and that neither these nor the past itself are broken down into a neat 
pattern. As the narrator admits, “some of it I made up […] – some of it you made up too” (GD 577). 
By  moving  from  the  structurally  determined  historical  interpretation  to  the  uncertainty  of  its 
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narrator’s final  words,  the narrative progression of  GD suggests the limits of the possibility of 
neatly patterned objective history.
This section has sought  to  introduce the general  characteristics  of  GD’s representation of 
history. By presenting an already-read history that is a part of our knowledge of the world precisely 
as such, as always already interpreted and assimilated, GD presents the acts of knowledge formation 
and world construction in action, via its characters. The object is not merely a historical situation, 
but its incorporation into a social history and its significance for the individual, both as example and 
reminder.  Where  this  section  approaches  the  question  in  terms  of  epistemology,  of  accurate 
representations,  I  would  argue  that  the  narrative’s  thematic focus  on  the  need  for  historical 
understanding, as for instance its focus on domestic histories (see 4.2.3),  further underlines the 
necessity of becoming conscious of and questioning readily available metanarratives and signifying 
tropes as an ethical insistence.
4.1.2 The Historical Value of GD: Criticisms and (A)Historicisms
The gulf between the moment of historical reflection and its object, the present and its past or 
future,  for  example,  can  be  construed  in  GD in  various  different  ways.  The  relation  between 
Galileo’s Italian present and his interaction with the utopian future and its inhabitants (and vice 
versa)  is  a  thematic  undercurrent  that  indicates  the complexity of this relation.  It  points  to  the 
anachronistic tendencies or necessarily limited nature of describing difference, which in GD’s case 
is primarily temporal, that is, historical, and to a certain extent social. I will discuss the relevance of 
this difference for  GD’s representation of  history by way of  the novel’s depiction of  historical 
knowledge  as  learned  by  Galileo,  and  furthermore  with  respect  to  the  resolution  of  the 
counterfactual  plot,  especially  regarding its  relation to  the authentic  past.  I  will  argue  that  the 
treatment of these themes signifies the novel’s referential dimensions, and the criticism of historical 
understanding in modernity, as introduced in the theory section (3.2).
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The alienation characterising the difficulty of understanding another reality such as the past is 
depicted in the encounters between Galileo along with his society and the depicted future.  For 
Galileo,  the  fact  that  the  future  society  does  not  really  understand  or  has  neglected  to  try  to 
understand  its  own  environment  and  necessities  of  living  is  remarkably  short-sighted  and 
suspicious. As he calls into question the extent of progress in the future by asserting that “It’s you 
who are uncivilized.  You don’t  know even the basics of how your machines work” (GD 181), 
Galileo also points out (from his scientific vantage point) the gulf between the societies. He is 
similarly less than understanding of the physical environment of the future society:
Galileo recalled standing in his garden at night, in the open air, under the stars. It was an 
experience this woman [Hera] had never had. Possibly she could not imagine it. Possibly 
she had no idea what he was talking about. ‘You don’t know what it is to be free,’ he said 
surprised. ‘You don’t know what it is to stand free in the open air.’ (GD 95)
The fact that “you could stay alive on Earth, by breathing, eating, and staying warm” (GD 94) is for 
Galileo the evidence of the utter mutual alienness of the two societies – Italy and the futurist utopia. 
For the difference is indeed felt by Hera as well as the narrator. Hera, visiting (from the future) the 
dying, physically ailed Galileo in Italy, is disturbed by his condition: “I can’t do this any more. Not 
when he could be fixed in a day” (GD 567). Here, it is even the physical body that is a locus of the 
alienating difference: what the body and its life is, and what it used to be, are separated, which 
reveals the extent of the historical determination of humanity. In addition to social and cultural 
phenomena, the latter is shown to encompass physical ones.
Similarly for Cartophilus, the self-effacing narrator now made explicit, the tactility of early 
modern Europe offers something of an instinctive relief in comparison to the future Jovian societies 
(where no material needs are evidently unaccounted for, however):  “So many mistakes, so much 
misery. And yet here I am still. Why do I stay, why? [...] I stay for the sunlight, I suppose, for the 
wind and the rain and for Italy” (GD 576–77). There is a gulf of difference and alienation between 
the utopia  and Galileo’s  atmospheric  earth.  This minor  but  recurring relation between different 
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present realities manages to problematize any concept of an essential human nature, pointing to the 
importance of historicised understanding. This limited relativity exhibits a (post)modern relation to 
history: it even undermines the novel’s didactic interests by reducing its “claim to inscribe timeless 
universal values,” namely by pointing to the “context-dependent nature” of all values (Hutcheon 
90).2
The mutual alienation experienced by the characters is connected to the historicist notion that 
the presentation of a non-existent past must come to terms with its distance from the present, both 
temporal and qualitative, either openly or implicitly (Jameson,  Ideologies 150). Jameson defines 
this problem of historicism in terms of the “Identity and Difference” of the past in relation to a 
present (Ideologies 150).  Assuming the  identity,  i.e.,  the intelligibility of the past,  “of the alien 
object,” shows how “what was to have been demonstrated” was presupposed in the assumption of 
its transparency and intelligibility:  acknowledging this means that  “our […] ‘comprehension’ of 
these alien texts must be haunted by the nagging suspicion that we have all the while remained 
locked in our own present – […] that we have somehow failed to touch the strangeness and the 
resistance of a reality genuinely different from our own” (Jameson, Ideologies 150). In terms of the 
“crisis”  of  “historicity”  in  postmodernity  (Postmodernism  284),  Jameson  laments  that 
representations  of  the  past  may  only  be  “sheer  images”  from  the  postmodern  present 
(Postmodernism 18).
The structuralist counterpart to the “identity” of the past means acknowledging the opposite, 
“the radical Difference” of the past, which closes “the doors of comprehension,” and denies the 
accessibility of the past, “defined as Other,” due to the “density of our own culture” (Jameson, 
Ideologies 150–51). The question of representability is relevant in analysing the representation of 
history in GD, as its narratorial position and (temporally) varying objects of perception necessarily 
incorporate some form of assumptions about the intelligibility of temporally distanced systems (of 
2 On the other hand, an exception to this denial of universalism could be seen in Jameson’s didactic, universalising 
slogan, “Always historicize!” (PU ix).
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thought and of social formation): specifically these are visible in the themes of historical change 
and alienation.
Particularly when Galileo himself learns of his historical role, and owing to his assimilation of 
that ‘history of Galileo’ as a present, living memory, the relation between an experience of a past 
moment and its representation as/in history is brought to the fore. In one of his ‘dreams’ where he is 
in the future, Galileo manages to internalise an immersive history lesson on his own life:
‘It was more than a biography. You lived it, but all at once too. I saw my life! […] Now I 
know what will happen. I mean, day by day. I’m sure I know all of it, but I can’t quite 
bring it to mind until it happens. But it bulks there behind every moment, every thought. 
[…] I follow myself as if from a couple of steps behind.’ (GD 306–7)
The effect is that for Galileo, everything that happens reveals itself as if through déjà vu. As the title 
of the chapter in question insists, everything has “Always already” (GD 302) happened, which acts 
also  as  an  essential  metaphor  for  historical  interpretation  and  representation  in  general.  The 
experience and the phrase itself suggest Paul Ricoeur’s idea of the necessary correlation between 
narrative and human temporal experience (52): “if […] human action can be narrated, it is because 
it  is  always  already  articulated  by  signs,  rules,  and  norms.  It  is  always  already  symbolically 
mediated” (Ricoeur 57).3
What Galileo undergoes is  thus a heightened experience of this mediation,  its  ‘doubling,’ 
because of a direct exposure to a symbolic “emplotment” (Ricoeur 53) of another degree. Generally, 
as discussed in 4.1.1, in exploring the past, its popular image or representation, history is always 
already there, whether as prior preconceptions or in the narrative schema that  historiography is 
bound to utilise (according to White), or in the particular historical narrative that frames the text or 
object in question. For White, there is the level of “story,” formed from the chronicle, and “the kind 
of story” that the historian interprets and identifies (White 59). Moreover, White too identifies in 
passing how historical representations “aggregate” (118). In  GD, pre-existing history frames each 
3 In fact, in the midst of this “pseudo-iterative” period, Galileo reads Augustine’s Confessions (which is also quoted in 
the narrative) and reflects on the “feverish chapter on that held his meditation on time” (GD 310).
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existential moment in Galileo’s life following his internalisation of his own historical narrative as 
the following passage shows:
A letter was going to come from Maria Celeste. It came, and as he had always done, he 
took out the little stiletto he used as a letter-opener and watched himself cut the wax of the 
seal neatly away. He had unfolded it in just the way he unfolded it, and he read what he 
had read. […] He tasted the fruit he had been going to taste, and it tasted the way it was 
going to taste when he tasted it. It had an underlying bitterness, as with all his life. […] 
Time  was  a  manifold  full  of  exclusions  and  resurrections,  fragments  and  the  spaces 
between fragments,  eclipses and epilepsies,  isotopies all  superposed on each other and 
interweaving in an anarchic vibrating tapestry, and since to relive it at one point was not to 
relive it at another, the whole was unreadable, permanently beyond the mind. (GD 308–9)
From within the framework of history – the knowledge of the connections between events – the past 
moment as the object of that history (in this instance, Galileo’s present) flickers between different 
states: its seeming individuality and singularity – its Jamesonian ‘difference’ – is always suspicious, 
as  encountering  it  is  always  accompanied  by  the  historical  déjà  vu,  such  as  a  narrative  or 
tropological form or emplotment in White’s theory (74), which casts significant doubt upon the 
actual difference of what is examined: its authenticity as something other than the present, or the 
possibility of understanding it not simply through present a priori conceptualisation.
In  terms of  historiographic  metafiction,  “[t]he  referent  is  always  already inscribed in  the 
discourses  of  our  culture” (Hutcheon 119).  Experiencing the  past  seemingly for  the  first  time, 
except that it is filtered through his newly acquired historical knowledge, the discursivity becomes 
evident  to  Galileo:  in  a  way,  he  assimilates  the  reader’s  position  (in  relation  to  history).  The 
lived/represented past is veiled in a haunting sense of Jamesonian ‘identity,’ denoting the tempting 
readability of already inscribed meanings and practises; the past is “unreadable” (GD 309) because 
the medium of reading takes us elsewhere.
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A central  way  in  which  this  problematic  may  be  addressed  in  GD is  its  counterfactual, 
alternate history plot  and its  resolution.  As Matthew Schneider-Mayerson argues,  “the alternate 
history is not just, as some critics argue, about re-writing history, but a test of the limits of historical 
imagination”  (79).  Evident  in  the  consideration  of  the  possibility  of  changing  history  is  an 
assumption of its accessibility, the supposition of understanding it. The initial conception that the 
novel  presents  is  that  of  a  certain  identity,  in  that  Ganymede’s  plot  is  to  affect  the  past,  and 
concomitantly the course of history, in order to achieve a desired effect. This suggests that  the 
system affected (that of the seventeenth-century Europe; as seen from the far future of the thirty-
first century) is intelligible as a whole, or that the institutional and social responses are discernible 
and ‘patternable’ to retrospection. The narrative treats the endeavour as possible, if contested, for 
most parts of the novel.
Yet  the  outcome  and  the  narrator’s  comments  on  it  suggest  that  there  is  a  fundamental 
distance between the past and its interpreters. This distance arises from the disparity between reality 
and its necessarily limited representation, as is suggested in the narrator’s reasoning: “Any event in 
history that gets more crowded the longer you look at it – that’s a sign. Sign of a contested moment, 
a crux that will never stop changing under your gaze. The gaze itself entangles you, and you too are 
one  of  the  changes  in  that  moment”  (GD 530).  What  the  narrator  applies  to  this  moment  in 
particular can be said to concern the interpretation of history in general, as in the case of increasing 
complexity and/or incompleteness of record. Moreover, the proposition of the narrator here suggests 
that in the experience of the specifically historical moment (history here as meaningful, laden with 
importance), in the present tense as it  were, the experience itself makes the subject part of the 
history being perceived and affects the perceived object, history.
The  past  becomes  more  simplified  and  intelligible  (as  opposed  to  being  necessarily 
‘different’) by submitting to the pressure placed on it by the characters: the plot to impact the past 
on the one hand and Galileo’s lessons about his society and his structure of feeling on the other have 
some effect, as the run of events evidently changes (for the narrator as its witness). Galileo does not 
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burn as a heretic, even though the characters have previously understood that this is the fate of this 
particular Galileo. The fictional world in which the narrator exists (within the presented fiction of 
multiple possible histories) shows that the history that Ganymede and the other future characters 
know differs from the one that exists for  GD’s Galileo and his fictional possible world: Galileo’s 
fate has changed, whether intentionally by the actions of Ganymede (or Galileo’s mentor Hera) or 
not. The assumptions guiding this change reveal the extent to which the fictional world of  GD is 
depicted as following a certain ‘identifying’ logic.
GD does not provide individual and specific points of departure from authentic history, but 
the resolution of its plot to change history is informative in terms of its historicist implications. 
Where Schneider-Mayerson argues that “[i]n their selection of a point of departure, each alternate 
historian  implicitly  endorses  a  theory  of  historical  change”  and  that  “[w]ith  a  few  notable 
exceptions, alternate historians support the great man theory or the primacy of military action, if not 
both”  (72),  within  GD,  Ganymede  asserts  that  the  dichotomy  between  science  and  religion 
determines the historical process. Galileo and Hera question it to a differing extent, as is discussed 
in 4.2.2, but the centrality of this way of phrasing the question, no matter its somewhat emphatic 
dismissal, makes it relevant to the larger question at hand. Asserting (as Ganymede does) that this is 
a relevant standpoint implies that the world, and history, is to a certain degree governed by its logic. 
The fictional resolution of the plot in favour of Ganymede’s theory suggests then that the reality of 
the past is assimilable, its unique difference and otherness permitting valid representation.
Indeed, the last revelations about the dichotomy Galileo has been struggling to understand 
indicate its very real effects, as Hera judges by the conception of time presented in the novel’s 
futuristic sections:
When you [Galileo]  succeed in  a  reconciliation,  and religion  dominates  science  in  its 
earliest phase, you get the deepest and most violent low points in the subsequent histories. 
This is what Ganymede saw, and this is what he has insisted ever since. When you are 
burned and become a martyr to science, science more quickly dominates religion, and the 
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subsequent low point is much reduced. It’s bad, but not as bad. This is what Ganymede 
insisted on. (GD 523)
According to the internal logic of the fictional world in GD, which depicts time travel as a real way 
of influencing the past, the apparent shifts in the dichotomy do result in actual changes in history. 
Consequently, a metahistorical cultural logic seems to be asserted.
Science and religion are central signs through which history is told in the story, irrespective of 
the narrative’s ultimate denial of this dichotomy as a sole code of history. ‘Science’ is moreover a 
key term the society of the future uses in structuring an understanding of itself and its historical 
appearance: it is thus present in the future history narrative of that society (and, consequently, of 
Hera  and Cartophilus).  Significantly,  this  follows the  present  discourse  to  a  certain extent,  for 
instance in view of the emphasis on Galileo’s exceptionality, his role as the first experimentalist 
creating his new science (Drake xxv).
The effect of this logic implies also the identity of the past and the present, however; the risk 
is  that  the past  comes to  exist  as a  construct  of these images and signs from the present.  For 
example, the  correspondence of present and (fictional) past facts suggests the necessity of ‘our’ 
present past and a connected deterministic view of agency (Singles 130). In GD, in the aftermath of 
Galileo’s trial, the narrator states how despite the burning, he “had seen what could happen” (GD 
510), but then he saw Galileo “squeak his way clear” (GD 578) – the affirmation of the actual state 
of history. This reversal can be compared to Roth’s  The Plot Against America, where despite all 
alternative events and causalities, on a larger, national scale the authentic present past reasserts itself 
by way of sudden changes in US administration. Singles notes the “conservative notion of history 
as fact, i.e. [sic] as knowable” that is inherent in Roth’s novel (180), but I disagree with both her 
and Jason Siegel’s view of the novel’s “overly contrived resolution” (Siegel 148) and indeed argue 
that it  somewhat deflates the counterfactual  imagination of the novel as a whole.  While Siegel 
argues that Roth’s novel disrupts teleological interpretations of history (150), I find it evident that 
the sudden, contrived return to ‘actual’ history, on several specific levels, makes history precisely 
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present-oriented in a teleological fashion: narrative closure affirms the necessity of the actual as 
opposed  to  openness  and  variation,  if  not  entirely  on  the  individual  (Siegel  150)  or  the 
“personal/familial stage” (Singles 189), where both interpretations are very much apposite.
However, in GD this identity of the historical narrative turns out to withstand the uncertainty 
of difference, namely by resisting the temptation of objective description. In contrast, there is an 
inherent  “conservative notion of history as fact,  i.e.  [sic]  as knowable” (Singles 180) in Roth’s 
novel. Consequently,  although the  unwitting  Galileo  curses  how “[t]hat  lying  bastard  [cardinal 
Maculano; indirectly Pope Urban] has eaten my life. From now on when people think of me, they’ll 
think of his trial of me. It’s the ultimate power” (GD 511), the matter of his trial is unresolved. 
Galileo’s identification of the fact that the power of judgement is also the power of the official 
representation of events denotes the terms of the entire novel: this is what Galileo represents and 
what determines his life.  The objective explanation of the trial, the symbol of Galileo’s historical 
life, is scattered over several  social  and institutional domains,  however,  including religious and 
foreign policy, metaphysics and natural philosophy, as well as ‘structures of feeling’ and epistemes, 
questions of power, and ideology.
Galileo’s mentor, Hera, offers an example of a political  (non-)explanation of these issues, 
stifling his enthusiasm about a new turn of events years before the trial. In this case, a friendly 
cardinal, Barberini, has become the new pope, Pope Urban VIII. Although the narrator notes how 
“[e]verything was changed” (GD 331), it actually has not, as Hera’s ominous response shows: in the 
various alternative pasts within the fictional world, “[i]t has always been the same pope in charge 
when  you  are  condemned  to  be  burnt  at  the  stake”  (GD 342).  While  the  circumstances  have 
changed in an unexpected way, this does not lead to the result that motivated the attempt to affect 
Galileo’s  circumstances.  Even getting  a  seemingly  favourable  individual  to  direct  the  crucially 
involved institution is in itself an inadequate reason to think that the totality (of society – or of 
history) will be necessarily influenced by it. The extent of the intelligibility of the past is limited; its 
distance from and incommensurability with the present respected.
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Earlier Hera had argued with Galileo that his fate “doesn’t have to do with the maths and the 
physical theories. It has to do with your situation at home, […] [t]he kind of conclusions you draw, 
and  how you  react  in  a  crisis”  (GD 244).  Finally,  near  the  end  of  his  life,  the  response  the 
disgruntled Galileo gives to the visiting John Milton, who in Galileo’s view “intended to make the 
Pope look bad, and also the Jesuits,” evidences a resigned understanding of power (GD 563). It 
shows that he acknowledges the discursive power (“the right to decide who gets to speak”) present 
in all societies, and in so doing denies that the allegations of his censorship are a peculiarity of the 
Roman Catholic Church (GD 563). All of these different descriptions of the conflict illustrate that 
the identity of the past does not arise straightforwardly out of any single rationalisation of Galileo’s 
life  and his  troubles  in  the  novel,  such as  the  specific  dichotomy of  science and religion:  the 
intelligibility of the past is not the matter of a single objective explanation, and in this the past 
remains ‘different.’ Nonetheless, various explanations do persist, and in an uncertain combination of 
them,  the  possibility  of  understanding the  past,  its  identity,  is  affirmed through actual  change, 
Galileo’s survival.
As the narrator relates Galileo’s thoughts on the writing process of his late work Discourse on 
Two New Sciences, further perspectives open up. Here the fictional Galileo faces the tragedy of his 
earlier fervent attempt to avoid inquisitional judgement, namely its inevitable failure:
Early in the dialogue of the first  day, Salviati  [a character in Galileo’s dialogical 
treatise] said something that startled Galileo when he read it later:
And here I must relate a circumstance which is worthy of your attention, as indeed 
are all events which happen contrary to expectation – especially when a precautionary 
measure turns out to be a cause of disaster.
That was 1616, he suddenly saw; his precautionary measure had led to disaster. But 
how could you tell until after the fact? And so didn’t you have to try? You did. You could 
only try. You learn things that make you try. (GD 553; emphasis original)
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Galileo’s  attempts  to  avoid  his  fate  are  in  the  novel  both  active  and  present,  in  the  sense  of 
approaching from the limited perspective of the present, and historical, in that the Galileo of  GD 
learns  of  his  historical  role  and  fate  from the  modern  perspective  of  historiography.  Both  the 
narrator (Cartophilus) and Galileo have experienced and learned the difficulty of understanding the 
past  –  an alien social  reality.  The advantages and limitations of  each perspective – actual  and 
historical  –  do  not  seem to  cancel  each  other  out,  however,  which  indicates  the  difficulty  of 
comprehending the past moment even with the support of retrospective historical structuring.
When changes in the history or fate (as it is known and expected to happen) of the specific 
fictional  Galileo  depicted  in  GD are  directly  referenced,  the  narrative  actually  suggests  both 
reversals and undoings as well as permanent changes.  After the fact, i.e., Galileo’s more lenient 
judgement, he learns that the past he has escaped can perhaps never be fully removed: “So there is 
still a world in which Galileo is burned as a heretic,” he notes (GD 524). While Galileo’s response 
to this is a desire to forget, I would argue that it does not indicate a surrender into an anti-historical 
present, as that desire concerns a resignation not to the terror of uncertainty and falsity, but to the 
understanding of  influence that  Hera’s  lessons  have  imparted.  A pharmacological  amnesia  will 
remove his memory of the fantasies in the story of GD, but the changes in Galileo that saved him 
from the pyre, from the structure of feeling of his time, will persist; “it will be in you anyway” (GD 
GD 526). The significance of this change transforms the resignation of the fictional Galileo into an 
acceptance and undercuts the temptation to see the characters’ (Hera and Galileo) melancholy as 
fatalistic when they consider the historical totality:
‘Please understand. They are always there. There are so many.’
‘Will they end? Will it ever end?’
‘End? Do things end?’ (GD 526)
To put it simply, acquiescing the impossibility of saving an infinity of Galileos or reconsidering and 
righting  infinite  bad  decisions  and  past  wrongs  (GD 526)  implies  Galileo’s  comprehension  of 
Hera’s message. Galileo states, “I can’t stand to know about the others” to “have to keep going back 
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and trying to change things, […] [b]ut I can’t face the bad alternatives either – all the deaths, all the 
burning. It isn’t right. So – so I need to forget,  to go on” (GD 527; emphasis added), and it is in 
these final contemplations with Hera that the significance or substance of history is defined. There 
is an important change in tenor in these lines, in which history ceases to be a goal, a framework for 
Galileo that needs to be amended, and this action is to be understood as a historicist metaphor.
For there is another theoretical parallel to the surprised Galileo’s words, “So there is still a 
world  in  which  Galileo  is  burned  as  a  heretic”  (GD 524),  which  points  to  the  ultimate  alien 
“difference” (Jameson, Ideologies 150) of history as a knowledge, an aggregate of worlds, a thing 
(as separate from both discourse and a specific past). No matter the understanding of the past, its 
dimensions of identity and relevance, it is nevertheless always  indifferent to the present, existent 
and  impossible  to  be  changed  in  reality,  except  in  totalitarian  or  the  wildest  of  constructivist 
fantasies. Even if for us there is no past where Galileo is burnt, there are/were other human beings 
who suffered that fate. Historiographical attention can never affect the past and remake it, so that 
the existence of that past necessitates an ethical consideration of the lived world: history should not 
sterilize the past and become sterile, affectless in turn. Understanding should not equate to approval. 
‘Things do not end’ points to the way in which the plurality of historical worlds turns into a sign of 
the sheer aggregation of history and of individual suffering. History does not change the present, 
human beings do, so the resignation is “to go on” (GD 527).
Before the present historiography is actually affirmed, the counterfactuality of the narrative 
has the effect of denaturalising the present and the historically objective past, making it possible to 
see  or  imagine  the  contingencies  of  past  societies,  for  example  (de  Groot  171).  In  GD,  the 
inevitability of the confrontation of science and religion, for example, is shown to be fallacious, as 
the intrigues of seventeenth-century Italy and Europe are shown to be the structure that  by its 
varying dynamics affects seemingly straightforward (narrativized) events. For instance, by calling 
Galileo  to  be judged the  Pope “could only play the game Borgia  had called;  he  had to  show 
leadership by crusading against heresy,” whereby Galileo’s trial is described as an Italian political 
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manoeuvre  (GD 445).  Both  in  terms  of  the  social  struggles  and  formations  of  power  in  the 
institutions,  as  well  as  the  overtly  discussed  structure  of  feeling  (see  4.2.3),  the  complicity  of 
individual agents in these structures becomes a more directly asserted historical logic.
This  complicity  is  revealed  in  the  contradiction  exhibited  by  the  reversal  to  factual 
historiography, namely between the implications of the work’s structure and its overt message. By 
citing and constructing Galileo Galilei as a sign of this,  GD does suggest, especially and overtly 
through its narrator, that historical interpretation and action is possible: “We are all history […]. It 
can always change” (GD 578). GD’s patterning of this return of more-of-the-same – identity of the 
fictional resolution with the factual state – then becomes important. If counterfactuals have any real 
historical dimensions in the above-mentioned sense, it seems that it must be above all the thematic 
depiction of history that is meant in assertions concerning their capabilities. Indeed, as Kathleen 
Singles argues with regard to her aims, “[u]ltimately, it is at neither the structural nor metaphorical 
level  that  alternate  histories  become  most  relevant  for  [the  openness  and  undecidedness  in 
narrativity (3)], but rather at the thematic level: in the contemplation of contingency/free will and 
necessity/determinism” (133),
While the Galileo of  GD is supposed to burn at the stake, following the knowledge of the 
characters at the outset, there is a change, although only within the fictional world depicted. The 
prolepsis of the narrator, the focus on the inevitable and on the known bad, ominous future, also 
subverts  the formal  return:  what  is  portrayed as  inevitable,  both by the narrator  (form) and in 
various degrees by Ganymede and Hera (content), is revealed to be less inevitable than suggested, 
because the reality of the resolution is different. As such, the didactics of the ending – “put your 
shoulder to whatever wheel you have at hand” and “[p]ush like Galileo pushed!” (GD 578) – refer 
to a disbelief in inevitability and teleology.
Nonetheless, the otherness or difference of the past depicted becomes suspect once the means 
of representation are scrutinised further. The narrator’s anachronistic use of descriptive language is 
an overt sign of the novel’s dissimilarity with more thoroughly realistic historical novels. It is this 
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extensive  modern  discourse  against  which  the  Jamesonian  identity  of  the  represented  past  is 
underlined: the existence as a ‘past present’ is supplanted by its representation as a present past.
Presenting history as and in a discussion between a futuristic fiction (Hera) and a historical 
character, specifically one with anachronistic modern knowledge, is itself a formal obstacle for an 
authentic historicist representation whose fundamental difference is to be maintained. The object of 
study is turned into a subject in it, and the clearest problem is that the language (more broadly: 
signalling system) of the object (in this sense, Galileo) is thereby turned into a modern copy. Even 
the ‘science’ that is referred to throughout the narrative is posited backwards from modernity “as if 
it  were  an  unchanging  territory,”  and  for  instance  no  further  (Kuhnian)  revolutions  happened 
between  Galileo  and  the  narrative  31st century  (Luckhurst  404–5):  it  is  at  least  partly 
incommensurable to the mode of study practised in the early seventeenth century.
Of course, the science in question is utilised as a part of the science/religion dichotomy that is 
propounded by Ganymede – a post-(post)modern character. In other words, the whole framework 
within which the past is presented in GD often reverts back to modern ideas and conceptions. There 
is a further science fictional and as such anti-realist explanation to Galileo’s modern individuality, 
as the Galileo of the novel is in some senses changed, if not modernised, by his ‘dream’ experiences 
of the future. Hera argues as much: “the lessons, they do more than teach you our maths.  They 
change you. By the time you’re done, you won’t remember what I showed you before!” (GD 243; 
emphasis original). The framework of representation is modernised to the point that the historical 
protagonist, Galileo himself, internalises these conceptions in order to better understand the same 
modern world; or rather, to better present himself to the modern authoring presence behind GD.
Hera’s criticism of Galileo is also partly relevant to this problem of historicity. For the fact is, 
the  Galileo  of  GD is  a  markedly  middle-class  character,  and  as  such  approaches  the  modern 
sensibilities and artistic conventions of the realist novel. His comforts enable both the expression of 
individualism and the pangs and contradictions that this includes. Although he complains about his 
salary, it is more due to his ambitions than his worries of livelihood: although granted a raised 
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“salary fixed in perpetuity,” he is unsatisfied, as “[t]he triumph of that day [a courtly exhibition in 
Venice]  had  had  Galileo  imagining  a  lifetime  sinecure,  all  his  debts  and  expenses  paid,  and 
afterward free from all work except research and consultation” (GD 33). His problems are mostly 
professional,  concerning  patrons  and  the  demands  of  his  teaching  position,  and  even  Hera’s 
criticism  of  his  privileged  myopia  is  mostly  domestic.  One  might  add  that  Galileo’s  familial 
concerns revolve around status,  namely  respectable  options,  and positions for  his  children  and 
siblings.
His social sphere is distinct from that of a modern middle-class reader, but it is also distinctly 
recognisable. Although Galileo is the focal revolutionary on a certain social stage, his domestic life 
betrays no room for resistance to norm, unlike the miniature protests and pangs of conscience of 
Thomas  Cromwell  in  Hilary  Mantel’s  Wolf  Hall,  for  example.  Again,  the  novel  utilises 
metafictional undertones and points the reader to this familiarity itself: in the end of his narrative, 
while describing his relation both to his subject and to the text that describes it, the narrator states 
that “I know he was like us, always looking out for himself; and unlike us, in that he acted, while 
we often lack the courage to act” (GD 577). I would argue that this is connected with the way that 
the novel represents history as a whole, in that it again alludes to the way in which the past is 
obtained and perceived: the positions of ‘I’ and ‘he’ – identity and difference – are explicated.
The  narrator’s  perspective  thus  paints  him  in  modern  colours,  and  the  science  fictional 
changes mitigate the necessity of seeing him as an appropriate representative of the seventeenth-
century society serving as the backdrop of the narrative. This does not remove the inauthenticity of 
the  representation,  but  to  an  extent  it  circumvents  the  question  –  which  means  it  ends  up 
representing our own preconceptions of the past, not that past itself. This consequence is very much 
in line with postmodern representational theory in general: because the signifier used to represent 
the  past,  Galileo,  is  an  amalgamation  of  non-contemporaneous  myth,  narrative  trope,  and 
(anachronistic or unrepresentative) modern subjectivity,  the language of the representation itself 
seems “schizophrenic” (de Groot 114; Jameson,  Postmodernism 25). In this sense, historicism in 
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GD is  very  much  a  familiar  problem:  despite  its  powerful  depictions  of  the  personal  and 
philosophical experience of scientific discovery, it  sacrifices historical authenticity for a broader 
representation and problematization of history as a discourse or a thing in itself. The concern of 
(postmodern)  fiction is  not  historiographical:  rather,  it  parodies  or discusses  the  discourse it  is 
working in (Hutcheon 34–5) or reappraises the narratives with which it coexists (Baker 126).
After all, it is the narrator Cartophilus who claims authority over the representation, and the 
science of his  didactic  history in  the end of  the book is  his  creation.  Or in case the reader  is 
compelled to consider his representation truthful (“So I’ve said what I like; and I knew him well 
enough to think I got it mostly right” [GD 577]), it is his conception of Galileo’s principles, seen 
through science fictional devices. That is, representation retreats into a single, subjective point of 
view, whose validity is questioned by the science fictional anti-realism on the one hand and the 
unreliability  of  the  narrator  on  the  other,  where  the  latter  is  provoked  particularly  by  the 
metafictional conspicuousness of the narrator.  In postmodern terms, as in Hutcheon’s theory, the 
self-referential description of the textual premise of the narrative indicates the problems of any 
discourse about a past present (Hutcheon 153), for how is the reader to value a narrative, whose 
narrator  admits  its  contrivance  (“some  of  it  I  made  up”  [GD 577]).  By  giving  up  his  own 
effacement, the narrator brings the creation of the text into the narrative, but his dispassionate – if 
not  lacklustre  –  way  of  doing so  distances  GD somewhat  from the  textual  contortions  of  the 
postmodernism of the recent past.
In terms of the value of the novel as history, its referential relation to anything outside the text 
itself,  its  historical  impulse,  if  not  obsession,  could  therefore  be  described  in  terms  of  what 
Hutcheon approaches as a “hermeneutic reference” (156). By representing the process by which we 
(or in GD, they) construct and interpret histories, GD evokes a reference “to the discursive situation 
of the reader that moves the study of the referent away from the level of individual words and 
names to that of discourse” (Hutcheon 156):
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Words hook onto the world, at one level, at least, through the reader, and this would be as 
true  of  historiography as of  fiction.  It  is  at  this  level  that  the  ideological  critique,  the 
demystifying of the “natural” and the “given” can operate. […] Any ideologically radical 
possibility for change – in a Brechtian sense – would be tied up directly with this kind of 
hermeneutic reference. (Hutcheon 156)
Drawing on the political or active, as opposed to symbolic, role of art, Hutcheon’s hermeneutic 
notion reinforces the non-antiquarian functions of all representation (Jameson,  PU  175; LaCapra 
17).
Juxtaposed with Cohn and Dolezel who disregard the referentiality of the fictional character 
(Cohn 157), my argument is that as a sign, the Galileo of GD refers in this way especially to the 
symbolic aspects of our cultural discourse about him. The narrative of Ganymede’s plan to guide 
history in a specific direction as well as its counterbalances and narrative resolutions is important in 
this sense, because it exposes and exhibits our cultural ideas and metanarratives concerning him. 
These include enlightenment or progressive narratives of science and religion, the birth of science, 
‘great man’ histories, and rationally-driven social progress, for instance. By drawing attention to 
historical  interpretation,  GD’s  reference  is  hermeneutic,  in  Hutcheon’s  sense  (156)  –  it  points 
toward the discourses present in the reading context.
I have argued that within the narrative, GD includes frames and themes that raise the issue of 
the accuracy and value of historical (re)presentations: Galileo’s déjà vu experiences, his modern 
‘nature’ (opposing Aristotelian science) and middle class liberties make him a position in which the 
present reader may approach his past, although this familiarity with Galileo simultaneously raises 
questions regarding the applicability of his experience (in GD) for understanding the depicted past. 
The  possibilities  of  the  counterfactual  approach  similarly  complicate  viewing  the  historicist 
perspectives inherent in the narrative as arguments for or against the  identity or  difference of the 
past. I argue that the counterfactual divergences from and reversals back to the (reader’s) actual 
state of events indicate how GD above all represents history as a complex form of narrative and 
85
reference.  In  other  words,  the  representation  of  history  in  GD inevitably  draws  out  historical 
presuppositions,  making its  referential  dimensions partly hermeneutic,  pointing towards modern 
historical discourse – but always valuing history as necessary and affective.
4.1.3 The Narrator
The role of the narrator in GD is important not only as the formal source of all propositions made 
about history in the novel, but also as an element bearing meaning in its own right. In this section, I 
will discuss in more detail the role of the narrator in GD’s representation of the past it depicts, as 
well as the process of creating history. The narrator is another marked position where the reader’s 
modernity is brought into the narrative thematically, as his explicit commentary, among other things 
in proleptic description, makes apparent.  Above all, I argue that the narrator’s transition from an 
ostensibly omniscient narrator into a deictic presence in the narrative is also a formal allegory of the 
novel’s representation of history. This is connected to the conclusions of the previous section, where 
I  argued that  the tension created by the shifting mode of narration is  analogous to the type of 
historicism that is concerned not with arguing objectivity but contextually dependent discourse.
By having the narrator come originally from the utopian future, the novel enables the narrator 
to have the modern understanding possessed by the readers, and in so doing makes him also a point 
of entry to the peculiar perspective of the past that the novel offers. The narrator, Cartophilus, is not 
omniscient, however, which is relevant as a formal element both in terms of the text’s relation to the 
reader as well as for the story and its plotting. The narrator as a character pleads his ignorance of 
(exact) foreknowledge of the history of Galileo (which is necessary in order to sustain the realism of 
the narrative) by referring to his alienation and weariness: “I don’t remember if I remember it right 
or not, anymore. It’s been too long” (GD 331). Although (at the time) the narrator is in this way 
distanced from the future to the point of not having the knowledge of Galileo’s situation that he is 
expected  to  have,  he  makes  the  anachronistic  representation  of  the  past  seem  somewhat 
unproblematic. This is due to the way in which the narratorial perspective is in the course of the 
86
novel revealed to be explicitly that of a distanced present looking at a past that is in many crucial 
ways  different.  This  is,  of  course,  the  perspective  that  all  historical  novels  embody  in  their 
reception, but as opposed to GD, they invoke it in accordance with the unmarked framework of the 
realistic novel form. In K.S. Robinson’s novel, the modernity of the narrator is orchestrated through 
his alienation from both future and past (as introduced in the previous section).  Furthermore, the 
means of that orchestration, meaning the diminishing self-effacement and weariness of Cartophilus, 
are part of the content of the novel. The perspective itself comes to the fore as the narrator emerges 
as a subject from his customarily unmarked role.
As a consequence,  the narrator’s modern perspective carries with it  present-day historical 
perspectives and anxieties, which are thus addressed throughout the novel in its explicit focus on the 
way histories are constructed. For example, our knowledge as well as our preconceptions about 
Galileo’s life and influence in history (in general) – e.g., his martyrdom as a modern myth – are 
bound to influence the way a modern novel about the past figure is created, and also (and more 
importantly) the way the narrative is received. The foreboding prolepses of the narrator are thus 
analogous to the ‘unwritten’ experiences of a reader of historical texts. For example, during his 
‘early’ successes with audiences in Rome, the narration notes how “Galileo did not notice any 
danger” (GD 122), where the danger is (in addition to being a part of the uncertainty of patronage) 
immediately clear (although perhaps vaguely defined) for a modern audience. A schema concerning 
the  suppression  of  scientific  work  by  religious  institutions  in  pre-modernity  is  a  basis  of  this 
prolepsis in  GD, as is the “myth” (in the sense of widely held but false belief) of the “constant 
conflict” of science and religion, originating from the nineteenth century, as Ronald L. Numbers 
claims (1). Indeed, as the narrator states that “the sight of Galileo standing in the torchlight over the 
long table of seated revellers was the very image of Pride before its Fall” (GD 122), the trope used 
not only describes but also explains the development of Galileo’s career. It is also an example of the 
structuration of history with specifically narrative tropes, “tragic” emplotment following White’s 
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narrative historiography (White 58–9, 84). Furthermore, it exemplifies the way such tropes already 
explain and impart meaning on an otherwise non-causal presentation (Day 176).
It is relevant that the narrator’s identity develops from being a formal convention to a diegetic 
character. At first the novel seems to be narrated by an omniscient third person narrator, but as the 
narrative progresses, the narrator time and again makes himself visible by referring to himself as a 
subject in the text (e.g., “later we counted fifteen wounds” [GD 78]). Even following these self-
referential acts, the narration continues to describe the thoughts and feelings of Galileo, even his 
dreams (where the narrator should not possibly be present), as if the third person narrator had access 
to this information. This causes a growing tension in the formal structure of the novel, between the 
fact of the diegetic narrator and his seemingly omniscient, yet impossible narration of Galileo’s 
private cognition. Although even this is explained in compliance with the science fictional metaphor 
(Galileo’s “dream visits” being visible to the servant Cartophilus), it exhausts the meaning of this 
tension only superficially, as other novelistic conventions of omniscient narrators are not explained 
until  the self-referential  final  words of the narrator.  The seeming objectivity of description and 
judgement, as well as the narration of Galileo’s cognition, remain under tension with the fact of the 
narrator’s presence as a character along his subjects. The unreliability of the narrator has also been 
noted in reviews of the novel (Clute, “Scores”).4
This deictic presence consequently strains the novel’s claim to historical objectivity, should 
the reader expect it; more to the point, it discourages expectations and signals the “tentativeness” of 
interpretation (Jacobs 42–3). The gradual revelation of a narrating presence behind the (hi)story 
makes the structuration of not only this history but all history explicit. This is due to the fact that the 
novel’s  content  is  specifically  the  formation of  history  out  of  present/past  events  and realities. 
Additionally,  GD thematises  the motivation and partiality behind a given form of history (e.g., 
Hera’s criticism of Ganymede’s historical  metanarrative),  especially in comparison with a  view 
4 To quote Clute: “in all its seeming innocence of narratage, Galileo’s Dream is a profoundly unreliable fiction. The 
‘Kim Stanley Robinson’ who purports to tell the tale is a lure, a fascinator in a hall of mirrors. From almost the first 
page he/it flickers in and out of focus like some doppelganger, like some ignis fatuus glimpsed through the blurred 
and distorting lens of one of the primitive early telescopes of Galileo himself, which are described (thoroughly, by 
someone) in this text.” (Clute, “Scores”; emphasis original)
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proposing  ultimate  objectivity  as  a  viable  possibility  (see  4.2.2).  The  form or  the  manner  of 
representation  inevitably  comes  to  exemplify  the  theme,  the  narrative  content.  In  the  end,  the 
narrator acknowledges this conviction:
I’ll be done with this story, which I tried so hard to stay out of. Some of it I saw, some of it 
Hera told me, some of it I made up – that’s fine, that’s the way it always is – some of it you 
made up too. Reality is always partly a creation of the observing consciousness. (GD 577)
The same authorial relation to history is, as discussed, also present in the thematic centre of GD, in 
Ganymede’s plan: the explicit argument is made that if Galileo began anything in the history of 
science, it is because he, Ganymede, “chose to begin it all” (GD 56). It becomes evident that as the 
narration is restricted to the voice of a subjective narrator, the representation of history becomes 
subjective  as  well.  Nonetheless,  the  novel  never  implies  that  the  past  consequently  loses  its 
significance for historiographical discourse.
The shift  in  the  narrative  voice  can  be  described as  an  attempt  to  utilise  both  historical 
omniscience  and  self-aware  subjectivity.  Discussing  omniscience  in  narration,  Paul  Dawson 
underlines the way that  the “proleptic voice of history” typifies the narration of “contemporary 
historical  fiction” (153).  A similar  proleptic  voice is  employed in  GD,  as was shown in 4.1.1. 
Letissier even calls this sort of narration “hyperomniscient” (121; Dawson 153), so that specifically, 
as in Faber’s The Crimson Petal and the White, “the double temporal perspective, with the twenty-
first century looking back on the nineteenth century,” incorporates anachronistic scientific details 
that  “stretch  the  narrative  contract,  almost  to  a  breaking point”  (Letissier  121).  The  structural 
tension in the narration of GD is an effect of the utilisation of the narrative mode characterised as 
“the literary historian,” where “literary imagination” supplements “the authority of the historical 
record” rather than undermining “the narrative ‘truth’ of history” (Dawson 153; emphasis original); 
only  in  GD,  the  mode  of  the  “ironic  moralist,”  with  its subjective  or  relativist  emphasis,  is 
growingly pronounced in the narration (Dawson 152; emphasis original).
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In  its  entirety,  the  narrator’s  role  progresses  from omniscience,  with  repeated  hints  of  a 
subjective voice breaking this fallacy,  to the revelation  of the identity of the narrator.  It  is this 
progression that  formally  allegorises the construction of historiography and the representation of 
history: despite the inconspicuousness of what must always be a single perspective on any  given 
past event, there will be a narrator behind it. In fact, the introduction of Cartophilus into his own 
narrative ironically underscores the function of the narrator: ”And so Cartophilus came into the 
service of Galileo, intending (as always, and always with the same failure) to efface himself as 
much as possible” (GD 61). This attention to self-effacement from one’s own narrative emphasises 
the idea that  “meanings given to histories” are “not meanings intrinsic in the past [...] but meanings 
given  from  outside(rs)”  (Jenkins  17).  For  although  his  self-effacement  ostensibly  shows  his 
adherence to objective description, it is ironically subverted by this very act of self-reference and 
his deictic recurrent presence. For instance, as Galileo’s servant, the narrator tells him: “Cartophilus 
is just a . . . performance. No one is really there. One tries not to be there” (GD 324).
In other words, the attention to the subjective narrator is in fact an essentially conspicuous act. 
Rather  than  proving  objectivity,  the  effacement  thus  appears  to  hide  (not  without  irony)  the 
subjectivity of historical representation and the existence of the narrator as a deictic member of the 
historical  narrative.  This  metaphorical  assertion  of  neutral  meditation  finds  a  correspondent  in 
Jenkins’s subversive critique of historical representation: the methodical self-effacing acts of the 
narrator in GD are akin to the references to a given objective methodology with which the historian, 
according  to  Jenkins,  regularly  seeks  to  guarantee  the  objectivity  of  historical  interpretation 
(Jenkins 19). In this sense Cartophilus’s form for his historical narrative brings history writing to 
the fore, although not necessarily in parody, but in resignation.
In  general,  the  narrator’s  self-effacement  serves  different  functions  relevant  in  the 
representation of history. The narrator’s feigned, unmarked (third-person) neutrality allows the story 
to  develop in a fallacy of  suspension of disbelief,  according to  which the narrative seems less 
openly directed and fabricated by a conscious agent – the metatextual and metafictional narrator. 
90
This is in an important sense a contradiction, as it is only by narrative convention that an impersonal 
narrator seems more passive than a deictic (passive) narrator, but then again the narrator of  GD 
embodies contradiction for clear purposes. An instance of this is his self-acknowledged attempt to 
be truthful while admitting his own active role and partiality. On the other hand it is his action that 
reinforces the effects of the narrative’s counterfactuality: by being present and saving the life of one 
of  Galileo’s  friends,  and  by  doing  so  in  clearly  anachronistic  terms  –  “we  shot  him  up  with 
antibiotics” (GD 78) – the correspondence of the narrative with actual history becomes explicit.
While counterfactual alternatives in general act as “a critique of the metaphors we use to 
discuss history” (Hellekson, Alternate History 5), in this case they immediately open the depicted 
moment as a present, allowing the fiction to represent the possibilities and uncertainties that are 
concomitant with it. Historiographical narratives (without counterfactualities) curtail in many ways 
the  sense  of  this  uncertainty  of  a  given present.  In  the  third  person the  narration  invokes  the 
proleptic structuration of history, as when “[t]he ancient one [Cartophilus] slunk away. He knew 
why Galileo  was  afraid  better  than  Galileo  himself”  (GD 151),  but  his  active  role  within  the 
narrative shows that in the fictional world of  GD, the present is mutable and concomitantly the 
future  – the  allegorical  history of  the  reader  –  is  in  fact  not  predetermined.  He explicates  the 
dramatic irony of history, known by the reader (A. Robinson 35).
Importantly,  the narrator also inhabits unmarked spaces,  (inevitable)  textual  blanks in  the 
authentic traces,  in the history of  Galileo,  which allows him to simultaneously function as the 
above-mentioned  subjective  voice  of  representation  and  as  an  additional  seam  between  the 
ontological levels of fiction and history. The latter, the juxtaposition of these ontological levels, is a 
crucial stylistic element of the novel, and it is visible on occasions such as the narrator’s description 
of the end of Galileo’s first official visit to Rome:
The visit to Rome was a triumph in every way, even if Guicciardini was now hinting 
that it might be best to leave while he was still being lionized. The ambassador stayed just 
on the right side of politeness about this,  but if Galileo had sneaked into his office and 
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looked at the letters on his desk, as proved easy to do, he would have gained a truer sense 
of the ambassador’s mind:
Galileo has little  strength of  judgement  wherewith to  control  himself,  so that  he 
makes the climate of Rome extremely dangerous to himself, particularly in these times,  
when we have a Pope who hates geniuses. (GD 123–24; first  emphasis added, second 
original)
The inclusion of correspondence by other people is legitimated here by the playful reference to the 
way it is acquired. As the narrator presents this as an actual possibility in the historical moment he 
is relating, he draws attention to the structure of history by asserting the plausibility of connecting 
this material to Galileo’s reality, because it exists in Galileo’s immediate vicinity. To some extent 
the effect is unavoidably ironic, in that the plausibility of the authentic past text (which is marked 
by italics in the novel) connects to the fiction that this history of Galileo is precisely through the 
implausible  means  of  attaining  it.  Whereas  elsewhere  these  historical  traces  are  evoked  in 
juxtaposition to the unmarked prose of the fiction, here it is the fictional narrator who makes the 
overt connection self-consciously.
While the function of the appearance of this narratorial presence is not to derail history into 
textual  play  and  deny  any  meaning,  it  inevitably  undermines  the  foundations  of  an  imagined 
immateriality of history,  specifically by presenting the (authentic and real)  historical  text  as an 
object of the fictional world and showing the (occasional) implausibility of its seemingly plausible 
incorporation into narrative. In other words, this “contamination” of the reference to history with 
“situational  discursive  elements”  challenges  “the  implied  assumptions  of  historical  statements: 
objectivity,  neutrality,  impersonality,  and  transparency  of  representation”  (Hutcheon  92).  The 
content of the narratorial form is thus made evident, and the plotting of the material into narrative, 
the  “intervention”  of  the  narrator  (A.  Robinson  43),  is  explicitly  shown.  As  mentioned,  such 
presentation does not deconstruct historiography into self-perpetuating textuality, but it presents the 
ambiguity  of  the  narrator  very  effectively:  the  material  he  seeks  is  authentically  historical  (as 
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signalled by the italics), but his deictic and active presence in his own narrative points to its primary 
existence  as  fiction. Therefore,  while  on  the  one  hand  the  deixis  signifies  fictionality  and, 
concomitantly, the discursive construction of history, the narrator’s active role in his own narrative 
points to the way that history is represented in the narrative of GD, i.e., as inherently changeable. 
Where  A.S.  Byatt’s  nostalgia  can be  described as  a  “fantasized redemption  of  postmodernity,” 
(Wells 672), in GD this fantasy is realized as a science fictional revisitation, as the narrator’s deictic 
juxtaposition with historical intertext exemplifies.
Moreover,  this  change is  done  in  the  present,  where  the  present  too  is  historical,  as  the 
narrator  advocates  in  the  end  of  the  novel.  Addressing  the  audience  of  the  narrative,  that  is, 
‘posteriority’, he states:
I’m sure that the history you tell yourself is still a tale of mangled potentiality, of 
unnecessary misery. That’s just the way it is. In all times people are greatly lacking in 
courage.
But sometimes they aren’t. Sometimes they keep trying. This too is history. We are 
all history – the hopes of people in the past, the past of some future people – known to 
them, judged by them, changed by them as they use us. […] It can always change. Because 
understand: once I saw Galileo burned at the stake; then I saw him squeak his way clear. 
You have to imagine how that feels. It makes you have to try. (GD 578)
In essence, the narrator’s anachronistic existence, his referential position in the future within the 
narrated present (of seventeenth-century Italy, for instance), shares a historiographical content with 
this last didactic appeal: together they point to the ‘historicalness’ of the present. The counterfactual 
denial of the rigidity of the past is a mirror image of the historical content of Robinson’s Orange 
County novels. As Istvan Csicsery-Ronay Jr. argues,
[b]y projecting the narrative point of reference beyond the present, science-fiction stories 
foreground the future-orientation that is usually unacknowledged (and often unconscious) 
in most historical writing. The placement of the readerly present in the future makes the 
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present, which most people view uncritically as a consummation of past developments, 
appear as a moment in the process of changing into something other than itself. (160)
In GD, it is the past that is not rigid; in Robinson’s other fiction, specifically the Orange County 
novels, it is the ‘alternate future’ that is not determinate. History in Robinson’s works opens the 
possibilities of the present.
To be sure,  the didacticism of the narrator in  GD only underlines the unreliability of the 
narrator, but it is the only, final voice of the novel as a whole, and there is little to none textual or 
stylistic evidence of a total  abnegation of the narrator’s  moral position in  GD to attribute to a 
disagreeing implicit author. As such, the narrative voice may be compared to the narration of Adam 
Thirwell’s  Politics  (2003),  where  Dawson  identifies  the  narrator’s  “agonistic  lament  for 
extradiegetic authority,” that is, an anxiety concerning possibilities of representation, combined with 
“a brazen display of diegetic authority” (Dawson 152). The self-reflective presence of GD’s narrator 
in his narrative follows the main idea of Dawson’s “ironic moralism” in narrative omniscience (in 
contemporary  fiction),  namely  the  maintained,  ostensible  belief  in  the  narrated  content,  which 
Dawson describes as an assertion of  the universal  value of  an admittedly subjective viewpoint 
(152).
In  this  section  I  have  sought  to  make  clear  how  the  waning  passivity  of  the  narrator 
allegorises notions of the interpretive subjectivity of history, and how his active role is a crucial 
element  in  GD’s  representation  of  history.  The  tentativeness  of  the  narrator  makes evident  the 
construction of history from the past, as well as the ethical imperative to find meaning in it instead 
of  succumbing  to  circular  postmodern  referential  games.  Lastly,  as  a  reminder  of  a  ‘modern 
present’, the narrator reverts the counterfactual openness of possibilities to the reader’s present.
4.1.4 Intertextuality and Postmodern Composition
This section focuses in more detail on the use of historiographical text in GD. The conspicuous 
utilisation of historiographical intertexts in the novel is one of its clearest formal idiosyncrasies, and 
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it is crucial in its representation of history. It is inescapably related to the poetics of postmodernity, 
as its mixing of genres is all the more prevalent due to the science fictional elements in the story. I 
will first argue that the juxtaposition of historical and fictional texts, as a clever manipulation of 
intertextual reference, points to the linguistic/narrative turn(s) of historical representation. However, 
the effect or the conjectured motive of this narrative device is not to deconstruct history into a mere 
rhetorical mode. I argue, following Hutcheon’s formulation of postmodern historical fiction, that by 
utilising these intertexts, GD thematises its relation to history, so that its ostensibly sincere belief in 
a meaningful relation to Galileo Galilei’s history is narrated in accordance with due scepticism of 
historicist  possibilities  (in  fiction).  Consequently,  the  composition  of  the  narrative  from  these 
materials is above all a stylistic matter, a means to an end rather than a pure show of textuality.
The narrative regularly incorporates  actual  historical  texts,  indicated by the use  of  italics 
(Author’s Note,  GD 584), for example as quotations from various contemporaries of Galileo, but 
also from later writers, such as Marcel Proust. As shown in the previous section, extracts from the 
writings of Galileo himself and his contemporaries are incorporated in the middle of the narration 
proper as ways of further dramatizing the narrated events as well as the Italian society depicted. 
Furthermore,  each  chapter  is  prefaced  with  epigraphs  presenting  quotations  from  both  people 
depicted in the novel, and by either earlier or later authors and thinkers. One of the effects of the 
intertextual passages is that they support the characterisation of Galileo in particular. For example, 
when Grassi, a Jesuit, is quoted as stating that “[e]ven with his telescope the lynx-eyed astrologer 
cannot look into the inner thoughts of the mind” (GD 388; emphasis original), it is as an epigraph to 
a passage where the eager, uninhibited Galileo returns from Rome, “willing to believe” that he had 
made  his  case  and  convinced  church  authorities  of  his  reasoning  (GD 388).  The  narration 
manoeuvres smoothly (but marked with italics) between fiction and intertext, and in these uses the 
intertextuality is quite conventional, presenting historical justifications for fictional conjecture.
However,  the  quotations  in  the  epigraphs  are  striking  introductions  and insertions  to  the 
narrative due among other things to the science fictional properties of the novel. The figurative 
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comments  made  in  the  correspondence  between  Galileo  and  his  contemporaries  become 
conspicuously  suggestive  because  of  their  context:  for  instance,  a  figurative remark  becomes 
suddenly literal, as an actual historical trace is juxtaposed with the science fictional narrative of 
depictions of Galileo experiencing formerly figurative situations. The effect is often ironic, as for 
example when Galileo in  one of  his  dream visits  is  about  to  enter  the interior  of  Jupiter.  The 
narration is paused in anticipation in order to introduce a quotation from the correspondence of the 
contemporaneous pope, Urban VIII: “Galileo who has entered the aetherial spaces, cast light on 
unknown stars, and plunged into the inner recesses of the planets–” (GD 424; emphasis original). 
These intertextual epigraphs are an intentional narrational device, the effect of which is to intensify 
the moment of reference, its context, by in a sense broadening the field of reference of the narrative 
moment. For example, right before the trial of Galileo, an extract from the work of Giordano Bruno, 
a philosopher and scientist burned at the stake in 1600, frames the impeding fate of Galileo in 
allusion: “’I want what Fate wants,’ said Jove” (GD 441; emphasis original).
Whereas the former example casts the prose surrounding it in a playful, ironic light, the latter 
structures the historical narrative of the fictional Galileo. The allusion to Bruno forces a schema on 
the events that follow: the start of the chapter connects Galileo’s trial to the earlier one, creating a 
narrative presupposition of the history in question. The foreboding expectation is reinforced by the 
comparison, the familiarisation being a form of interpretation (White 86). The novel’s concern with 
history ensures that this similarity is seen as meaningful, and the depicted past is marked by the 
recurrence of institutional persecution.
Presenting  short  epigraphs  as  prefatory  introductions  to  chapters  is  of  course  nothing 
strikingly original or laden with distinct meaning. For example, the epigraph of the novel as a whole 
comes from Virgil  and reads “The Muses love alternatives.” It  is interpretable as an altogether 
conventional introduction, as it can be read as a comment on the decision to represent history in GD 
as a counterfactual narrative, the evocation of muses being furthermore traditional to the point of 
banality. The epigraphs and intertexts in the prose that follows slowly depart from this unobtrusive 
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variety of commentary and gradually but continually refer to the overtly counterfactual fictional 
reality of the narrative, however, which is interesting in terms of historical representation, as these 
intertexts come from historical  sources.  This stark juxtaposition of figurative passages with the 
literal realisation of those passages is somewhat more novel, because this juxtaposition in GD also 
marks the mixing of distinctly different genres and fictional worlds.
This  can  be  seen  in  an  epigraph  presenting  a  quotation  from the  twentieth-century  poet 
William Bronk, placed right before Galileo’s return from a dream that precedes his persistent déjá-
vu experience:
We aren’t even here but in a real here
Elsewhere – a long way off. Not a place
To go but where we are: there.
Here is there. This is not a real world. (GD 302, emphasis original)
The reference is anachronistic, but only in the narrow sense of not belonging to the same time as the 
narrative content around it. It is on the one hand a comparison of the feeling of unreality, and in 
GD’s  case,  of  the  incommensurability  of  experience  and  discourse.  On  the  other  hand,  it 
universalises the experience itself, precisely because it is anachronistic.
More strikingly, authentic extracts appear also without the spatial break separating epigraphs 
from the narration (an example of this was already discussed in the previous section). The crucial 
difference is  that  in these citations the source is itself  more closely part  of the fictional world. 
Therefore, to the reader the citations seem to exist on or refer to several different ontological levels 
of fictionality, or in distinct possible worlds of fiction (Dolezel 788): they appear as actual historical 
traces,  or  as  parts  of  the  fiction  and  the  fictional  world  (but  with  intertextual/“transworld” 
backgrounds  [Dolezel  787]),  but  also  as  the  creation  of  a  fictional  entity  within  the  narrative. 
Galileo’s  own texts  are  often  used  for  purposes  such  as  to  hint  subtly  of  his  fictional  dream 
visitations to the future, and of his exceptional knowledge in the novel. Thus, when questioned 
about his theories on the solar system by a puzzled audience,
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Galileo wrote back tersely. I know certain things which have been observed by no one but  
myself.  From  them,  within  the  limits  of  my  human  wisdom,  the  correctness  of  the  
Copernican system seems incontrovertible. (GD 375; emphasis original)
Employed precisely as an explicit reference to an actual historical text, the juxtaposition of texts of 
different ontological validity, so to speak, seems at first glance to lend a certain credibility to the 
interpretations  made of  the  dispositions  and  personalities  of  historical  characters,  for  example. 
However,  if  viewed  from the  perspective  of  Hutcheon’s  concept  of  parodic  representation  for 
example,  this aspiration to credibility may be seen as belonging to an older narrative tradition 
aiming at the mimetic representation of some sort of a genuine reality.
The fact is that  GD does not attempt to ‘faithfully’ mimic a past reality, although a certain 
kind of realism is pursued; this much is obvious already from the choice of a science fictional 
perspective. Furthermore, the (italicised) break between the two textual varieties is indeed explicit: 
there  is  thus  no  straightforward  attempt  to  “hide  the  joins  between fiction  and history”,  as  in 
nineteenth-century historical fiction, and the effect of introducing these intertextual references is in 
fact very much opposite to what Lukács for instance described (Hutcheon 114).  Rather than lend 
credibility  to  something  like  historically  accurate  interpretations  of  characters  and  plot,  they 
accentuate the clever design of the narrative, in that it utilises these textual traces to support an 
explicitly  and  overtly  fictional world. Nonetheless,  as  Jacobs  shows  in  her  discussion  on  the 
postmodern, overt fictional biography, “to overwhelm the biographical record” with explicit fiction 
is a form of representational scepticism, but it is more importantly also an absorption in history 
(29). As the narrative is genuinely interested in Galileo’s history as an ethical model for the present 
(cf. Dawson 152), it also resembles a fictional history, but not according to a “mimetic mode of 
representation,” but a “symbolic” one, similarly to A.S. Byatt (Wells 671).
The novel takes place in two different settings – in Galileo’s actual life in Italy, and during his 
dreams, in the future of human society. Both the epigraphs and the extracts from historical texts, 
which quite naturally occur in Galileo’s Italy, as pieces of narrated correspondence among other 
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things,  cleverly  connect  the  outlandish  dream  experiences  of  Galileo  to  his  waking  life.  The 
figurative and evasive remarks are thus evoked in order to link the overtly fictional elements of the 
narrative to traditional historical fiction – to hint at Galileo’s dreams’ influence on his work as well 
as his ordinary life in general. For example, as Galileo returns from a dream to his Italian reality, his 
enforced loss of memory is described by an epigraph, a letter to his Medicean prince Cosimo in 
1911:
These confused and intermittent mental struggles slip through one’s fingers and escape by  
their  subtleties  and  slitherings,  not  hesitating  to  produce  a  thousand  chimeras  and  
fantastic caprices little understood by themselves and not at all by their listeners. By these 
fancies the bewildered mind is bandied about from one phantasm to another, just as in a  
dream one passes from a palace to a ship and then to a grotto or a beach, and finally,  
when one awakes and the dream vanishes (and for the most part all memory of it also), one 
finds that one has been idly sleeping and has passed the hours without profit of any sort. 
(GD 103; emphasis original)
This  is  markedly  different  from  using  historical  texts  to  bolster  the  claims  to  credibility  of 
traditional historical fiction. In GD, the quotations from actual historical sources thus promote not a 
factual historical interpretation but a wholly fictitious representation of history.
Despite the fact that these fractures in the fictional ontology are marked, the juxtaposition of 
these different materials establishes their similarity on another level. That is, the fact that actual 
historical texts can be utilised to support the apparent plausibility and the consistency of a (science) 
fictional world, shows explicitly how arbitrarily these historical facts create historical narratives. 
What formally postmodernist texts and Hutcheon’s historiographical metafiction do, is that they 
highlight the form of the discourse about the present and about history: by for example juxtaposing 
wholly  different  elements,  they  make  explicit  the  discourses  and  ideologies  that  govern  our 
apprehension of the present in opposition to the past, to history (Hutcheon 118). Thus, in fact, the 
factual records are drawn to the same level of ontological credibility as the unobtrusive fiction – 
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they  are  both  mere  texts.  Moreover,  they  are  equal  parts  of  a  fiction.  GD is  not  formally 
postmodernist to the extent that many other texts are, as it employs among other things science 
fictional narrative strategies and metaphors instead of anti-mimetic metafiction (cf. McHale 64–5). 
Yet in following its own poetics it participates in the discussions on the referential questions that 
possible fictional worlds and their relation to historical representation present: differing from GD’s 
thematic  explanation  of  the  influence characters  have  on  history,  the  intertextuality  indicates  a 
distinct convergence of what McHale sees as the “analogous but independent” trails of “the two 
ontological sister-genres, science fiction and postmodernist fiction” (62). In particular, it does so in 
order to represent history as similarly subjectively constructed as fiction, as discourse (Jenkins 57).
Consequently, A. Robinson’s discussion of the postmodernist fiction of Peter Ackroyd seems 
very familiar in the context of  GD. Whereas A. Robinson sees in Ackroyd the “blurring of the 
boundaries between historical fact and invention” as an effect of the narrative patterns (“analepsis 
and  prolepsis”)  of  metafictional  recurrence  and  prefiguration  (157),  it  is  the  overtly  marked 
intertextuality of the epigraphs and historical sources that performs this function in GD. The effect 
of  this  intertextuality  is  that  it  “puts  intratextual  verbal  echoes into  [the  characters’]  unwitting 
mouths, and points out synchronicities of which they are unaware, foregrounds the artificiality of 
this narrative construct and tends to reduce history to discursive textuality” (A. Robinson 157). The 
difference to what A. Robinson identifies in Ackroyd’s fiction is that GD’s intertextuality is at times 
so apparently disjunctive that it parodies the fiction, rather than the history, of the entire endeavour. 
The best example of this is perhaps the quotations above, describing Galileo’s literal entry into the 
atmosphere of Jupiter as the figurative “aetherial spaces” of Pope Urban’s correspondence (GD 
424; emphasis original). 
Reality, in the form of an intertext, encroaches on the fiction also in a sudden curious notion 
in correspondence to the Medici Duchess, where Galileo states how “[T]he open book of heaven 
contains  such  profound  mysteries  and  such  sublime  concepts  that  the  labour  and  studies  of  
hundreds of the sharpest minds, in uninterrupted investigation for thousands of years, have not yet  
100
completely fathomed them” (GD 304; emphasis original). Here the millennia alluded to also point 
forwards, to the utopian, thirty-first-century future depicted in GD. However, the farthest fantasies 
of the science fiction are inherently incongruous with the actual Galileo’s referent, even if they are 
not so with the shared wonder at humanity’s place in the cosmos. The result is, I argue, that the 
parodic barb points rather at the fiction (and its narrator) and not the other way round: the textuality 
of  history  or  of  reality  does  not  bend as  far  as  the  science  fiction,  which  results  in  a  partial 
affirmation of the historical. In this sense, Hutcheon’s ideas become even more suggestive when she 
states that “Postmodern intertextuality […] is not an attempt to void or avoid history. […] It uses 
and abuses […] intertextual echoes, inscribing their powerful allusions and then subverting that 
power through irony” (118).  The juxtaposition seems therefore to return to an insistence on the 
singular perceptiveness of Galileo’s thoughts. Consequently, it is the pattern of the presentation, the 
representation of history as stretching into pasts and futures, that is meaningful: history is textual, 
but it is also persistent and pointing towards presents and futures.
The framing of the Galileo of GD as this science fictionally modernised – and subsequently 
amnesic – mathematician creates an ironic tension where his scientific ideas and their writing into 
his final works are described. The narrator notes how Galileo “kept writing things that surprised 
him later, things he didn’t know that he knew,” these things being intertextual quotations from his 
actual work, describing accurately Newtonian mechanics as well as visionary glimpses of infinities 
and invisible forces acting at  a distance (GD 553–55).  It  is obvious that  the way in which the 
authorial figure links the wildly fantastic with the intertextual historical text does not denote that 
Galileo’s actual work is to be seen as influenced by any anachronistic knowledge. Intertexts, in the 
form of actual historical excerpts and speeches, are similarly used for their satirical incisiveness in 
Robert Coover’s novels, whereas in GD, the intertexts, “arranged and selected for maximum effect” 
(Jacobs 168–69), recover the strange and unique, yet simultaneously suggestive discourse of the 
depicted past. This specific kind of allusiveness can only work in one direction – from historical 
affirmation to fantastic resolution.
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One effect of the juxtaposition then is that it only underlines the inventiveness of the real 
Galileo and partly also historicises the possibility of these ideas, drawing attention to the evolution 
of  ideas,  for  instance.  I  therefore  argue  that  the  realisation  of  this  (specific  kind  of)  one-way 
historical relation in fact affirms the uniqueness of the past: the present (science) fiction/fantasy can 
never refute the reality of the past text – it retains its own “Identity” (Jameson, Ideologies 150). A 
similar argument is made by Katharina Boehm in her analysis of Sarah Waters’s  Affinity (2002), 
namely  that  “ultimately”  Waters’s  “use  of  pastiche,  intertextuality,  and  other  devices  of 
historiographic  metafiction”  undermines  the  over-textualisation  or  constructedness  of  history 
(Boehm  242).  Indirectly,  the  past  is  vitalised  by  the  explicit  inadequacy  of  postmodern 
representation.
The other functions of this compositional strategy are evoked similarly in the inclusion of a 
passage from Galileo’s letter, written after his trials from the pained tedium of house arrest, where 
he states how he is “caught in the loops of these events, and thus crossed out of the book of the 
living”  (GD 528;  emphasis  original).  The  passage  fits  so  well  together  with  the  fiction,  by 
suggesting in its  wording (loops and deaths) the fantasy of the science fiction,  that  the overall 
representation becomes rounded and unified in accordance with one Aristotelian maxim, but the 
overt impossibility of this imagination contradicts it by violating another (fiction as the imagination 
of what is possible). The effects are thus also intensely aesthetic, in that the selection, plotting, and 
narration of his work and writing are neatly combined: they are both evocative, constantly referring 
to different directions, and capable of being in conflict with its own representation.
It is thus important to note that the function of this metafictional denotation and plotting is not 
always and primarily the subversion of reference. Rather, it is in fact primarily a clever structuration 
of historical material in view of historical representation, in which thematically the novel follows 
science fictional poetics, whereas the formal structure may also be seen as postmodern. The latter, 
postmodern play, along with the realism inherent in science fictional explanation are furthermore 
not only stylistic aspects or periods, but may “also be understood as persistent responses to the 
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demands  of  history”  (Rothberg  9).  By  providing  “frameworks  for  the  representation  and 
interpretation  of  history  […],  a  text’s  ‘realist’ component  seeks  strategies  for  referring  to  and 
documenting the world,” while the modernist and postmodernist “sides” and “moments” question 
the transparency of the historical  imaging of the past and, among other things, respond “to the 
economic and political conditions of its emergence and public circulation” (Rothberg 9). In GD, the 
persistence  of  the  relevance  of  the  past  in  history,  as  well  as  changing  it  as  an  allegory  of 
understanding it, corresponds to the novel’s realist impulse to depict and refer to the human world, 
while  the  intertextual  metafiction frames all  attempts  at  the  former  in  the  representational  and 
epistemological conditions of the supremely discursive contemporary world.
The result is nevertheless also subversive: it is the same seam that presents history and fiction 
as deftly connected, but also points to their common nature as text. In a sense, the cleverness of the 
invention, its entire aesthetic method, always escapes the physical author, both here and in general 
(the  latter  evidenced  by  the  weariness  shown  to  the  linguistic  turn  and  postmodern 
preposterousness). The juxtaposition of these different materials is furthermore a recurrently used 
strategy in  GD, and although the science fictional material of the narrative is always partly anti-
realist (or rather anti-reality), the possibility, necessity, and temptation of playing with time, while 
taking  into  account  the  plausible  breaks  where  fabrication  fits  (the  places  to  insert  either  the 
historical  text  or  conversely the fictional  explanation),  betrays a  deep interest  in  showing how 
history bends and needs to be bent in alternative dimensions. The importance of plotting history and 
interpreting the past is such an important part of the novel that the open-endedness of all objective 
explanations of large and complex moments which the juxtaposition reveals in its cleverness is a 
part of GD’s historically attentive function.
My point is that these intertexts do not deconstruct the narrative into disconnected fictional 
‘play,’ if that word is used according to its fullest connotations of ineffectiveness or irrelevance; 
precisely the opposite seems true – that the past and history (in GD’s case, both concepts are very 
much relevant)  can be discussed and referred to in fiction in various different poetics,  be they 
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historiographic metafiction, science fiction, or the psychological realism of heterodiegetic narration. 
The novel’s intertextuality connects to what I argue in section 4.1.1, namely that the variously pithy, 
ironic, and ridiculous connections between authentic historical fragments and fantastic elements of 
GD underline the (over)saturation of interpretation by the already existing narratives and tropes. 
Moreover, in GD, the fictionalisation of Galileo’s actual writing, their extension onto the fantasies 
of GD, works more to sustain the metaphorical tenor and artistry of Galileo’s ‘dream,’ rather than 
subvert historical reference altogether (Jacobs 42). As historical intertexts are juxtaposed with the 
counterfactual  openness  of  narrative  presents  and  their  futures,  the  oppression  of  dominant 
discourses (which is thematised via the reinterpretation of Galileo’s legacy) is lessened. As a result, 
overt fantasy to an extent denaturalises what postmodern anti-referential revisionism would assert – 
that history is a lost cause.
4.2 Explicit History: Plotting History, Plotting Historical Change
This section discusses the explicit thematisation of history, which appears in GD in the discussions 
between Galileo and the various members of a future society that is tangled in a plot to change 
Galileo’s life in specific ways. The participants in these dialogues include his mentor, Hera; his 
initial Patron Ganymede; his teacher Aurora; and his servant Cartophilus, who in the course of the 
narrative emerges as the narrator of the novel. In 4.2.1, I discuss the central historical theme of GD, 
namely Ganymede’s plan to actually affect and change the past. Inevitably, this includes questioning 
historical agency and the very capacity to ‘change history,’ as the trope suggests. I will specifically 
discuss the reasoning behind such a plan and its role as the historiographical content of GD.
In 4.2.2 I specify the overt metanarratives present in the novel. I treat the dynamic of the 
competing narratives as an example of a postmodern approach to history, assessing the historical 
value of the narratives themselves. Finally, in 4.2.3 I present what I argue to be the historico-ethical 
content of GD, its qualification of the various symbolisms and narratives as well as narrative forms 
concerning Galileo in addition to the act of historical interpretation itself.
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4.2.1 Bending the Banks of History: History as a Theme in Galileo’s Dream
My aim in this section is to present the manner in which history is explicitly discussed and becomes 
thematical in  GD, as distinct from a contextual or subtextual matter (cf. 4.1). The fictional world 
includes an imperative to cope with historical trauma as well as explicit discussions of material 
access to the past, and these combine to make historical access a thematic question. I will first 
consider the fictional yet material rationalisations of historical (re)interpretation and its means, and 
later  relate  this  to  the  symbolical  level  on which Galileo,  as  well  as  the reader’s reality,  must 
consider history. My argument is that the thematisation of history and its narrative treatment show 
how GD represents history as an object requiring and permitting symbolic reprocessing.
The novel thematises history most clearly by revolving straightforward around the plot of 
affecting  the past.  This  frame is  present  at  the  very  moment  of  the  narrative’s  beginning,  and 
although this science fictional trope is surpassed by other plot and thematic elements, it tints almost 
all of the novel’s thematic elements in a historicist hue: the focus on a vaguely defined historical 
existence, i.e., the historical significance of the portrayed issues, is underlined in an explicit way. As 
introduced  in  4.1.1,  Ganymede’s  presence  in  the  opening  scene  makes  the  counterfactual 
manipulation of history explicit and indicates the investigation of the possibility to change history.
The supposed reason for Ganymede’s actions is implicated in the metanarrative of history 
within  the  fictional  world  of  GD.  As  Galileo  learns,  the  growth  of  human  resources  and 
resourcefulness, and the crises following them, as the novel puts it, resulted in a world in which ”the 
main broad channel of history was filled with blood” (GD 413). He saw, listened, “but more than 
anything he felt the ferocious tempests in Europe after his time, felt how the early advances in 
maths and physics […], so beautiful and inspiring, were somehow intertwined and complicit with a 
continuous tale of war and spoilation [sic]” (GD 413). Importantly, history is “felt” and science is 
“complicit”. The latter’s uneasy (to describe it mildly) relationship with history –  here in the sense 
of the metanarrative agent – recurs in different instances throughout the fictional world’s narrative 
about its past(s). This future history narrative goes on to depict how
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[i]n the nineteenth and twentieth centuries  the world was carved up entirely into 
industrial empires; people were enslaved in factories and cities. Galileo felt their lives: not 
one in ten of them even tended a garden. ‘They live like ants,’ he groaned.
[…] [A] point came where entire nations of people were gathered up and fed into 
roaring furnaces and destroyed. […] in Galileo’s mind the Earth appeared not unlike the 
maelstrom-strewn face of Jupiter, a planet red with blood. […] The inherent anger, the 
depth of hatred, the potential for evil; he had always known, always seen it. […] Galileo 
felt in his stomach the iron ball of despair that had dragged down every single version of 
these generations’ efforts.  Shattered,  traumatized,  frightened, they did what  they could. 
(GD 413–14)
Ganymede’s actions are part of a larger sentiment that seeks to account for this past in the best 
possible  way.  Combined  with  the  knowledge  and  technology  required  for  “effective  action 
backward in time,” importantly termed “analepsis” in the novel5, this sentiment leads to action:
The idea to try changing some of their pasts, it seemed to Galileo, was born out of the 
trauma of the nightmare humankind had earlier unleashed on itself and the world. The 
hope was for restitution: if the past could be changed, it was possible that an amount of 
suffering and extinction beyond all telling might be averted […]. Not only restitution then 
but redemption. (GD 415–16)
This depicted outlook on history suggests, among other things, that there is a cultural logic that 
makes it imperative to go to such lengths to make amends to deeds whose founder or agent is only 
questionably relevant to this depicted present. Galileo  feels the lesson, and indirectly the cultural 
logic, more than he reads about it  or even sees it  unfold, and his feelings parallel those of the 
generations with an “iron ball of despair” as their principally represented affect.
5 It is obvious that using the word ‘analepsis’ does not signal the reading of the entire endeavour as a textual allegory, 
since the extended metaphor simply does not encompass enough aspects of the novel; on the other hand the word 
choice is significant. The whole is not symbolic, not a straightforward allegory, and the interpretation of this text (or 
any text for that matter) is not simply an effort to replace one master code with another (cf. Jameson, PU), which is 
what Adam Roberts argues in his theoretical introduction to the genre of science fiction in particular (Science 
Fiction (2006), 138–39).
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It is also the deictic narrator’s affective motive: “When I taught young children history, and 
saw the look on their faces when they understood, I was ashamed” (GD 576). Here too, history 
exists in order to provoke reaction (and not as an antiquarian display). The history and the historical 
trauma it generates is as such a powerful influence in the present moment, not merely as an ethical 
consideration, but as an actual stimulus. The endeavour for restitution, when presented with the 
means  of  its  material  fulfilment,  is  thus  sought  out  in  quite  straightforward  (and  somewhat 
stereotypical) means.
What is significant about the trauma of the past is specifically the focus on its tangibility. Its 
affective nature is the structural means by which the narrative validates the fantasy of time travel, in 
other words, the thematic analepsis. The cause of this endeavour is not a personal peculiarity but a 
generalised cultural affect – an Apollo program rather than a case of Wellsian individual ingenuity, 
with the cultural  and ideological associations of the former included. Earlier  in  GD,  as Galileo 
wants to understand the scientific situation of the future society, he learns from the character Aurora 
that  “what  you  see  here  is  a  damaged  and  traumatized  humanity”  (GD 238).  Moreover,  her 
(pseudo)scientific summation of the contemporary understanding of time crucially points out that 
“[w]e are connected and alive in the manifold of manifolds” (GD 238) – a concept that shows the 
interconnection of all times and their many alternating possibilities in the fictional world of  GD. 
Although the explanation is only pseudorealistic and clearly marks the narrative as such, in this 
affective sense it rises from an inherent cultural logic in the fictional world, as opposed to a solely 
technological one; it is furthermore ‘scientific fact’ within the “counterfactual world” (Singles 95). 
Most importantly, by way of these future histories and lessons, the relation to the past is underlined 
as a theme in itself.  Positing historical  understanding as imperative,  GD inevitably provides an 
interpretation of history – specifically in the sense of a cause in itself, an “aggregate of past events; 
the course of human affairs” (“history” [Def. 7a.]).
In  addition  to  the  culturally  affective  nature  of  the  historical  relation,  the  technological 
possibility of action (“if the past could be changed” [GD 416]) brings us to another rationalisation 
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of the endeavour to materially reform the past and change history. It concerns the very practice of 
reaching its goal – the logic of the technological means. Although the pseudo-physics of time is 
briefly described in the novel, and while the vague background of scientific progress which enables 
the plan Ganymede is executing is alluded to in Galileo’s lesson on history, (futuristic) technology 
is not very relevant for the narrative. This does not mean that the ideological basis of a technocratic 
optimism – committing to the plan of changing the past simply because it is possible – remains 
unproblematized  in  the  novel.  It  is  defused  particularly  by  the  previously  described  historical 
metanarrative and its distinct message: the direct impact of the historical trauma is a much more 
powerful motive.
Nonetheless, the technological aspect can be brought into the analysis, although in the history 
Galileo learns, its connection to the reason for why the past is changed is not made explicit. But 
what seems evident throughout the novel, especially in its historical scenes, is that technology is 
important for larger reasons than its use as a magnification of the human senses. Namely, as Adam 
Roberts’s description of science fiction as a form suggests, there is a straightforward logic in the 
way  technical  knowledge  affects  human  consciousness  and  interpretation  of  the  surrounding 
world(s), and this logic is relevant for  GD.  The idea comes from Heidegger’s phenomenology: 
instead of science (as in the science of science fiction as well), “Heidegger thinks that technology, 
from windmills to hydroelectric plants, ‘enframes’ the world in a certain way, allowing or shaping 
the ways in which we ‘know’ the world around us” (Roberts, History 11; emphasis added) and “in 
which  thinking  happens”  (Roberts,  “Is  SF  Handwritten?”  64).  Although  it  is  more  evidently 
applicable with Galileo’s findings and the revolution he was swept in, the resolve to actually change 
the past can be understood to follow the same logic.  Not only the understanding of time, which 
permits the present to influence the past, but also the instrumental means of doing so, crucially 
affect the cultural logic(s) of time and history: restitution is sought physically, as the means change 
the way the object (time/past/history) is known and understood. The same imperative underscores 
Galileo’s discoveries and assertions, which are enabled by his methods and the (newly) available 
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material technology. Indeed, technology in its use is a large part of the “structure of feeling” in 
itself: it suggests the “justified experiences” and “practical consciousness” of the depicted near-
utopia, by which the dimensions of ‘technology as a means’ are determined (Williams 132).
It is by textual means that we engage in restitution and amendment of the traumas of the past 
as well as the historical narratives pointing out patterns in it. Underlying the narrative of GD is the 
same idea,  although it  is  not brought  to the fore:  the means of  Galileo’s  discoveries show the 
confines of the epistemologies preceding it, whereas Ganymede’s and Hera’s future society attempts 
to ‘fix’ history in their natural mode, as it were, which is the science fiction for the reader of the 
novel. The fact that the science fictional, if not science fantastic, device of time travel is accepted as 
rational points to its effect on the perceptions of time and history in Hera’s society. It is criticised 
only later, and even then merely as being ineffective or done in the wrong way. For example, in the 
very end, the narrator states bluntly that  what Ganymede wanted, that is,  the realization of the 
hegemony of science as early in the past as possible, “isn’t really possible” (GD 576), but this is in 
the end of the narrative and spoken by Cartophilus, the fieldworker of the endeavour itself. In any 
case the focus is here on the socially felt trauma which urges its material alleviation, as much as it 
would prompt a psychological or holistic restitutive action, which, moreover, are not themselves 
outside corporeality.
As  Peter Rabinowitz describes, the use of science (including counterfactualities) in fiction 
often also naturalises an otherwise unnatural narrative, “de-foregrounding […] strange things that 
would otherwise be foregrounded” (205). Roberts’s point about the phenomenological effects of 
technology seems to complement this notion,  showing how this de-emphasis of the fantastic is 
merged in GD with its other naturalising functions. Including scientific elements in the text enables 
it to focus on its speculative material, but the technological means adds an ideological content in 
itself: the actual and the metaphorical lens through which the world is observed and described is a 
prescription as well, and it concerns, rather crucially, the material means of affecting that world. In 
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GD, history is written and rewritten, but what that rewriting is to us, reformatting, reliving and 
redirecting are to Ganymede’s and Hera’s society.
However, the foregrounding that Rabinowitz argues for is not entirely straightforward. The 
scientific  explanation  emphasises  as  well  as  it  de-emphasises,  which  collapses  some  of  the 
metaphorical unity of Robinson’s novel. Galileo’s visitations to the future occur during his dreams 
and seizures of catalepsy, or this is how his contemporaries find him during the narrative segments 
in the future. After the first instance, Galileo wakes up and finds himself on the ground, the tugs of 
his artisan assistant Mazzoleni rousing him from the dream:
‘You were in some kind of a trance. I came out before, but I couldn’t wake you.’
‘I – I had a dream, I think.’
‘It seemed more like a trance. One of your syncopes.’
[…] ‘I had a dream, I think. I can’t quite remember! It was blue. I was talking with 
blue people. It was important somehow.’ (GD 59–60)
The added figurative heft of Ganymede’s telescope, or the “teletransporta” (GD 129), adds to the 
metaphorical allure of this narrative device, if only until the scientific explanation deconstructs it in 
favour of generic conventions and the appeal of the technological and affective explanation of the 
time travel as a device on its own. Galileo as the first great man of modern science (whether as a 
discoverer or methodologist) is able to dream, see, and escape the epistemic restrictions into the 
empirical existence and factual proof of a modern cosmology.
Although the pseudoscience strips the metaphorical level out of the narrative of his dreams, 
the framing of the latter remains to support the metaphor, if only as imagery. Moreover, it is the 
technological frame – looking at a telescope – that initiates the dreams and enables the change in 
perception. Although these impulses – metaphor and literal materialism – are conflicting, if not 
contradictory, to a certain extent they respect the historicism of the novel’s settings: the metaphor 
dominates in Galileo’s time, whereas the future Jovian society not only explains the fantasy away, 
but clings to the substitutive materiality in everything they do with respect to the past. If the effect 
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is literarily muddled and defused, it is by the unfortunate necessity of a common science fictional 
generic  convention.  Nonetheless,  I  would  argue  that  the  figurative  dream  and  its  material 
deconstruction are brought together precisely in reference to the novel’s historical dimension. By 
structuring the narrative shifts between chapters, the symbol of the dream connects to changes in 
historical perspective.
This ambiguous portrayal of the ‘transhistorical’ movement in the novel can be seen as a 
device for mediating between the figurative historicist impulses of the novel and its generic, science 
fictional realism. By offsetting the impossible, literal time travel, the ‘dreaming’ relates to the actual 
present  that  which  seems  a  necessity  in  the  fiction,  namely  the  temporal  perspective  (both 
analeptical-historical  and  proleptical).  As  I  have  shown  in  this  section,  history  is  explicitly 
discussed in GD as an affective narrative in the present. At the same time that Galileo’s life is from 
the beginning of GD an artificially contrived and manipulated narrative, history is represented as a 
culturally  relevant  relation  to  the  past. This  relation  is  moreover  imagined  as  effective  and 
productive, by way of the technological logic of affecting the past. Consequently, my argument is 
that the conflicting, even stumbling twofold imagery (technology versus dream) encompasses and 
deals with the novel’s generic properties to represent history as first of all compelling its audience to 
action, and secondly productive in the sense that history should not be thought of as static – it is 
rather open to rediscovery, even if it does not (and should not) be reformed at will.
4.2.2 Historical Metanarratives: Amelioration and Progress
In this chapter I will show that the historical metanarratives presented in the story are tools in the 
(re)writing of history, but that the novel’s narrative resists simplified historical representations that 
they offer.  I  proceed by introducing the main arguments  of  Ganymede’s and Hera’s narratives, 
specifically in points where they conflict. I also refer to postmodern cultural theory to show how 
Galileo becomes a signifier in the two discourses. My argument is that by narrating the friction 
between Ganymede’s understanding of history and Galileo’s experience in particular, the narrative 
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attempts to define a modern perspective on history in relation to the actual past and prior narratives 
of it.
A historical metanarrative, as discussed in 2.1., is a teleological form of history that not only 
describes large transformations and collective events in human societies – it also explains them and 
positions the narrative subject within the narrative (Day 183). Ganymede, as the main proponent 
and  protagonist  of  the  endeavour  to  change  Galileo’s  life’s  course,  offers  the  clearest  explicit 
metanarrative of history in  GD. The metanarrative itself is the basis on which he implements his 
plan to change past realities into a more favourable (later) course. In specific, he aspires to influence 
and visit certain scientific figures of the past in order to  drive human society more quickly away 
from what he considers primal and superstitious modes of thinking. His aim is to make Galileo a 
martyr for science, in order to commence ”[t]he secularization of the world,” allowing science to 
begin ”to dominate, religion to recede” (GD 144). The metanarrative presents the actors in history 
(to be influenced) and prescribes what results from specific types of dialectical relations: although it 
is  historical,  i.e.,  about  the  past,  the  metanarrative  “shape[s]  our  future  as  well”  (Day  228). 
Consequently, the view of history guiding him is a highly teleological narrative. Not only is there a 
goal to the achieved, Ganymede firmly believes that  Galileo’s fate is crucial for the favourable 
progression of later humanity. For Galileo in particular, the teleology provided by the metanarrative 
gives him a place and a direction, an explanatory context (Day 183).  Later, having already been 
condemned for some of his other actions, he tries to convince Galileo to accept his role, in order to 
create a secular science to oppose religion: “The tide turns at your bend in the river. The precise 
initial conditions of the birth of science are simply that important to the human story. […] [Y]our 
condemnation is determinative” (GD 421).
The  metanarrative  in  question  represents  history  as  a  competition  between  science  and 
religion, where the two are opposed among other things as epistemologies: Galileo should “play 
[his] part and become the scientist martyred for telling the truth” (GD 421). However,  Ganymede 
himself refers to “the human story” and “the birth of science” (another narrative), as well as to the 
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parts to be played (GD 421), which all point to the symbolism inherent in the historical re-writing 
he has sought (despite the material and tangible connection to the past, which the fictional world 
presents as possible). As is implicit in Ganymede’s wording, even in this very literal transformation 
of the past, the discursive element of GD’s representation of history can be underlined. If narrative 
is  a  socially  symbolic  act,  as  Jameson  (PU 82)  argues, then  Ganymede’s  description  similarly 
portrays action as a socially symbolic narrative. Moreover, by pleading Galileo to accept his part as 
a martyr Ganymede seems only to be attempting to complete a  narrative of tragic  emplotment 
(White 58).
Although by referring to Galileo as “the first scientist,” Ganymede is referring to his empirical 
methods, but at the same time, and more predominantly for Ganymede’s metanarrative, Galileo is 
the metonym for his confrontation with “archaic structures of fear and control” (GD 55–6). Both the 
other  characters  and  the  novel  as  a  whole  challenge  the  metanarrative,  but  the  characters’ 
refinements never supplant its centrality to the representation of history, especially in relation to 
Galilean ‘myths.’
The only direct action that Ganymede takes to make Galileo and his assertions enter into a 
conflict with the dogma of the Catholic Church takes place at the onset of the narrative: he gives 
Galileo the idea of the telescope and later uses his telescope to transport Galileo to the future with 
the specific aim to create an unconscious preoccupation that would allow him to dedicate himself to 
astronomy.  The  premise  sets  both  the  novel  and  Galileo  in  motion,  as  a  compositional  and 
consequently entirely narratorial contrivance, but its most direct counterfactuals do nothing to push 
him into specific directions. Although Ganymede’s plan is so central to the plot and the thematic 
conflicts of the novel, it is argued by Hera that it is Galileo himself who of his own accord alienates 
himself from the authorities of the church. It is rather the historical persona depicted, coupled with 
the  intermissions  of  thematic  discussion,  that  drives  Galileo  and  the  narrative  onwards.  For 
example, his socialising exhibits an ambition and pride that earn him favour but also the enemies 
that later prove fateful. With the Pope-to-be, “Galileo was his usual self, a happy Pulcinella with a 
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genius for mathematics. […] [H]e was quick and funny, always chuckling in his baritone rumble, 
out to please” (GD 112). After the current Pope supports him, however, “Galileo lost his head” (GD 
120): humility by silence “during a banquet discussion, be it on pride or anything else, became 
laughable. […] [E]ver more full of himself, he began to use his wit like a sword, […] like a club” 
(GD 121), bashing his friendly Jesuit hosts who later become his biggest problem (GD 122). This 
focus on the  effect  of  the historical  figure  himself  can  then be seen  as  an  effort  to  assert  the 
accuracy of the interpretation of his life and its representation, in due accordance with postmodern 
stylistics (Jacobs 29).
The past  as a  content  of  GD,  i.e.,  Galileo’s  life,  retains  a  weight  of  its  own  as it  is  not 
overwhelmed  by  the  themes  commenting  on  it,  such  as  the  metanarratives.  In  this  realisation 
historiographic metafictionality becomes distinct, not as a pattern to be matched, but as a practical 
designation:  “Historiographic  metafiction  appears,  then,  willing  to  draw  upon  any  signifying 
practices it can find operative in a society. It wants to challenge those discourses and yet to use 
them, even to milk them for all they are worth” (Hutcheon 133). Despite the narratives constructed 
by Ganymede and Hera, and their “signifying” nature – their inclination to determine history – 
threaten to deconstruct GD into a mere polemic, it unwinds as a historical novel. The content and its 
internal  commentaries  combine  in  several  ways  to  form a  historically  comprehensive  (yet  not 
exhaustive) image of Galileo as looked through the historically affected forms of (post-)modernity 
(Baker 135).
The  description  presented  by  Hera  comments  and  challenges,  partly  unsatisfactorily,  the 
narrative of Galileo as presented by Ganymede. Its presence widens the focus of the novel towards 
a  historical meta-analysis: the imperative is to draw  attention to the historicism  of places where 
Galileo’s history flows seemingly free from any constraint  by fantastic  agents.  She  focuses on 
Galileo’s thinking and feeling which is […] social and material” (Williams 131), and the “power 
structure” of his time: what she and Aurora term as Galileo’s “structure of feeling,” that which “we 
think of as spontaneous and  natural emotions,” but which “are actually shaped in a culture-made 
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system that changes over time” (GD 226; see 4.2.3). Specifically, Hera’s narrative concerns his 
relationships, both with the women of his life as well as his institutional peers: “You don’t want to 
be one of those supposed scientific geniuses who is also in his home life a jerk and a fool” (GD 
344).
Although Ganymede’s theory of history as the antagonism between science and religion is 
questioned and made more unreliable in its effects as the novel progresses, it is nonetheless based 
on  a  fundamentally  descriptive  historical  notion.  Galileo’s  own  competence  in  antagonising 
authority may not in the final instance be explained by the essence of science, but this particular 
historical  moment  remains  crucially  important.  The  narrative  of  GD therefore  dramatizes  the 
coalescence of these elements in its presentation of the figure of Galileo. Throughout the novel 
Galileo seeks the modern perspective of historical explanations, but ultimately he remains part of 
the distant past, without which he would not truly depict it, in other words the structure of feeling 
particular to his time.
For  instance  Galileo  himself  tries  to  argue  for  the  inaccuracy  of  Ganymede’s  historical 
explanation, but from the perspective of his own time: “Science needed more religion, not less. And 
religion needed more science. […] Science is a form of devotion, a kind of worship. You made a 
fundamental mistake, both in my time and your own” (GD 419). In a sense, this is the synthesis to 
Ganymede’s skewed dialectic, but from the perspective of the past. Hera’s theory is evoked and 
discussed to understand the dominant culture from which Galileo is articulating his thoughts. As 
such it becomes the counterforce to Ganymede, although not its direct antithesis. Hera’s view of 
what are the significant factors and flaws concerning Galileo directly evoke modern ideas on history 
and power. Through these she becomes Galileo’s tutor – a modern(-utopian) voice to guide him into 
realising how the world has changed and will continue to change. By way of their conversations, the 
novel underlines themes concerning the historical constitution of consciousness.
The central point of contention is Galileo’s misunderstanding of his situation in relation to 
authority as well as to other human beings. Having shown Galileo his burning at the stake, as it 
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occurs in “almost all the potentialities” (GD 144), she states that his scientific achievements are 
“certain to get [Galileo] in trouble with […] theocracy” (GD 145), to which Galileo objects, his 
objection revealing also his muddled yet historically determined understanding:
‘I don’t see why!’ This was already such a grievance with Galileo that he almost shouted 
this. He wrenched it into a plea: ‘There is no contradiction between science and scripture! 
And even if there were […], as God made both nature and scripture […] the two cannot 
disagree […], and He can’t be logically inconsistent. And the Earth goes around the Sun, 
with all the rest of the planets. Since that is true, there is nothing blasphemous in it.’ (GD 
145)
 Although Galileo’s craving after logical consistency might be an evidence of his disagreement with 
– if not misunderstanding of – certain kinds of religious belief and dogma, his devout belief in a 
Christian God never diminishes throughout the narrative regardless of his ordeals with the Catholic 
authorities. This is an acute grievance and has indeed “already” been one, as the passage suggests, 
clearly indicating Ganymede’s misunderstanding of history, or historicism, exactly in the sense that 
Hera wishes Galileo to grasp.
The grievance is that the strict antithetical opposition between the paradigm of science and 
organised  religion  in  Galileo’s  time  is  an  anachronistic,  retrospective  construct  (Vint  32),  and 
furthermore,  that  heliocentrism was not  at  the  time “formally  heretical,”  but  “only contrary  to 
scripture” (Findlen 213). By theorising history in his dichotomy, Ganymede makes the mistake of 
neglecting historical reality. What he misses is specifically framed in Hera’s lessons – historically 
determined consciousness, actual sentiment and thought, where the oppositions do not exist as later 
theorised (Vint 32–3). Vint’s analysis is compatible with the Foucauldian idea of genealogy, in its 
historicist understanding, where Ganymede’s formation of dichotomy is seen in the diversity of 
reality  (Shepherdson  9).  Ganymede’s  totalising  history  turns  lived  reality  into  a  simplifying 
metanarrative.  Vint  underlines  how “Galileo’s  structure  of  feeling  sees  continuity  rather  than 
rupture between science and religion, and the value of this vantage point is one of the novel’s main 
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themes” (36). “More specifically,” she writes, “Galileo’s Dream is a novel about utopian—in all its 
Jamesonian complexity and contingency—science” (Vint 32). The paradigm shift that occurs when 
Aristotelian physics is overturned invites Ganymede – even modernity – to find an absolute shift in 
the moment, which is the tempting error of retrospective formalism, namely the ordering of a past 
present, with all the inherent complexity of any given present, as clear structure.
Whereas Vint considers GD largely as a discussion and an expression of the aforementioned 
dialectic,  I  concentrate  on  the  way  its  representation  of  historical  phenomena  underlines  a 
hermeneutics that is above all historical. GD expresses that an understanding of not only one’s own 
life  (Galileo)  but  also  of  the  human  social  world  (Ganymede  looking  at  the  past)  necessarily 
requires a historicising and broadened awareness. Galileo’s tutelage under Hera is significant in 
exactly this way, for it highlights the perspective on the past  from modernity, but also manages to 
aim  at modernity and to an extent historicise the present, if only in absences and in the science 
fictional exaggeration (see  4.1.2).  In the first  instance Hera mainly draws attention to Galileo’s 
naivety in thinking about authority. Contrary to what Galileo thinks, his transgression does not have 
to do with the correspondence between empirical data and its antecedents in natural philosophy and 
religious dogma.  “[T]hat  was never  the issue,”  she responds,  drawing attention to fundamental 
aspects of discourse and power:
One question was, who gets to speak? Who has the authority to make statements about the 
ultimate nature of reality. […] Cosmology was a religious matter, do you see? This was 
what you were saying, under all your details, which as often as not were wrong, or at least 
unsupported – that you had a right to your opinion about reality, and that you had the right 
to say it in public, and argue for it against the views of theocrats. (GD 145)
Content and “details” are of less consequence: although the more Galileo stresses them the deeper 
his troubles grow,  the correlation is not causally linked with them, but, to an extent, with their 
origin. The more he speaks and asserts himself, i.e., taking over the role of the subject – which is an 
essential aspect of empiricism – the more transgressive he becomes. Hera contends to Galileo that 
117
“asserting yourself in that way” is necessary for the “story,” although it – rather than the message – 
is  precisely the issue to which the relevant authority  objects (GD 145–46; emphasis added).  A 
significant  difference  between  the  two  narratives  is  that  Ganymede  represents  Galileo  as  an 
“artifact,” a type to be utilised in a subsequent metanarrative, in the present (Jacobs 79); by contrast, 
Hera’s narrative focuses on the psychological  formation of subjectivity in a social  and cultural 
context, and by so doing fosters an awareness of the historicity even in the present (Jacobs 72).
The  essence  of  this  point  is  that  the  competing  theories,  both  Ganymede’s  and  Hera’s, 
construct historical metanarratives:  they are retrospective structures of the past, viewed from (a 
different)  modernity.  They  differ  in  the  narratives  they  present:  Ganymede’s  explanation  is  a 
teleological  dichotomy,  while  Hera’s  metanarrative  is  a  type  of  “synchronic”  study  of  power, 
“transhistorical” and “immanent” (A. Robinson 16). Hera historicises Galileo’s responses, which 
the  other  plot  lines  broaden  to  a  larger  philosophical  scope,  opposing  Ganymede’s  focus  on 
martyrdom: ”[w]hat is important is not the punishment, but the assertion” (GD 146). In focusing on 
this specific, entirely relevant point  in the past,  GD raises and thematically discusses questions 
about the meanings that we give to the past. 
Thus  Hera  actually  draws  attention  to  fundamental  aspects  of  discourse.  In  view of  the 
subtleties of narrative formation and discursive power, there is a notable difference between the two 
types of histories constructed by the two varying views. Ganymede’s narrative presents Galileo’s 
(counterfactual)  burning as  important  and as  a  success.  The history of  Galileo begins a  larger 
history of humanity, for which crucially important is the fact that he was punished and martyred. 
Ganymede desperately argues that if Galileo submits to burning, “with those few moments [he] 
give[s] science the moral high ground for all time” (GD 421): Galileo’s work, his subjectivity is 
disregarded as insignificant in favour of the negative actions of his opposition. Furthermore, as the 
focus  is  (self-evidently)  on retrospective  audiences  and  on  their  interpretative  and  evaluative 
actions, the importance is drawn further away from Galileo’s agency, and onto the self-fulfilling 
pre-constructed content of a grand narrative (Baker 66).
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Compared to this,  Hera’s explicit reference to the importance of Galileo’s assertion focuses 
precisely on subjectivity, on the importance of distinguishing the role of power and authority – the 
discursive structures that create institutional hierarchies  in the first place. In Ganymede’s history, 
ethics supports science because it is correct (at least in specific questions), giving it the “moral high 
ground”: his framing of history has no room for a morality that is disconnected from epistemology. 
Hera’s  view  tentatively  approaches  and  tries  to  make  Galileo  aware  of  a  principle  of  social 
interaction that wholly transfigures human knowledge, a different change in human understanding, 
namely an entire change of episteme (Vint 35). Galileo’s part in a scientific revolution is therefore 
nonetheless specific and relevant to the understanding of his situation.
The relation of these two interpretational narratives becomes more distinct when approached 
as instances of the poetics of postmodern historical fiction. Their interconnection points out the 
“distortion”  of  history  (Jacobs  173),  the  incompleteness  of  a  single  perspective.  The  criticism 
directed  towards  Ganymede’s  narrative  by  Hera  can  also  be  seen  as  a  postmodern 
“[delegitimisation] of hegemonic structures of social and cultural authority,” and grand narratives, 
paralleling the juxtaposition of Ganymede’s narrative with others as a more effective “critique of 
those authorative [sic] forms by which historical and social narratives are constructed” (Baker 126–
27).  The  two  metanarratives  are  mutually  complementing  also  in  the  sense  that  where  a 
synchronistic theory lacks the capability to explain historical change (A. Robinson 21), as seems to 
be the problem with Hera’s focus on structures of feeling,  this is  precisely is  the attraction of 
Ganymede’s narrative in GD. Moreover, Hera’s challenge of the (rationalist) metanarrative placates 
the “uneasy relationship with teleology” that  science fictional representations have, which often 
manifests as a secularized “religious apotheosis” in a future of human transcendence (Sawyer 492).
While the reader’s (post)modern present is effaced from the representation, and despite the 
fact that the utopian future of Hera and the other characters is only vaguely described, moreover 
without any exposition that would reveal its economic foundation, it may be argued that at least one 
commodity may be found in it – Galileo Galilei (GD 275–76).6 The importance of the historical 
6 In one of the few scenes that take place in the utopian society, Galileo happens to enter a room “that was occupied 
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persona to this society, which reaches the point of theoretical antagonism concerning him, points to 
his absorption into debates on identity. The idea is most evident in Ganymede’s plan to change the 
past or rewrite history, which approaches the historical relation of Jameson’s postmodernity, with its 
appetite for “sheer images of itself” (Postmodernism 18): Ganymede’s narrative represents precisely 
the unwillingness to approach the past on its own terms, and attempts instead to rewrite it on the 
basis of the necessities of the present – as a commodity serving the needs of its user. The narrated 
discussions  on  Ganymede’s  metanarrative  then  reveal  how  it  in  particular  parallels  the 
postmodernist sceptical view of history, as found in Robert Coover’s fiction, for example: history, 
as presented by Ganymede, is thus “not the objective and rational product of scientific examination 
of facts but a myth […], produced as a means of dealing with primitive fears and desires” (Jacobs 
175), constructing “roles” and “scripts” to be followed (Jacobs 173).
Ganymede’s narrative does not therefore correspond with Baker’s description of the (truly 
historicist) postmodern historical novel, which concerns “the creation of history, the rediscovery of 
a historical  dimension in the reading process itself” (Baker 126), and which was in section 3.2 
identified  as  a  way  out  of  Jameson’s  impasse.  It  is  rather  in  the  juxtaposition  of  the  two 
metanarratives where this postmodern historicism is affirmed. Hera’s opposition to Ganymede’s 
premises and her alternative metanarrative appear to combine with Ganymede’s theory to form a 
synthetical approach that corresponds to Baker’s idea of self-reflective historical discovery, as well 
as Lyotard’s call for “a multiplicity of micronarratives” (Jorgensen 281). Exhibiting not only “future 
history,” but a heterogeneous collection of historical interpretations, this aspect of GD “reminds us 
that history itself is a narrative, pieced together out of competing discourses” (Sawyer 493).
Vint reads the novel as a discussion on the paradigms of science, and her thorough analysis of 
it as a criticism of the ‘Ganymedian’ narratives of antagonistic science and religion underlines the 
relevance  of  interpreting  Galileo’s  situation  correctly  (Vint  50).  By  presenting  the  conflicting 
models of representing the history that affects Galileo’s life, I have attempted to show that the overt 
discussions on historical interpretation in  GD are part of a postmodern rediscovery of a stratified 
entirely by Galileos,” with strange, i.e., inauthentic fabrics and cuts, “ridiculous clothing really” (GD 275–76).
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history. From the beginning of GD, historical frames, definitions, and explanations appear, overlap, 
and  confront/supplement  each  other,  which  makes  GD a  historical  fiction  that  represents  this 
creation/rediscovery of history as a narrative process.
4.2.3 Representation of the Past in GD: Reinterpreting the Legacy of Galileo
This section introduces GD’s central (re)interpretation of Galileo’s historical legacy, which typically 
concerns his trial. This is, as I argue, the clearest particular historiographically inclined content of 
GD.  I  will  begin by discussing the perspectival  shift  concerning Galileo’s trial  and judgement, 
which  is  the  basis  of  Hera’s  historical  metanarrative,  concerning  structures  of  feeling  and 
historically determined consciousnesses. In addition to Galileo’s singular works and actions, the 
novel thus focuses on individual complicity in social structures and their effects. I will show that the 
overt narration of this focal shift, by way of Hera’s didacticism, is accompanied by a narrative focus 
on Galileo’s domestic life. I aim to show that GD underlines the historical significance of this larger 
frame in which to view Galileo Galilei. By dramatizing the wider historical context, GD reinterprets 
history by complementing the metanarrative symbolism of Galileo’s life with the historical reality 
that  simplification  ignores.  The  identification  of  a  specific  context  complements  the 
historiographical assertion with an ethical one, because it discovers ethical dimensions subsumed by 
the metanarrative of science, for example.
Galileo persistently misjudges what he needs to know and understand in order to avoid a 
judgement by the Catholic Inquisition.  As the narrator states, “[w]inning all those banquet debates 
had apparently caused Galileo to think that argument was how things were settled in the world,” 
encouraging him to believe that he could persuade anyone to accept Copernican cosmology “in 
person”  (GD 153).  A subsequent  disastrous  trip  to  Rome  in  defence  of  his  views  ends  in 
Inquisitional censure and a formal order to cease the promotion of Copernicanism: “all Rome was 
buzzing with the news. The outline of the story was all too clear: Galileo had come to Rome to 
campaign for the Copernican view, and in spite of this – indeed, because of this – his view had been 
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declared formally false and contrary to Scripture” (GD 171; emphasis added). The way he describes 
and interprets the causes of his censure is apparent in his vehement letter from his return trip, in a 
way that  is  significant  for  GD in  particular:  “Of all  the  hatreds,  none  is  greater  than that  of  
ignorance for knowledge” (GD 174; emphasis original).
Although his contempt for the result can be seen as justifiable and very much agreeable (and 
it is by all appearances a case of authoritative dogma censuring truth – religion snuffing science), 
his own ignorance of his role (according to Hera) in his cul-de-sac is underlined by its obviousness 
to everyone else. For instance, it is noted that listeners of his theological condescension would all be 
“thinking, Bellarmino [an Inquisitional cardinal]. Don’t be where Bellarmino is looking had been a 
saying in the city for over twenty years” (GD 158; emphasis original). It  is also recognised by 
Galileo’s  Medicean  host  in  Rome,  Guicciardini,  who  states  in  a  report  on  Galileo’s  visit  that 
“Galileo  has  relied  more  on  his  own  counsel  than  on  that  of  his  friends”  who,  including the 
cardinals,
tried to persuade him to be quiet and not to go on irritating the issue. If he wanted to hold  
this Copernican opinion, he was told, let him hold it quietly and not spend so much effort  
in  trying  to  make  others  share  it.  Everyone  feared  that  his  coming  here  might  be 
prejudicial and dangerous and that, instead of justifying himself […] he could end up with 
an affront. […] [His] irritability makes Rome very dangerous for him. […] [H]e does not  
see what it could lead to. (GD 170; emphasis original)
It is this blindness and complicity that  Hera too identifies as Galileo’s problems, and what she 
brings  to  the  fore  in  terms  of  historical  understanding.  As  a  fictional,  futuristic,  and  as  such 
anachronistic (postmodern) voice, Hera tries to underline Galileo’s “own context of enunciation,” 
the  understanding  of  which  “foreground[s]  the  way  we  talk  and  write  within  certain  social, 
historical,  and  institutional  (and  thus  political  and  economic)  frameworks,”  i.e.,  discourse 
(Hutcheon 184).
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After  his  first  censure,  Hera  chastises  Galileo’s  failure  to  understand  that  if  anything, 
persistent arguing over mathematics and dogma only occludes the real reasons for his judgement: 
”You don’t  understand. Your fate doesn’t  have to do with [your work].  It  has to do with your 
situation at home, and with you yourself, your nature or your characteristic responses. The kind of 
conclusions you draw, and how you react in a crisis. You are your own problem” (GD 244; emphasis 
original). Hera turns Galileo’s own words of the fear of the ignorant toward his woefully evident 
lack  of  self-knowledge,  as  a  further  emphasis  of  her  view that  the  explanatory  power  of  the 
Ganymedean narrative of science versus religion is limited. The appearances and implications of the 
discoveries  made  with  the  telescope  are  evident  to  “the  Pope’s  official  astronomers,”  but  the 
conclusion  that  Galileo  draws  from  this  is  not  that  his  work  has  now  been  successfully 
disseminated, but that he may argue his case with the authority of the church they represent, going 
beyond mathematics into theology. The work in itself is evidently not the biggest problem.
The famous trial itself is presented very distinctly as a contest and the exhibition of power, 
where  Galileo’s  actual  assertions  and  their  consistence  with  theological  permissions  and 
prohibitions  remain  secondary.  Partly,  the  real  matter  in  GD is  Pope  Urban’s  contest  with  the 
Spanish  Borgias,  in  which  the  context  is  of  a  Catholic  Christianity  divided  in  its  national 
foundations and threatened by the Reformation.  “Gustavus Adolphus” was “chopping Catholics 
down” on his European trek, and consequently, “[t]he Spanish were furious,” blaming Urban for 
over-tolerance of “all kinds of […] heterodoxies” (GD 442). It seems that in GD, it is this context 
that determines the reaction of the Church more than simplistic theology, which is only an index of 
the autonomy and power of the church in the face of the threat of Protestantism.
Thus “the ban on Galileo’s  Dialogo was just  one part  of this  turn in the Italian political 
landscape” and Galileo’s order to report in Rome “was already a judgement as Galileo well knew. It 
was not like an ordinary trial; the Holy Office of the Congregation made its judgements in advance, 
in secret, and then called you in to tell you what your punishment would be” (GD 445). The crime 
is in a sense a function of institutional power – in that it is more directly an effect of the self-
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perpetuation  of  power,  a  survival  mechanism,  rather  than  a  real  debate  about  the  world 
(Shepherdson 25): “he [Galileo] felt he was a victim not of the Church but of corruption within the 
Church […]. With the guilty a prince can show forbearance, but against one wrongfully sentenced 
when he is innocent, it is expedient to uphold rigour” (GD 562; emphasis original). Framed in this 
cynicism,  the  judgement  is  no  less  reprehensible,  but  more  complex,  and  underlines  Hera’s 
statement that arguments do not change opinions (or history).
The shift of perspective that Hera explicates is significant. While keeping in mind that the 
point of Hera’s and Galileo’s interaction is the changing of history, Hera’s focus suggests that the 
narrative of history that only treats the individual action by Galileo or any other famous scientist as 
exceptional is inherently flawed. To a certain extent, the adjustment of the focus of the narrative 
onto previously insignificant things evokes Foucault’s notion of favouring ”discontinuities, gaps 
and ruptures  [...]  in  opposition to  continuity”  and seeking ”irregularities that  define discourse” 
(Hutcheon  97)  instead  of  transcendental  or  essentializing,  ahistorical  sameness  (Foucault  117). 
Thus, rather than seeing the opposition between religion and the allegedly now-existent science as 
being formed in this historical moment, and precisely in opposition to each other, this moment is to 
be examined in terms of the social relations within which a construct such as the preceding one can 
be possible. As Vint argues, “Galileo comes to condemn Ganymede’s project, not merely because of 
his own fate in the fire, but further because of his premodern structure of feeling that does not see 
science and religion as binary opposites” (36):  the opposition in question being the creation of 
modernity. Again, the understanding that is sought in the fictional move corresponds to the actual 
historical and historicist interpretation. The observations on the individual’s relation to his historical 
situation enable a critical investigation of a more universal pattern of human activity (Jacobs 76–7).
As Galileo approaches his situation as the already interpreted conflict between science and 
religion, he fails to have any influence on the matter; instead, through its narration GD suggests that 
his condemnation happened “in spite of” his defence of the realm of empirical science, and “indeed, 
because  of  this”  (GD 171).  The  accentuation  of  his  mathematical  and  scientific  knowledge  is 
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represented as a repetition of the same supposed exceptionality that is vital to Ganymede’s theory of 
having science as a newly risen adversary of religion. This is why Hera asserts that it makes him 
less  inclined  to  understand how it  is  not  the  exceptionality  of  his  ideas  and their  quantitative 
accumulation of knowledge but precisely the consonance of his way of promoting them that marks 
his distinctive situation (GD 244). In Foucault’s terms, the affront he is judged to commit, and the 
division  between  the  discourses  of  science  and  religion  that  it  marks,  is  not investigated  as 
exceptional,  but  a  predicate  of  the  logic  of  his  time  (Pieters  35).  Science  and  religion  are 
reconcilable even for Galileo, but Hera’s point is that his problems are created by the assertive 
structure of feeling of his time, which he too exemplifies. The social relations damning him are the 
same  that  he  is  implicated  in  in  his  personal  life.  It  is  Hera  who  makes  this  genealogical 
interpretation part of the novel’s narration. The fault-lines of the former are found firstly in her 
allusive reference to the questionability of a science that needs martyrs (see 4.1.1), for example, and 
secondly in her insistence on the significance of the mundane over the exceptional, i.e., Galileo’s 
work.
The first of these is highly consequential, for although it is a superficially simple take on the 
form of history, it points to a more fundamental critique. It reveals the concealed “original relation” 
of the assumedly antagonistic religion and science, and shows that the “supposedly natural status” 
of especially the latter, science, “is a fiction” (Shepherdson 17). Ganymede’s notion and the popular 
myth of science’s oppression by the church are in this formulation at the very least very much 
relational. Science is markedly not a narrative of martyrs and individuals, but an epistemological 
framework. It is preposterous, if not also a platitude, to argue that a scientific revolution needs a 
martyr in order to oppose a religious point of view, if one at the same time argues that the two are 
distinct opposites, for the language of martyrs and teleological narratives betrays their mutual logic. 
On the other hand it  is  preposterous for a structure in power to actively discourage a  different 
epistemological  development  on the basis  of  an ancient idealism,  and even further to  violently 
persecute dissent. Understanding the role of the structures of power (both institutional and domestic 
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patriarchy) that enable persecution against dissidence would seem to be the aim of the presentation 
of these subtleties in GD’s narrative.
Hera also dismisses the dependability of authority and the discourse of social power. Playing 
with  the  power  relations  is  repeatedly  futile:  even  having  Galileo’s  former  supporters  in  the 
positions of popes and cardinals does not help his situation. Hera’s laconic response to Galileo’s 
initial elation at one such occasion shows the predictability of his predicament with power: ”It has 
always been the same pope in charge when you are condemned to be burnt at the stake” (GD 342). 
The enigmatic response suggests that any irregularity or individual peculiarity is lost in the larger 
historical  pattern,  individual  agency  engulfed  by  a  larger  structure.  A  similar  impulse,  this 
perspectival  shift  to  the  agency  of  individuals,  is  identified  in  in  A.  Robinson’s  analysis  of 
Rushdie’s fictional national histories: the “location of agency within the individual rather than in 
larger  social  structures”  in  Rushdie’s  works  for  example  enables  a  consideration  of  “moral 
responsibility, in the form of complicity with the developments they abhor,” as well as a subsequent 
implication that “social change is only possible through a transformation of the self, affecting the 
interactions on a micro scale through which society is (re)produced” (A. Robinson 84).7 Although 
“agency” here suggests precisely the opposite, meaning the possibility of exceptional individual 
deeds,  both  A.  Robinson’s  analysis  and  Hera’s  fictional  theory  actually  underline  specifically 
individual complicity.
If  viewed  from  a  controversial  Foucauldian  perspective,  it  is  not  the  argument,  nor  the 
interconnectivity of agreement, that changes the truth, but the arrangement by which the truth is 
created,  i.e.,  the relations of power.  In this system supra-hierarchical  supplication is secondary: 
“Foucault has argued that ‘the social’ is a field of forces […] – discourses and their anchoring 
institutions—in which we adopt various (constantly shifting) positions of power and resistance” 
7 Although A. Robinson strongly disagrees with Hutcheon’s general interpretation of the same works by Rushdie, for 
example,  I  would argue that their  juxtaposition is not incoherent.  A. Robinson objects to the emphasis laid on 
fragmentation  (by  Hutcheon  and  other  postmodernists)  and  analyses  Rushdie  by  looking  for  coherence,  but 
Hutcheon’s argument in  A Poetics of Postmodernism is that historiographic metafiction does  both: in terms of its 
textual play and historical reference it is “a curious mixture of the complicitous and the critical” (Hutcheon 201). In 
any  case,  A.  Robinson’s  analysis,  specifically  regarding  the  historical  dimensions  of  Rushdie’s  works,  is 
considerably more insightful (cf. Walsh 112).
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(Hutcheon 98). As Hera alludes to Galileo’s social being, his responses, she argues that through 
them, Galileo’s fate is to be “inscribed within the signifying practices of a culture” (Hutcheon 98), 
which disrupts the metanarratives that position him into a (teleological) metanarrative of a universal 
process.
Following this interpretation, Galileo’s judgement by the church is an essential part of the 
operation of that structure of feeling/”régime of truth” (Foucault 118–19): the epistemology of the 
church functions in  difference,  mapping the  relation of  the acceptable  to  the unacceptable,  the 
viable to the unviable. The paradigm shift in science might be there, in Galileo’s work, but Hera’s 
insistence on discourse undermines this difference in favour of the shared sentiment of the time, its 
structure of feeling. The creation of a science which succumbs to the repetition of the same human 
mistakes  is  no  comprehensively  different  paradigm  of  humanity  or  humanism:  the  narrator 
Cartophilus indicates as much, lamenting how even subsequently, “very little scientific progress has 
been made, or progress of any kind, to be frank” (GD 575). Hera essentially argues to politicise the 
narratives that are presented. This follows Hutcheon’s description of the postmodern approach to 
history in fiction (121), in that Hera attempts to expose the omissions of these narratives, as well as 
the  ordinariness  surrounding  the  extraordinary  turns  in  them,  although  she  does  not  entirely 
disregard the narratives themselves.
Reinterpreting the past, or for Galileo, changing history by amending his life, is not done by 
carefully tuning the grand narratives of scientific progress. It is approached by re-appropriating the 
entire focus of history, which in this case means turning to Galileo’s personal, domestic history. The 
vital interpretation to be made of the novel’s representation of Galileo is the repercussion of his 
horribly restricted historical consciousness – his patriarchal egoism. It is this restricted mode of 
thinking that Hera tries to show Galileo, but it seems he learns it foolishly late. Galileo tries to 
ennoble himself by proclaimed he ”worked like a donkey” for his family, but Hera brushes these 
perceptions aside:
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You lived a life of privilege that you took for granted. [...] There were people who 
worked like donkeys, literally, [...] but you weren’t one of them. [...]
[You] almost died of an excess of privilege [...] While your women drudged and 
starved. Had the babies and raised the children and did all the real work, the work that’s 
work. The woman you had children with, she didn’t even know how to read8 [...] What 
kind of a life is that? (GD 344–47)
Limited by his own historical consciousness, Galileo needs Hera’s interpretation of his reality to 
completely perceive and comprehend it. The obliviousness of Galileo to his mistakes is not due to a 
general insufficiency of apprehensiveness, but rather a structurally determined blindness to it.  This, 
it seems, could be viewed as a “creation of history, the rediscovery of a historical dimension in the 
reading process itself” (Baker 126), for the principal metaphor of the novel’s relation to history is 
that of change via close attention, and its dwelling on Galileo’s conflicted relation to the world is a 
means of  resisting  simplistic  metanarrativizing.  The  historical  dimension rediscovered  not  only 
deepens  the  linear  metanarrative  into  a  fuller  representation  of  the  contradictory  nature  of  the 
historical moment (see 4.2.2), as well as its concomitant uncertainty, but it also seeks to unearth the 
singularity  of  Galileo’s relation to  the world,  which Vint  establishes somewhat  differently as a 
utopian science (45).
In a somewhat psychoanalytical fashion, Hera draws out Galileo’s most powerful memories, 
for he “should understand the context” to “know” his own life (GD 248). Hera’s explicit theorising 
thus makes this domestic history part of the narrative of GD. In stark contrast to the content of the 
historical narrative of his astronomy, this has nothing to do with the church authorities, and all to do 
with his relationships with the women of his life, and his internalisation of the culture of his time. In 
a straightforwardly Freudian mode of expression,9 Hera asserts that his whole life has been marred 
by his experience of being “a boy who sees his father constantly abused by his mother” – by his 
“fear of women” (GD 250, 251). Galileo had three children with Marina, a Venetian courtesan, 
8 According to Heilbron, Marina was in fact literate (Heilbron 84).
9 “Why don’t you just steal the eyes out of my head,” Galileo replies to her mother at one point (GD 221), inviting 
Oedipal comparisons and Freudian analysis.
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whom he never married. The fictional Galileo says that he left her because they fought – he and 
Marina, Marina and Galileo’s mother – and having stood in front of and between fighting women 
all his life, his explanation to Hera is that “[t]hey were angry people. Choleric” (GD 286). Hera 
retorts:
‘Nonsense,’ Hera said. ‘You know better than that. They were people just like you. 
Except that their minds were crimped, every day of their lives. Women in a patriarchy, 
what a fate. […] I would have killed you. […]’
‘Well.’ Galileo regarded her uneasily; she towered over him, and her massive upper 
arms were like carved ivory. ‘You said that a time’s structure of feeling has a lot to do with 
how we are. Maybe you would have felt differently.’
‘All humans have an equal amount of pride,’ she said, ‘no matter how much it gets 
crushed or battered. […] It’s part of the integrity of the organism, the urge to life.’ (GD 
286)
In the imprecisely suggestive sense it often connotes, the term structure of feeling is explicitly used 
as an explanation in the passage above. In Raymond Williams’s theory, the structure of feeling 
refers  to  the  subjective  experience,  feeling,  and  action  that  are  representative  of  a  culture  or 
generation and the ways individuals in that culture interact with and within it (Simpson 37, 42; 
Williams 131).  The concept  is  very much related to  ideology (as used by other theorists),  and 
central to Williams’s definition (which changes throughout his writings [cf. Simpson]) is that it is 
never fixed and articulated in the moment that is represented (Simpson 42). It is sought precisely as 
a means to depict the presence of the general and the societal in the individual subject’s vocalised or 
written experience (Simpson 47; Williams 131–32): it is an identification of the ways in which “the 
opposition between the individual and the social is transcended” (Lehtonen 92). In GD, the interest 
Hera shows in Galileo’s structure of feeling, as well as his apprehension of the concept itself, is 
another  sign  of  the  rewriting  of  the  historical  narratives  that  form  the  background  of  any 
understanding of history as a worldly thing that can be changed.
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Importantly, for Williams it is precisely the structure of feeling that conveys the uniqueness of 
the past in its cultural determination (Simpson 38). Its use follows Kim Stanley Robinson’s habit of 
including psychological explanations of thematic content within his works10, and its import for GD 
seems to be to use the denotative concepts to point to the vague, connotative difference between the 
time  of  Galileo  and  that  of  Hera  –  between  past  and  present.  Its  evocation  suggests  and  is 
simultaneously  supported  by  an  ideological  content  that  is  visible  in  this  general  historical 
explanation in which Hera is engaged. For Hera’s lesson is didactic, and as much as it is directed at 
Galileo,  whose historical  specificity the novel does well  to portray,  the explicit  references to a 
structure of feeling suggest more to the actual reader of the novel: they are further signs of the 
novel’s thematisation of historical interpretation, historicism. 
The structure of feeling is also formally important, in that these memories punctuate the main 
narrative with secondary narratives, memories, of past moments, that distort the metanarrative of 
Galileo’s astronomy and its  significance.  As argued in 4.2.2,  the narrative begins in  the frame 
allotted to it by Ganymede’s metanarrative – the counterfactual ‘gift’ of the telescope – but Hera’s 
lessons in a sense break that  form and bring Galileo’s life more comprehensively into the plot. 
Hera’s discussions on Galileo’s structure of feeling, specifically underline the historical significance 
of domesticity, male privilege, and Galileo’s scientific inquisitiveness before his involvement in 
debates concerning the doctrines of the Church.
Hera forces Galileo to acknowledge his complicity, his agency in the drudgery of the women 
of his life. And in Galileo’s memory of him learning of the pregnancy of the courtier he admitted to 
loving, his perspective is telling. “[T]here was no other choice for him. He had to get patronage,” is 
Galileo’s rationalisation:
‘I’ll care for the child, and for you too, of course. […] I’ll set you up in a house near 
mine in Padua. You’ll move there.’ […]
She gave him another sidelong look, sharp as glass under a fingernail.
10 Cf. The Mars trilogy (1993–1996), ‘Science in the Capital’ series (2004–2007), 2312 (2012), for example.
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Then she looked away, roused herself. She was realistic, a smart girl. She knew how 
things went. […] Although one hopes for more than one hopes for, as he well knew. And 
they had been in love. So he felt a little flash of vertigo as he watched her slip away. […]
But that look. In his voluminous Catalogue of Bad Looks, this one was perhaps the 
worst. A whole life ended there. (GD 347–48; emphasis added)
Galileo’s focalisation shows that if she knew, then he very well did likewise. Furthermore, although 
he notes that his decision ended “a whole life,” the tragedy is doubled by the obvious fact that 
Galileo thinks of his possible life and not the position of Marina:  “I  lived with a prostitute,  it 
wrecked everything” (GD 355). Galileo’s appraisal of how he must act, reveals the double standards 
by which he conducts. By imagining them both as participants of mutual involvement in the social 
norms  (where  he  “has  no  choice”,  Marina  is  “realistic”  and  “smart”  and  “knows”  what  is 
necessary), he represses his own agency in their perpetuation.
Even more determining is his condemnation of the socially stigmatised agency of Marina, and 
his blindness to the same pattern in himself. His problem with Marina is her status as a prostitute, 
and Hera finds a figurative, damning similarity between this and Galileo’s merchandising of his 
ideas and principles.  For despite  his reservations with astrology, he writes  horoscopes and had 
agreed to write one for the sickly Medicean Grand Duke, Ferdinando. The fictional Galileo had 
even at the time acknowledged Kepler’s opinion that “astrology is the prostitution of mathematics” 
(355; emphasis original), which, as Hera points out, makes Galileo very much a hypocrite in many 
senses:  Marina  was  dishonourable,  and  as  such  unfitting  for  a  gentleman  seeking  patronage, 
“precisely because she was like you, in that she had sold access to herself to better her position” 
(355). Galileo’s own ignorance of the situation of women in his life as well as these active decisions 
in favour of viewing his opposition as the one acting on their  ignorance and impulses is what 
endangers him, namely by making it impossible for him to realise his own complicity in the logic in 
question, as well as his agency in the social interaction that he is censured for.
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Although Hera never exactly clarifies the cultural confrontation in question, when described 
by using the terms of Raymond Williams’s cultural theory, what Galileo represents to the dominant 
institution is an emergent culture in opposition to the dominant form (123). It is the alterity and 
incommensurability  of  Galileo’s  mathematical  proofs  with  the  mode  of  forming  truths  of  the 
institutional culture that distinguishes him as different, but the important observation is that he is 
still crucially part of the dominant culture, which Galileo affirms elsewhere by emphasizing his 
religious affects. His argumentation is as aggressive as his opposition’s, and his domestic life shows 
his very unexceptional implication in a dominant  patriarchalism, very much a cultural  tradition 
(Williams  117).  Essentially,  Hera’s  lesson  is  that  while  Galileo  identifies  (and  posthumously 
confines) as “archaic” the (“residual”) Aristotelian scientific practice of his institutional opposition, 
but fails to see or is ignorant of the cultural forms that victimise his family as well as well  as 
himself (Williams 122). It is thus by describing Galileo’s problem-solving method that the narrator 
indicates  the  telling  way  in  which  Galileo’s  approach  reflects  its  shortfalls.  What  preoccupies 
Galileo does so completely, as the narration elsewhere indicates: “he threw himself into it. To be 
able to get one’s hands on a problem and strangle it was a very satisfying thing” (GD 535). This 
denotes the aggression and lack of constraint by which he approaches problems. The trouble is, as 
Hera’s theory suggests, that the problem can be people, or going further, the fact that Galileo makes 
people into problems to be solved (in his throttling manner).
Especially  his  two daughters  have  a  crucial  role  in  GD’s  representation  of  the  historical 
Galileo, its (hi)story of Galileo. As Galileo’s separation with Marina makes his daughters unsuited 
for marriage, he solves “both their problems and his” by “strenuous efforts” by getting them into a 
monastery, which his mother reproves: “You’ve condemned those poor sweet things to a lifetime of 
drudgery  and  slavery  and  starvation”  where  servitude  and  Christian  charity  is  recreation  and 
pleasure (GD 219–20). “Sounds great, eh? Sounds like a lot of fun! What a life!” (GD 221).
The  fact  that  his  children  have  been  a  problem  for  him  escapes  him  initially.  The 
preposterousness of his patriarchal behaviour is visible in the wretchedness of the monastery, and 
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the state of Galileo’s younger, unhappy daughter. At a low point, having slashed her wrists and hit 
her forehead on the brick walls, Galileo rushes to visit her to find her bound in her bed, pleading for 
release:  “‘Please,’ she begged the wall.  ‘Let  me go’” (GD 339).  Galileo’s response completely 
misses the larger frame that the narrative forces on this episode: “‘But how can we,’ Galileo asked 
her, ‘when you harm yourself like this? What would you have us do?’” (GD 339); as if there is 
nothing  they  can  do  about  her  incarceration.  The  only  perspective  he  has  is  on  himself,  the 
protagonist of his life and of the concerning history, not on the situation of others, including the 
members of the household of the most brilliant mind of his time. The problem has been confined, 
throttled.
The attention to gender-based inequality in  GD is only partly an example of  “recovering” 
silenced voices from history (Rosen 141) in order to improve the historical understanding. In GD 
these voices (e.g., Marina and Virginia/Maria Celeste) are mostly reported indirectly and in the third 
person and remain secondary to Galileo. However, the critique of Galileo’s historical patriarchalism 
is in many ways a critique of the symbolic content of Galileo, namely of scientific rationalism as a 
part  of  the  most  clearly  one-dimensional  myths  or  metanarratives  of  progress  (in  which 
epistemological progress, for instance, is equated with moral growth). It therefore resembles the 
“task of undermining the master narrative[s]” of repressive historical writing, which Sarah Eden 
Schiff identifies in Octavia Butler’s fiction (Schiff 107). Jeremy M. Rosen even argues the “minor-
character elaboration” of the eponymous genre as well as the supplementation of a fuller variety of 
voices to history in general is “not to be confused with the bestowal of agency on the previously 
oppressed” (158), because this confusion, if it is actually happens, misconstrues the ‘imaginary’ 
representation  by  authors  as  “authentic,  autonomous  speech  of  formerly  oppressed  characters” 
(158).
Correspondingly, the gendered critique of Galileo in  GD  is always an image created by a 
contemporary male author, narrated and focalised by male characters. The manner of the critique 
then more clearly relates to the problem of the “contemporary author’s ability to speak on behalf of” 
133
the  previously  voiceless  minority,  and  the  way  it  “presumes  commensurability  between  the 
experience of the author and the marginal subject she claims to represent” (160). Similarly to what 
Rosen argues about Coetzee’s Foe, GD’s critique therefore calls “attention to literary and historical 
silences without presuming to be able to fill those silences with voices” (169) – whether or not this 
‘first-person silence’ is for the good. Hera’s lambasting of Galileo complements the novel’s general 
focus  on  metanarratives  by  revealing  important  facts  about  one-dimensional  or  teleological 
historical  representation. Specifically,  it  may  be  seen  as  analogous  to  what  Carine  Melkom 
Mardorossian  states  about  Jean  Rhys’s  Wide  Sargasso  Sea.  Whereas  “[t]he  racial  and  social 
divisions foregrounded in [Rhys’s] novel […] show [Antoinette] as constituted within and by the 
processes  of  colonization  and  imperialism”  (Mardorossian  89),  Hera’s  intratextual  critique  of 
Galileo points out his structure of feeling, his patriarchalism.
Immediately before his second, more famous trial, Galileo reaches an agreement between his 
scientific assertions and their dimensions in and as social praxis. Ganymede tries to argue that the 
real otherness of an alien consciousness is fatal in its effects on the human psyche. Galileo defends 
himself and his religiousness, and the crucial detail is that he does so as a facet of his science. 
Ganymede’s  criticism of  religious  faith  and other  anti-realist  ideas  is  that  they  are  “delusions, 
protecting you from the knowledge of death. In your structure of feeling you don’t have to face 
reality,” and reality, in the familiar conception even our modernity recognises, “crushes you” (GD 
429). For Galileo that is only “trying to save appearance that humans are at the centre of things,” 
which is only the cosmology of “the poor friars,” the Jesuits and others who disregard the actuality 
of nature in favour of fallacious orthodoxy (GD 429).
Although the event is a science fictional fabulation, it is deeply rooted in the language and 
structural metaphors denoting otherness, both temporal  and more fundamental. The fantasy is a 
continuation  of,  among  other  things,  the  theme  of  the  historically  determined  consciousness. 
Hereafter Galileo retires back to his present,  which now corresponds to  the historically factual 
narrative we have of his life – but which differs from the narrative Ganymede and Hera have of 
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him. The difference that has been made is not an extraneous change in the pattern of events, but 
Galileo’s modernist understanding about his own life, namely the epiphany in which his scientific 
Copernicanism is unified with an analogous social humanism:
Everything in his life had been based on  a misunderstanding, a base fear, a refusal to see 
the other, similar in its cowardice and malignity to the absurd misreadings that his enemies 
had applied to his theories. Men in his time had been furiously afraid of whatever was 
other; and thought women were other; and thought it adequate justification of their fear to 
invoke the dead past […]. As if it made right. But it wasn’t so. He wept for his wasted life 
and world and time. (GD 438)
GD explicates through Hera’s theory and the narrative focus to which it gives rise that Galileo’s 
history  should  (also)  be  approached  through  contextually  aware  historicism.  Galileo  argues 
vehemently that the ‘natural’ opposition of science and religion, as it were, is a fantasy. This is in 
fact the foundation of Vint’s analysis, which focuses specifically on science, rather than history 
(Vint  32–3,  36,  45).  This  ‘unnaturalizing’ of  the  dichotomy  reveals  the  effect  of  simplistic 
prescription which tries to “save appearances” by effacing the complexity and common bases of the 
social phenomena it presents as solved.
Hera’s solution points to the ways in which Galileo’s judgement shares its reasons with his 
social situation, or at least attempts to reveal the socio-cultural pattern of thought, or structure of 
feeling, that victimises not only Galileo but his family, through his repetition of the same patterns 
that  make him an  object  of  persecution.  This  kind of  interpretation  of  historical  agency is,  as 
referred to above, also seen in A. Robinson’s analysis of Rushdie’s work: “In Rushdie’s national 
story the betrayal of a civic ideal is thus rooted in the intra- and interpersonal conflicts in which 
individuals (re)produce social divisions” (A. Robinson 92). The idea shared by these novels is that 
their subjects, human beings, are inconsistent with the abstract subjects of national and institutional 
histories. Furthermore, in  GD and  Midnight’s Children,  for example, both these dimensions are 
presented through the single figure of the protagonist, which clearly reveals the incongruity.
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By having a character present this metanarrative of history to Galileo, GD dramatizes both the 
interpretation of history,  as well  as an instance of it,  namely the historical  narrative of Galileo 
Galilei. Despite the fact that I have aimed specifically at an analysis of the novel’s portrayal of 
various  predispositions  toward  history,  it  must  be  stated  that  Jacobs’s  criticism  of  the 
“condescending in-text gloss” in Ishmael Reed’s Flight to Canada (1976) is very much relevant in 
GD as well (102). Hera’s didacticism similarly empties some of the value of the narrative content 
by diminishing its complexity.  Although it resembles the critique of power structures in Reed’s 
novel (which Jacobs finds lacking), GD does not reduce Galileo into a straightforward generalized 
type (Jacobs 101). It is above all Galileo’s resistance to the modern ‘present’ of Hera that makes her 
exposition less overbearing: his fate is not pinned down in specific moments (the deictic narrator 
plays a more distinct part in certain moments), and it is not explained simply and solely by Hera’s 
metanarrative,  as  other  explanations,  including  Ganymede’s,  are  apposite  in  different  ways. 
Moreover, despite the modernising emphasis and lessons by Hera and Aurora,  Galileo’s eloquent 
and heartfelt religious convictions point at the very least to the sign of pre-modernity, which is 
never truly subsumed by Hera’s condescension. A more simplified narrative of this past  would 
perhaps eschew the religious affect that is such an important part of this particular past. Indeed, 
postmodern historical fiction avoids “transcendent meanings,” and represents the impossibility of 
simplistic representation itself (Jacobs 111), which interestingly respects the past as distinct from 
postmodern typification.
In this section, 4.2, I have analysed the historical content of GD, its explicit narrativisations 
and explanations of the past. The starting point of the novel and one of its central, cohesive themes 
is the question of changing the past or alternatively changing/rewriting history. In 4.2.1, I argued 
that  by  depicting  the  tragedies  of  history as  a  cultural  imperative  to  act  on  grievances and to 
transform  nightmares  into  a  utopia,  the  novel  seeks  to  promote  a  relation  to  history  that 
reinvestigates  it  more  fruitfully.  By  imaging  the  shifts  in  location  and  historical  time  as  both 
figurative  dream and  science  fictional  realism,  GD depicts  the  utilisation  of  registers  that  are 
136
available to us and shows how technical, pragmatic means compel as much as cultural affects. In 
4.2.2,  I  compared  the  incommensurable,  conflicting  historical  metanarratives  proposed  by 
Ganymede and Hera. By alternating the viewpoints and by remaining vague about the direct effects 
these metanarratives have on Galileo’s fate (through his internalisation of historical knowledge and 
these metanarratives) the novel presents in narrative form the process of historicist interpretation 
and its role in understanding the subjective present. 4.2.3 then presents the clearest reinterpretation 
of  the  story/history/lesson of  Galileo,  the  historiographical  content  of  GD.  The  reinterpretation 
focuses on the facts and social practises of Galileo’s life and times that are often disregarded in 
simplified metanarratives presenting Galileo as a signifier and symbol of rational progress. It also 
incorporates a  criticism of Galileo’s structure of feeling.
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5. Conclusion
This  thesis  has  demonstrated  that GD represents  history  specifically  by  various  juxtapositions 
between varying contexts and explanatory frameworks. Temporal distance is evoked and bridged in 
the  novel  through  counterfactual  means  in  order  to  provoke  an  understanding  of  historical 
uniqueness of any given moment in time, as well  as its  inevitable  relation to other times.  The 
formation of historical knowledge itself is dramatised through Galileo’s ‘dreams’ and his historical 
lessons, but also through the figure of the narrator and the specific type of intertextuality utilised in 
the novel. The combined effect of these narrative analyses of time and history is to promote a more 
comprehensive and intricate understanding of history in the present, i.e., for the reader. The present, 
contemporary modernity, is brought into the narrative through the ‘anachronistic’ narrator and in the 
dramatisation, and the science fictional overstatement, of the exceptionality, if not modernity, of 
Galileo Galilei. By evoking modernity in this implicit way, GD evidences the relevance of history 
specifically in the present and for present attempts to understand the world more effectively.
My analysis began in 4.1.1 with a discussion on the novel’s narrative structure. Specifically, I 
have argued that the form and the pattern of the narrative qualifies the representation of history in 
GD. Not only is Galileo’s life framed in terms of his astronomy and, concomitantly, the reader’s 
previous schema and historical symbolisms concerning his role, Galileo is represented as ‘standing 
in’ for the reading subject of history – including the reader of the novel. 4.1.2 discussed the relation 
of the ‘history’ in the narrative to the reality of the past, and its possibilities of referring to an 
extratextual reality. I have shown how the narrative reverts to modern ideas and conceptions of 
Galileo’s  history,  but  that  it  also refuses  to  oversimplify  this  history  in  a  single,  anachronistic 
explanation.  Using  Jameson’s  terms,  GD maintains  the  past’s  distinctive  ‘difference’ from the 
present. In its shifts between counterfactual possibilities and reversals to familiar history, the novel 
underlines the importance of a contextual, historicist understanding of the present as well as the 
past.  In  4.1.3  I  described  the  way  that  the  narrator’s  deictic  presence  mirrors  the  postmodern 
understanding history  by  showing the  structuration  of  all  historical  narratives.  Nonetheless,  by 
operating within a counterfactually possible present, the narrator asserts a viable commitment to 
ethical action through historical understanding. The analysis of the novel’s intertextuality in 4.1.4 
indicated how GD utilises contemporary, postmodern textual strategies to underline the productive 
suggestiveness of history, rather than to undermine it altogether.
Chapter 4.2 concentrated on the explicit references to history in  GD. In 4.2.1 I have shown 
how history is  represented as  a  relevant  cultural  affect  within the story,  in  the  utopian society 
depicted  in  GD.  History  is  subject  to  reinterpretation  that  is  arguably  beneficial,  and  it  is 
contextually  determined  –  also  in  the  present,  which  GD itself  shows  by  juxtaposing  science 
fictionally  futurist  and  pre-modern  approaches  to  time  and  history.  4.2.2  concentrated  on  the 
conflicting  metanarratives  within  GD.  It  indicated  that  the  novel  exemplifies  a  postmodern 
understanding  of  history,  in  which  conflicting  narratives  form  discursive,  complementary 
representations  of  reality  that  combine  to  criticise  more  simplified,  misleadingly  symbolical 
metanarratives.  I  have nevertheless  argued that  these  aspects  of  the novel  also reveal  how the 
historical content, i.e., Galileo’s life, retains its own importance in the fiction, irrespective of its 
(meta)narrative explanation. Finally, in 4.2.3 I have shown that the novel’s principal reinterpretation 
of Galileo’s history takes the form of a rediscovery of the diversity of Galileo’s historical context. 
This in turn fosters an investigation of present cultural logics and structures of feeling as a means of 
viable understanding of reality, because the endeavour is dramatised as Galileo’s own conscious 
attempt to do so – to understand his own context and complicity in societal power relations.
My approach to the concept of historical representation is based on the contextual background 
of postmodernity and the contemporary understanding of history in general. As discussed in both 
the theoretical sections and the analysis, these present questions regarding the possibility and value 
of fictional references to history. If approached by way of these questions and from this perspective, 
i.e., postmodern theory, the self-reflective element of GD’s representation of history, its discussion 
of the creation of history, becomes more prominent. I have argued in passing that the novel can also 
be interpreted as dramatising, in a fashion typical to historiographic metafiction, the fact that history 
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is  inevitably  a  textual  construct.  It  consequently  evokes  arguments  about  the  epistemological 
equivalence of  factual  and fictional  texts,  particularly by juxtaposing counterfactual,  even anti-
realist,  events  with  authentic  historical  sources,  thereby  undermining  the  referential  value  of 
‘authentic’ history. I have similarly drawn attention to the way Galileo in particular recognises the 
fact that the authorities in power have the power of representation, i.e., determining what kinds of 
fact  and  value  statements  are  conveyed  to  the  generations  that  follow.  As  I  have  mentioned, 
however, this referential play and questioning of objectivity is an aesthetic,  fictional, strategy to 
convey  sentiments,  or  at  the  most  communicate  rhetorical  truths  and  interpretative  strategies 
concerning the act of reading history.
I have therefore argued that  GD is rich in didactically-oriented, ethical content that is very 
difficult to view only as hollow, arguably overbearing postmodern irony. Octavia E. Butler’s fiction 
provides another example of the “two-pronged and paradoxical technique of undermining master 
narratives  while  retaining a  faith  in  the truth-value of  the archive”  (Schiff  110),  which can be 
utilised in an attempt to reinterpret the true, traumatic events of the past in a constructive, ethical 
way.  The  licenses  of  fiction  in  GD make for  a  compelling  narrative  with  necessary  narrative 
dynamics, which enables a sense of deeper understanding: together, counterfactual possibilities and 
feminist critique unbalance the rigid, only seemingly inevitable, foundation of an almost mythical 
historical narrative equating reason with ethic, for example.
The historiographical content of fiction is to be doubted, as signalled by such devices as the 
subjective, unreliable narration of Cartophilus, but the sensibility argued for is another case entirely. 
GD presents a historical  character from a markedly different time with its specifically different 
discursive rules. Conceptualised as a structure of feeling or an episteme, these differences broaden 
an understanding of historically and contextually determined consciousness. Consequently,  GD’s 
depiction  of  Galileo’s  theological  science,  as  it  were,  his  religious  delight  in  discovery,  is  not 
portrayed as  a  direct  model  to  be  adopted.  Rather,  it  is  discovery and the  reverence shown to 
perception and openness that  is  argued to be of value,  not  dogma,  nor  for  that  matter a given 
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orthodox paradigm. His message in  GD concerns the capability to appreciate the world as it  is, 
whether in the abstraction of universal rules of nature or the practical work of gardening. In  GD, 
Galileo sees through things, and one of the most important discoveries he makes, the novel argues, 
is the agency of the women in his life, the repressed human beings, whose discovery necessitates 
seeing through overly  abstracted  classifications and essentialisation,  mystification.  The didactic 
narrator hesitates himself in stating that “[t]he good that he fought for is not so easy to express” 
(GD 575), which nonetheless summarises the novel by undermining simple truths and simplistic 
narratives.
This mode of representation seems typical to K.S. Robinson. With regard to the representation 
of history in his Orange County novels, Carol Franko argues that
his  practice  of  writing  plots  that  turn on their  own recontextualisations  makes readers 
participate in his preoccupation with otherness,  history,  contingency, and hope.  We are 
‘constructed’ to undergo the intersubjective education of his characters. (206)
Although the narrative perspective in GD is the same throughout, its gradual shift to overt diegesis, 
along  with  the  general  characteristics  of  the  competing  (meta)narratives  of  history, 
counterfactuality, and temporal variation, constantly changes the appearance of the fictional world. 
The reader shares in the constructive process of relating these perspectival shifts to each other, and 
by doing so has to assume an ethical position to the historical material.
The genealogical identification of similarities in differing discourses or making differences in 
homogenous patterns, in  GD’s case the identification of Galileo’s troubles in his own actions, is 
interesting, but also biased from its outset. The search for difference almost inevitably finds it, 
because no two historical phenomena are identical. As to the matter of Galileo’s judgement, it is 
preposterous to defend an institution that tortured dissenters. What the writers on the matters of 
Bruno and Galileo in Numbers’s Galileo Goes to Jail and Other Myths about Science and Religion  
(2009) miss in an analysis that borders on pedantry (whether Galileo, or any suspect for that matter, 
was incarcerated in a dungeon or in house arrest is meaningful only to a limited extent) is the 
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general idea of advocating openness to action, to change. The ethical content is not that promoting 
the ‘myth’ (of Galileo,  for instance) is suspect, but that  history should provoke a reaction,  i.e., 
understanding should never be equal to approval (which is true of my ‘act’ as well, in that it should 
not see pedantic understanding directly as approval).
Nonetheless, the value of the critique of the intratextual historical narratives and myths in GD 
that has been discussed throughout this thesis could in the end be found in the idea of Foucauldian 
genealogy. The antagonistic  opposition narrated in  GD that  we posit  in the past  is  not entirely 
historically accurate. The pedantic search for faults in metanarratives and myths, and for Galileo’s 
religious affects for example, responds to a yearning to know better, while the ethical dimension of 
knowledge is perhaps related to the connotations of any knowledge; that ‘knowledge for its own 
sake’ is misleading in the sense that science as much as the scientist is never removed from the 
social context. The science created in society is subject to the powers that be, which means that 
although the reigning discourse does not change physical reality, it  determines the utilisation of 
truth  and  its  ‘direction.’ The  narrative  source,  Cartophilus,  argues  that  much  by  stating  that 
“[s]cience was scared and so did what it was told. It designed the gun and gave the gun to power, 
and power then held the gun to science’s head” (GD 575).
Religion is in this sense no different, as it gives the authorities in GD the weapon with which 
to discipline Galileo. When Cartophilus states that “science is a religion” (GD 576), it is therefore 
surprisingly true, first in the sense that both are discursive phenomena, at least in their utilisation as 
instruments in an abstract power struggle, but also in the sense that without that manipulation they 
are both acts of worship. According to the fictional Galileo, science is precisely this, “a form of 
devotion, a kind of worship” (GD 419). At least this is the narrative truth concerning history that is 
represented in GD, by way of its focus on the perspective of Galileo and his relation to the world 
and its structures of feeling, among other things. In the final instance, history is represented as a 
way of understanding the present, as Cartophilus tries to get across by relating the legacy of Galileo 
as an imperative to act and perceive in a certain way.
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Further research on this topic could benefit from the concepts of time and memory. The novel 
includes interesting representations of (purely fictional) the physics and human effects of time, as 
experienced by and related to Galileo. Relevant to this proposed topic, to a certain extent, is the 
depiction of encountering otherness, both truly and science fictionally alien, as well as in terms of 
repressed groups and a more comprehensive analysis of temporally removed consciousnesses. The 
concept of utopia is part of Vint’s analysis and could be further examined, but this concept has 
already been analysed in great detail with regard to Robinson’s other novels.
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